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1

Voilà pourquoi je ne suis pas "ontologue"

100%

Gilbert P.

Forum Philosophicum

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2011

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vol. 16

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issue 1

29-45

EN

The word “ontology” has no meaning outside the context in which it was created. When it was invented, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the word 'metaphysics' already existed. So the creation of “ontology” had to express a distance with respect to tradition. “Metaphysics” had its roots in Aristotle and his search, his impossible search, for a first principle. This project is taken up again by “ontology” but this time by limiting the Aristotelian intention to the area of univocal formality, while Aristotle had situated himself within the order of dialectical investigation. Current phenomenology tries to re-actualize the Aristotelian intention by emphasizing ontological difference and analogy, while analytic philosophy remains firmly within the tradition of modern ontology.

2

Disenchantment, Rationality and the Modernity of Max Weber

88%

Carroll A. J.

Forum Philosophicum

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2011

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vol. 16

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issue 1

117-137

EN

Following Aristotle's distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, Max Weber holds that beliefs about the world and actions within the world must follow procedures consistently and be appropriately formed if they are to count as rational. Here, I argue that Weber's account of theoretical and practical rationality, as disclosed through his conception of the disenchantment of the world, displays a confessional architecture consistently structured by a nineteenth century German Protestant outlook. I develop this thesis through a review of the concepts of rationality and disenchantment in Weber's major works and conclude that this conceptual framework depicts a Protestant account of modernity.

3

Úloha filozofie v živote a diele Jana Husa

88%

Dragašek J.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2020

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vol. 68

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issue 3

427-443

EN

This study deals with the role and place of philosophy in the thought of the Czech reformer Jan Hus. The first part of the article seeks to identify some of the basic philosophical positions that Hus absorbed when studying at the Faculty of Arts of Prague University, and which are discernible, particularly in his academic writings. At the same time, attention is given to the consequences of those philosophical perspectives: these, however, are not reflected in Hus’ work. The second part of the article presents a polemic with an interpretation of the important Czech theologian, Zdeněk Trtík, on the question of the status of Aristotelian philosophy in the thought of Hus, especially in his ecclesiology. The third part of the text treats of the status of philosophy in the work of Hus in several of the different parts of his work. The aim of the article is to show that Hus did not devote any great attention to philosophical problems and that accepted philosophical positions sometimes came into contradiction with his reforming endeavour and his preaching activity.

SK

Predložená štúdia sa zaoberá úlohou a miestom filozofie v myslení českého reformátora Jana Husa. Prvá časť príspevku je zameraná na identifikáciu niektorých základných filozofických pozícií, ktoré Hus absorboval počas štúdia na artistickej fakulte Pražskej univerzity a ktoré sú badateľné najmä v jeho akademických spisoch. Autor poukazuje aj na dôsledky týchto filozofických východísk, ktoré však Hus len málo reflektoval. Druhá časť príspevku predstavuje polemiku s interpretáciou významného českého teológa Zdeňka Trtíka vo veci postavenia aristotelovskej filozofie v myslení Jana Husa, najmä v jeho ekleziológii. Tretia časť textu pojednáva o postavení filozofie v Husovom diele, pričom je pozornosť sústredená najmä na relevantné spisy. Cieľom príspevku je poukázať na to, že filozofickým problémom Hus nevenoval veľkú pozornosť a prijaté filozofické východiská sa niekedy dostávali do kontradikcie s jeho reformnou snahou a kazateľskou činnosťou.

DE

Die vorliegende Studie befasst sich mit der Rolle und Stellung der Philosophie im Denken des tschechischen Reformators Jan Hus. Im ersten Teil des Beitrags werden bestimmte grundlegende philosophische Positionen identifiziert, die Hus während des Studiums an der Artistenfakultät der Prager Universität absorbierte und die insbesondere in seinen akademischen Schriften zu sehen sind. Gleichzeitig wird auf die Folgen dieser philosophischen Ausgangspunkte hingewiesen, die von Hus jedoch nur wenig reflektiert wurden. Der zweite Teil des Beitrags enthält eine Polemik bezüglich der Interpretation des bedeutenden tschechischen Theologen Zdeněk Trtík zur Stellung der aristotelischen Philosophie im Denken von Jan Hus, insbesondere in dessen Ekklesiologie. Im dritten Teil wird dann anhand von Werkpassagen die Stellung der Philosophie im Werk von Jan Hus abgehandelt. Ziel des Beitrags ist es, darauf hinzuweisen, dass Hus philosophischen Problemen nicht allzu große Aufmerksamkeit widmete und dass die von ihm übernommenen philosophischen Ausgangspunkte manchmal in Kontradiktion zu seinen Reformbestrebungen und zu seiner Tätigkeit als Prediger gerieten.

4

Habitus or the Possibility of Science of the Contingent

75%

Gensler M., University of Łódź

Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris

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2015

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vol. 31 (4)

PL

Numer został przygotowany przy wsparciu Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego (1222/P-DUN/2015).

EN

Most of sciences can be traced back to Aristotle. This is because in opposition to Plato he was able to find a way in which one could give a scientific form to reflection concerning contingent facts of every-day life. Knowledge of the contingent was made possible thanks to the Aristotelian concepts of category and state (habitus). It is the latter concept that was especially important for forming knowledge about change. Aristotle and his medieval followers apply it in analyses of various processes, from local motion to changes in temperaments, to formation of virtues.

5

More Aristotelian than Aristotle. Duns Scotus on Cognizing Singulars

75%

Novák L.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2017

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vol. 65

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issue Special Issue 2

79-100

EN

At least from Plato and Aristotle onward the common wisdom of the entire philosophical tradition, hardly ever questioned, was that while universals are grasped by the intellect, individuals are perceived by the senses. Even in the “moderately realistic” Aristotelian-scholastic setting (perhaps best represented by Aquinas) where universals are situated “in rebus”, this axiom naturally generated the idea of two separated realms of objects of cognition – individuals and universals – whose ontological status, mutual relations, etc. would, in turn, be philosophically investigated. In my reading, Scotus does not share this common preconception at all; rather, he takes the position that ultimately there is only one single realm of cognized objects – the individuals or particulars. Thus, although it may be argued that his theory of cognition does not represent any radical departure from the moderate-realistic, Avicenna-inspired paradigm of the 13th century, but rather a specific elaboration of it, a closer look reveals that Scotus takes an entirely new perspective on the problem and reinterprets the old approaches from a new standpoint. And yet, this new perspective can at the same time be understood as being merely a consistent completion of the anti-Parmenidean and anti-Platonic movement in philosophy initiated by Aristotle – namely that of epistemic rehabilitation of the world of ordinary particular things. Scotus’s epistemic thought can thus be described as simultaneously consistently traditional and revolutionary.

6

Between Ramus, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes. Francesco Vimercato’s Commentary to Book Twelve of Aristotle’s Metaphysics

75%

Facca D.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2012

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vol. 3

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issue 1

211-230

EN

What kind of causality does the Aristotelian Prime Mover exert on the heaven? Who “loves” the Prime Mover? Renaissance peripatetic philosopher, Francesco Vimercato, a “royal” teacher of “Greek and Latin philosophy” in Paris during the forties and the fifties of the 16th century tried to resolve these traditional puzzles that resulted from the exegesis of the Metaphysics XII, 6–7. His solution appears to be innovative, if compared to the ancient and the medieval ones. It seems partially to prefigure the last two decades’ interpretations of Aristotelian “theology”.

7

Aristotle on Touch

75%

Bremer J.

Forum Philosophicum

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2011

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vol. 16

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issue 1

73-87

EN

According Aristotle's On the Soul, the first and most important form of sensation which we human beings share with other animals is a sense of touch. Without touch animals cannot exist. The first part of my article presents Aristotle's teaching about the internal connection between the soul and the sensory powers, especially as regards the sense of touch. The second part consists of a collection of the classical considerations about this subject. The third part then deals with the actuality of some Aristotle's thesis about touch with reference to current research in neurophysiology on kinesthesia and haptic perception.

8

Czy Bóg zna zło? Antyczne rozwiązanie problemu na przykładzie filozofii Temistiusza

63%

Komsta M.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2019

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vol. 67

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issue 1

19-33

PL

Filozofia grecka, a w szczególności arystotelizm, ze względu na zawartą w niej koncepcję Boga nie podejmowała tematu Bożej wszechwiedzy, która wydawała się sprzeczna z boską doskonałością, a co za tym idzie — również zagadnienie Boskiej wiedzy na temat zła nie było rozważane. W czasach Temistiusza, którego myśli tutaj przedstawiam, pojawiają się jednak nowe możliwości ukazania tego problemu pod wpływem nowej koncepcji Boga w neoplatonizmie i neoplatonizmie chrześcijańskim. Temistiusz, będąc świadom tych nowych zagadnień i włączając je do swoich rozważań, nie zmienił jednak schematu, w jakim powstaje jego stanowisko (arystotelizm). Zadał więc pytanie o to, czy Bóg zna zło, ale jego odpowiedź ograniczyła się w zasadzie do powtórzenia nauki Arystotelesa: Bóg poznaje samego siebie, tj. najdoskonalszy przedmiot poznania, a nie poznaje tego, co niedoskonałe, w tym braku, jakim jest zło.

EN

Greek philosophy, especially Aristotelianism, because of the concept of God present in this thought, did not raise the issue of divine omniscience and divine knowledge of evil. The divine omnisciene seemed to be contrary to God’s perfect being. In the time of Themistius, whose thought I present in this paper, Neoplatonism and Christian Neoplatonism showed new possibilities of solving this problem. Themistius being aware of these new topics and including them in his own philosophy, still however represents ancient Aristotelianism with all its limitations. He asked about divine knowlegde of evil, but in his answer he repeated only the Aristotelian doctrine: God knows only Himself, because He Himself is the most perfect object of knowledge and cannot know less perfect beings.

9

The “Physica Mosaica” of Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638):

63%

Čížek J.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

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2020

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vol. 42

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issue 1

117-139

EN

Some early modern scholars believed that Scripture provided more certain knowledge than all secular authorities – even Aristotle – or investigating nature as such. In this paper, I analyse one such attempt to establish the most reliable knowledge of nature: the so-called Mosaic physics proposed by the Reformed encyclopaedist Johann Heinrich Alsted. Although in his early works on Physica Mosaica Alsted declares that his primary aim is proving the harmony that exists between various traditions of natural philosophy, namely between the Mosaic and the Peripatetic approaches, and despite the fact that his biblical encyclopaedia of 1625 was intended to be based on a literal reading of the Bible, he never truly abandoned the Aristotelian framework of physics. What is more, in his mature encyclopaedia of 1630, he eventually openly preferred Aristotle to other naturalphilosophical traditions. I argue, therefore, that Alsted’s bold vision of Mosaic physics remained unfulfi lled and should be assessed as an unsuccessful project of early modern natural philosophy.

CS

Někteří raně novověcí učenci byli přesvědčeni, že Písmo poskytuje jistější poznání nežli všechny světské autority – s Aristotelem včele – či zkoumání samotné přírody. Ve své studii se zabývám jednou z takových snah o získání toho nejspolehlivějšího vědění o přírodě: takzvanou mosaickou fyzikou, jak ji koncipoval reformovaný encyklopedista Johann Heinrich Alsted. Ačkoliv ve svých raných dílech, jež se Physica Mosaica týkají, Alsted za svůj nejvyšší cíl prohlašuje dokázání souladu mezi různými podobami přírodní fi losofi e, především mezi mosaickým a peripatetickým přístupem, a navzdory tomu, že jeho biblická encyklopedie z roku 1625 měla být založena na doslovném čtení Bible, Alsted ve skutečnosti nikdy neopustil aristotelská východiska přírodní fi losofi e. Co je ještě pozoruhodnější, Alstedova vrcholná encyklopedie z roku 1630 již přímo upřednostňuje aristotelismus před jinými přírodně-fi losofi ckými přístupy. Tvrdím proto, že Alstedova smělá vize mosaické fyziky zůstala nenaplněna a měla by být hodnocena jako neúspěšný projekt raně novověké přírodní filosofie.

10

O NIEKTÓRYCH UWARUNKOWANIACH WSPÓŁCZESNEJ RECEPCJI ARYSTOTELIZMU W PERSPEKTYWIE WYCHOWANIA MORALNEGO

63%

Rutkowski J.

Forum Pedagogiczne

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2014

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issue 2

15-24

PL

Współczesne interpretacje, podzielonej na fragmenty, nauki Arystotelesa o etyce i polityce nie uwzględniają kontekstu całości myśli Stagiryty. Trudności pojawiające się w nowoczesnej percepcji arystotelizmu są związane z – kontynuowanym również obecnie – fundamentalnym sporem toczonym przez sofistów z filozofami. Istota tego sporu dotyczy istnienia niezależnych od ludzkiej woli, uniwersalnych norm moralnych.

EN

Contemporary interpretations of the fragmented Aristotelian ethical and political theory do not employ the context of the whole Stagirite's thought. The difficulties in the modern perception of Aristotelianism are reflected in the fundamental dispute between the sophists and philosophers, which has not ceased nowadays. In essence, this dispute concerns the existence of universal moral standards, independent of human will.

11

Klasyczne ujęcia problemu prawdy w „post-świecie”

63%

Pawlikowski T.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2018

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vol. 7

313-344

EN

1. For many people, the contemporary culture seems to be something different from modernity, it is something resembling a special period of “post-”. At the same time, different trends are present in current culture. Some reach the genesis of nearly two and a half thousand years back, others have about half a century. Perhaps also breaks some modern belief that in every culture, “newer” means “better”. 2. Representatives of the philosophical and theological trend of “Radical Orthodoxy” noticed in this the approach of postmodernism to the pre-modern tradition. Therefore, we can say that we live and operate in a “post-world”, without leading currents of thought. On the other hand, is the current culture very different from the others when you look at it from the perspective of centuries? 3. For many philosophers, it is still important to reach to the great traditional approaches to the problem of truth. These are above all three concepts related to three great philosophical syntheses created by Plato, Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. This is also evident among the basic contemporary trends critical of the classics and philosophical tradition. 4. M. Heidegger created a certain idea of being reduced to the time determinant. For the supporters of his views, it became the overcoming of Aquinas’s theory. The German thinker also formulated a specific interpretation of Plato's views on truth. He contrasted it with Thomas's concept, especially with the definition of truth as the adequacy of thing to intellect. 5. T. Bartoś – Polish author of the new attempt to read the essence of the concept – believes, in turn, that the statements of the Angelic Doctor can be found close to the characteristics of post-modernity. He points to a certain incoherence and fragmentary nature of the problem, anthropocentrism and pragmatism of the approach, and a rejection of the unity of truth. It seems, however, that there is a lot of exaggeration in this interpretation. De facto, we are dealing here with radical criticism of Thomism as a trend that develops the views of Saint Thomas Aquinas, because none of the known Thomists do not even come close in their deliberations to the view that T. Bartoś formulated. 6. Finally, a group of philosophers using in the method of reflection the achievements of contemporary logic, representatives of analytic philosophy, generally seems to be aimed at getting rid of the term “truth” from his vocabulary. The idea of reaching their assumptions of logical positivism is difficult to discuss with his followers because of the difference in approach to the practice of philosophy itself between the “analysts” and “non-analysts”. The classic concept of philosophy, under which situates itself Platonism, Aristotelianism and Thomism, is different from the concept of linguistic or neo-positivist, which locates to analytic philosophy. 7. The classical approach to truth, especially the definition developed in the final shape in the Middle Ages, indicating the adequacy of things and the intellect as the essence of truth, therefore meets with criticism from various directions. This does not mean that they should go into oblivion, that they have been replaced by newer and better concepts, or simply refuted. The proclamation of the slogans such as “The End of the Era ...”, “The End of Truth ...” sounds propaganda. 8. The classical approach to the problem of truth has lost nothing in its argumentation. In fact, the current forms of criticism do not rely on any discussion, but on the rejection of the principles on which it is based. Heidegger proclaimed his vision of being and truth, supporting it with a hermeneutic analysis of ancient works. He claimed that this vision is contained in the properly read outlooks of ancient Greek thinkers. The current of philosophy practiced with the use of modern logic tools considers reality only in so far as it can be translated into a “language fact”. This is the analysis of language and not reality. The proposal to read the theory of truth contained in the works of Aquinas, submitted by T. Bartoś to be a projection of some interpretative grid on the expression Thomas's interpretation, wherein the radically differs from the recognized positions. 9. It seems that in the whirlwind of ideologies present in philosophy, science and culture in general, it remains to preserve the classical approach to the problem of truth and develop them according to their essential elements. Compilation with principles that are not appropriate to them will not result in the presentation of their authentic content. They are permanent achievements of culture, philosophically justified. Recourse to reality, confrontation with it, makes the classic approaches open in terms of development. None of them provides a closed system also adopted a priori or received by the conversion performed according to a specified number of regulations. The development of the classical approaches to the problem of truth is theoretically interesting for the whole field of philosophy and as such should be supported.

12

The Compatibility of Evolution and Classical Metaphysics

51%

Polis D. F.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2020

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vol. 9

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issue 4

549-585

EN

The compatibility of evolution with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics is defended in response to Fr. Michal Chaberek’s thesis of incompatibility. The motivation and structure of Darwin’s theory are reviewed, including the roles of secondary causality, randomness and necessity. “Randomness” is an analogous term whose evolutionary use, while challenging, is fully compatible with theism. Evolution’s necessity derives from the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, the vehicle of divine providence. Methodological analysis shows that metaphysics lacks the evidentiary basis to judge biological theories. Species are entia rationis whose immutability does not conflict with the evolutionary succession of biological populations. While Darwin’s theory was unknown to Aquinas, he endorses the possibility of new species immanent in the initial state of the universe, nor does his understanding of exemplar ideas offer ground for objection. Finally, five arguments given by Fr. Chaberek are answered.

13

Istnienie pierwszym aktem bytu

51%

Andrzejuk A.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2017

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vol. 6

13-25

EN

From the perspective of existential Thomism, and following Aristotle’s philosophy of being (metaphysics) as the nucleus and keystone of the whole philosophy, seeking there the most important claims of St. Thomas, the article asks the three following questions: 1) What is the novum of Thomistic metaphysics? 2) What was Thomas’ way of thinking that led him to formulate the thesis that existence is the act of being? 3) Would anyone else have discovered the uniqueness of existence if Thomas Aquinas had not done it? The answers to these questions were formulated in reference to Gilson’s views and his concept of the history of philosophy and to the study of the concept of being in the texts of Thomas Aquinas and the historical sources of that concept. 1) Thomas proposed a new understanding of the structure of being, in which existence is the act that makes essence real and constitutes being’s potency, together making a real individual being. Thus, Thomas formulated a new existential theory of being, overcoming the limitations of Aristotle’s theory, and consistently explaining the issue related to esse (a problem that Avicenna and his followers - Parisian theologians of the 13th century could not solve). 2) Thomas Aquinas - with the help of Avicenna’s metaphysics - outdistances Aristotle’s essentialism, perceiving being as composed of existence and essence. Then, examining thoroughly the proposition of the Arab philosopher, he sees there inconsistency of attributing the position of accident to existence. According to Avicenna the element of being considered as the cause of the reality of being became - at the same time, as the accident - an unimportant component of essence. That is why Thomas Aquinas recognized that existence is the act of everything that makes essence, which transcended Avicenna’s theory, and thus he formulated his own existential version of the metaphysics of being. 3) It seems that nobody else but Thomas Aquinas would have put up a thesis that existence is the first act of being. And what would have been if Thomas Aquinas had not done it? It is hard to say as we have no historical data to let us discuss it. Similarly, it is impossible to answer this question even assuming Gilson’s thesis that the detailed claims of a given philosophy are the conclusion of the set of principles adopted at the beginning because Thomas did not have such a set of principles as at the starting point he modified the principles of Aristotle and Avicenna. Would someone else have made the same modifications, thus creating a “Thomistic” set of principles? The history of philosophy analyzes the things that actually happened and left their mark; it has no interest in things that did not take place and leave any trace. This could be an area for historical and philosophical fantasy, if it ever exists, but we try to stay in the field of the history of philosophy.

14

Simone Simoni: Stefan Batory’s ‘vita medica’

51%

Ryczek W., Ryczek W.

Ruch Literacki

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2020

|

issue 4

15

Konisskii and Peripatetic Orthodox

51%

Drozdek A.

Studia Warmińskie

|

2014

|

issue 51

9-25

PL

Jerzy Konisski – prawosławny biskup białoruski, kanonizowany przez Synod białoruskiego Kościoła prawosławnego – był wykładowcą w Akademii Kijowskiej, jego wykłady zachowały się do dziś. Jako filozof był perypatetykiem akceptującym zasadnicze elementy systemu Arystotelesa: istnienie materii i form; cztery rodzaje przyczynowości; odrzucenie atomizmu; dusza jako forma ciała; trzy typy duszy: wegetatywna (nutrytywna), zmysłowa (zwierzęca) i myśląca; odrzucenie aktualnej nieskończoności; odrzucenie próżni w przyrodzie. Konisski wprowadził modyfikacje do tego systemu, sięgając do zasad teologii chrześcijańskiej: świat został stworzony i nie będzie trwał bez końca; Bóg jest zasadniczą przyczyną sprawczą. Teologia Konisskiego miała wymiar tradycyjny – nie podejmował się on wyjaśnienia tematów nie dość wyraźnie zarysowanych w teologii prawosławnej. Konisski mocno podkreślał duchowy aspekt teologii i konieczność manifestowania go przez własne życie duchowe. Teologia prawosławna była dla niego nienaruszalną podstawą i jego rola jako osoby duchownej polegała na przekonaniu ludzi do żywej akceptacji tej teologii.

EN

Georgii Konisskii, an Orthodox bishop of Belarus canonized by the Synod of the Belorussian Orthodox church, was at first a lecturer in the Kiev Academy and his philosophy lectures have been preserved. As a philosopher, he was a peripatetic through and through accepting all the major tenets of the Aristotelian system: he accepted matter and form; the four types of causes; rejection of atomism; the idea of the soul being a form; three types of the soul: vegetative (nutritive), sensory (animal), and rational; rejection of actual infinity; rejection of the void in nature. He made modifications only when forced by the Christian theology: the world was created and will have its end; God is the major efficient cause, not only the final cause. His theology remained traditional with no attempts to modify anything or to explain if there were areas not clearly delineated by Orthodoxy. Konisskii stressed very strongly the spiritual aspect of theology and the necessity of manifesting this theology through one’s spiritual life. Orthodox theology was for him an inviolable foundation that should be accepted without questioning and his role as a pastor was to imbue people with reverence of this theology and urge them to make it the way of their temporary spiritual journey through this world heading to the eternity in the afterlife.

DE

Georg Konisski, ein orthodoxer Erzbischof von Weißrussland, von der Synode der weißrussischen orthodoxen Kirche heiliggesprochen, war zuerst Dozent an der Kiew-Mohyla-Akademie und seine philosophischen Vorträge sind erhalten geblieben. Als Philosoph war er durch und durch Peripatetiker und akzeptierte alle wichtigen Grundsätze des aristotelischen System: die Existenz von Materie und Form; die vier Arten von Ursachen; die Ablehnung des Atomismus; Seele als Form des Körpers, die drei Arten von Seele: vegetative (nutritive), sensitive (tierische), und intellektuelle; Ablehnung der aktuellen Unendlichkeit, Ablehnung der Leere in der Natur. Er machte Änderungen nur dann, wenn er von der christlichen Theologie gezwungen war: die Welt wurde geschaffen und wird sein Ende haben; Gott ist die erste wirkende Ursache, nicht nur die Zweckursache. Seine Theologie blieb traditionell ohne Versuche etwas zu ändern oder die Bereiche zu erklären, die nicht ganz klar durch die Orthodoxie beschrieben worden sind. Konisskii betonte sehr stark den spirituellen Aspekt der Theologie und die Notwendigkeit, diese Theologie durch ein spirituelles Leben zu manifestieren. Orthodoxe Theologie war für ihn ein unantastbares Fundament, die ohne zu fragen angenommen werden sollte und Konisskis Rolle als Pastor war es, Menschen Ehrfurcht vor dieser Theologie zu verleihen, so dass diese Theologie sie in ihrer zeitlichen spirituelle Reise durch diese Welt in die Ewigkeit führen könnte.

16

Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics

45%

Polis D. F.

Studia Gilsoniana

|

2021

|

vol. 10

|

issue 4

847-891

EN

I respond to Michał Chaberek’s and Robert A. Delfino’s criticisms of my argument that evolution is compatible with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. Biological species, as secondary substances, are beings of reason founded in the natures of their instances. They are traceable to God’s creative intent, but not to universal exemplars. Aquinas teaches that concepts are derived from sensible accidents. Thus, evolution’s directed variation of such accidents will eventually require new species concepts. This accords with projective realism, which allows diverse, well-founded concepts based on the multiple perspectives and conceptual spaces of knowing subjects. Charges that this is nominalism, not moderate realism, are rebutted; however, it is relativism because knowledge is a subject-object relation. Other metaphysical issues are considered. Chaberek’s thesis that species cannot evolve naturally fails because he: (1) reifies the species concept, (2) misrepresents the motivation, structure and conclusions of evolution, (3) confuses Aristotle’s four causes and (4) limits God’s creative omnipotence. Finally, Chaberek is out of step with contemporary theology.

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Voilà pourquoi je ne suis pas "ontologue"

Disenchantment, Rationality and the Modernity of Max Weber

Úloha filozofie v živote a diele Jana Husa

Habitus or the Possibility of Science of the Contingent

More Aristotelian than Aristotle. Duns Scotus on Cognizing Singulars

Between Ramus, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes. Francesco Vimercato’s Commentary to Book Twelve of Aristotle’s Metaphysics

Aristotle on Touch

Czy Bóg zna zło? Antyczne rozwiązanie problemu na przykładzie filozofii Temistiusza

The “Physica Mosaica” of Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638):

O NIEKTÓRYCH UWARUNKOWANIACH WSPÓŁCZESNEJ RECEPCJI ARYSTOTELIZMU W PERSPEKTYWIE WYCHOWANIA MORALNEGO

Klasyczne ujęcia problemu prawdy w „post-świecie”

The Compatibility of Evolution and Classical Metaphysics

Istnienie pierwszym aktem bytu

Simone Simoni: Stefan Batory’s ‘vita medica’

Konisskii and Peripatetic Orthodox

Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics