Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 8

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  ARGUMENTATION THEORY
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
|
vol. 75
|
issue 8
644 – 659
EN
Typically, a distinction is made between argumentation and explanation based on their different illocutionary aims. While the aim of argumentation is to provide support for the acceptability of a particular thesis by means of other statements, the aim of explanation is to provide understanding of a phenomenon, regularity, etc. Although this distinction is well-founded, it obscures certain interesting interactions between explanation and argumentation. This paper identifies a particular type of explanations that presuppose argumentation in their favour. These explanations refer, at least in part, to pieces of knowledge that had not been a part of the pre-existing knowledge base of science. Their epistemic status is therefore problematic and they require separate justification. The success of this justification (a speech act of argumentation) is one of the felicity conditions of (the speech act of) explanation. The paper proposes a general scheme of argumentation in favour of an explanation. It combines subordinate and coordinative argumentation whose aim is to show that the explanation satisfies the (often implicit) criteria of adequacy. The scheme is briefly illustrated on an example of empirical research in International Relations.
EN
The main achievements of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) are associated by argumentation theorists mostly with the developments of mathematical logic. However, in the LWS there was carried on also research which may be particularly inspiring for the study of argumentation: systematic investigation of applying language and methods of logic in order to develop knowledge and skills which constitute the so-called logical culture. The discipline which aimed at developing these skills was called pragmatic logic; this is also the title of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's book of 1965. The aim of this paper is to show that the pragmatic approach to reasoning and argumentation constituted the core concern of the LWS as early as in the first half of the 20th century. This aim is realized by discussing the subject-matter, goals and methods of pragmatic logic. I argue that (1) some crucial assumptions of pragmatic logic harmonize with those accepted in argumentation theory, (2) pragmatic logic is a legitimate tool in the study of argumentation.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 9
705 – 720
EN
The methods of abstraction and idealization are typically examined in connection with their applications in modelling and explanation. This paper investigates how the use of abstract and idealized models in arguments structures the process of argumentation. If a discussant uses an idealized model to justify a thesis, they also adopt an implicit or explicit attitude towards the idealizing assumptions it involves. The precise nature of this attitude determines the argumentation strategies available to the opponent. If the proponent views the assumptions as approximating the actual state of affairs, the opponent can request a de-idealization of the model. On the other hand, if the model is viewed as a non-Galilean idealization, or in a purely instrumental way, the opponent must challenge the relevance of the model with respect to the target system. However, as illustrated by the debate on minimum wage, even empirical evidence need not always provide a clear-cut resolution of the difference in opinion.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
|
vol. 75
|
issue 8
628 – 643
EN
This paper deals with various ways of criticizing arguments. In particular, I focus on John Pollock’s theory of defeasible reasoning and show that his conception of rebutting and undercutting defeaters omits some important ways of attacking arguments. I discuss not only the tenets of Pollock’s theory but I compare it also to some traditional ways of criticizing arguments occurring in philosophical logic, informal logic and argumentation theory. The paper provides some interesting kinds of counter examples to deductive arguments which play a similar role to those of the undercutting and the rebutting defeaters occurring in case of non-deductive arguments. Finally, I point to a dilemma emerging from the analysis of Pollock’s conception: Either we acknowledge that Pollock’s theory is applicable only to a limited scope of defeasible arguments or we admit that we have to broaden the definition of defeasible arguments in such a way that it covers also deductive arguments. However, the latter option can lead to a conclusion that there are no non defeasible arguments.
EN
I characterize informal logic and argumentation theory as disciplines consisting of a great variety of research ideas, approaches, conceptual frameworks, and methods which allow to inquire into the complicated phenomenon of argumentation. Yet, the argumentative discourse constitutes a key subject of inquiry for disciplines which deal with various forms of language and reasoning. Among those disciplines there are: formal logic, semiotics, methodology of science and informatics. The articles included in this volume support the thesis that various approaches in the study of argumentation, despite of differences in methods of inquiry, try to realize a common research goal: elaborating tools, in particular (1) language and (2) methods, for analyzing and evaluating common-sense reasoning performed in an argumentative discourse. After discussing the content of the present volume I make some remarks on popularizing informal logic and argumentation theory in Poland.
EN
In this paper, I undertake to present clearly just what informal logic ('logika nieformalna') is and how it relates to formal logic, and to logic as such. To do that, I start by explaining how the Informal Logic Initiative (ILI) began in North America in the 70s. That will lead to a discussion of what is meant by 'informal logic' and how it stands related to cognates such as formal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation. In Section 3, I discuss what I take to be basic theses about argumentation that have emerged from the informal logic perspective. In Section 4, I discuss some achievements of informal logic, and in Section 5, I discuss several interesting recent developments and in Section 6, I discuss the possible future developments. I conclude with some remarks on the importance of the Informal Logic Initiative in Section 7.
EN
I characterize the deductivist ideal of justification and, following to a great extent Toulmin's work The Uses of Argument, I try to explain why this ideal is erroneous. Then I offer an alternative model of justification capable of making our claims to knowledge about substantial matters sound and reasonable. This model of justification will be based on a conception of justification as the result of good argumentation, and on a model of argumentation which is a pragmatic linguistic reconstruction of Toulmin's model of argument.
EN
Argumentation theory, as a subdiscipline of philosophy, concentrates on the human expression of reasoning. It is an ancient area of research which has been enjoying a renaissance over the past thirty years or so with the development of two distinct theoretical branches: informal logic and pragma-dialectics. Both of these areas have influenced the development of mathematical and computational models of arguments that since the mid 90's has seen an explosion in research interest and output: with the area currently supporting two annual workshop series, a biennial conference series, a slew of journal special issues and, from 2010, its own dedicated journal. The links between the philosophical and formal ends of argumentation research, however, have been relatively sparse and ad hoc. This paper aims to build a bridge between the two areas that supports a more rigorous and extensive exchange of ideas and results to the benefit of both fields.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.