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EN
Written probably between 1021-1024 the treatise on soul, known as Liber de Anima or Liber Sextus de Naturalibus, is one of the most popular works of Avicenna in the Middle Ages. It constitutes an original synthesis of the science of the soul, maintained in the peripatetic and neo- Platonic spirit. In book V Avicenna opposes pre-existence and the transmigration of souls. He provides numerous arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul. In this way he breaks away from the typically Greek understanding of the problem of soul. The basis of argumentation for the immortality of the soul is its unity with the body treated as accident. The treatise on soul was received with kindness and interest by scholastics, particularly by Albert the Great. It includes ideas characteristic for Avicenna ideas, for example the story about the Flying Man resembling Cartesian cogito.
EN
The article deals with Aquinas’ onto-theological concept of metaphysics. In particular, it focuses on the question of the subject of metaphysics. The author shows how Aquinas systematizes various expressions about the subject of the first philosophy that appear in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Attention is also paid to some ancient commentators who stood for the theological concept of metaphysics. Avicenna’s concept of metaphysics is thematized in order to clarify to what extent Aquinas, in his determination of the subject of metaphysics, followed this Arabic thinker. A clarification of the relationship between metaphysics and “sacred doctrine” enables to understand why it is Avicenna’s onto-theological concept of metaphysics, which Thomas took over. The author argues that paradoxically Aquinas did not accept the Neoplatonic theological concept of metaphysics and tilted towards Avicenna to allow space for his own “sacred doctrine,” constructed according to Neoplatonic theology.
CS
Autor v této stati analyzuje onto-teologické pojetí metafyziky u Tomáše Akvinského. V souladu s tím se zaměřuje zejména na problém předmětu metafyziky. Nejprve ukazuje, jakým způsobem Tomáš systematizuje různá vyjádření o předmětu první filosofie a rozmanitá označení pro tuto disciplínu, která se objevují v Aristotelově Metafyzice. Poté věnuje pozornost některým antickým komentátorům, kteří se klonili k teologickému pojetí metafyziky. Dále tematizuje Avicennovo pojetí metafyziky, aby objasnil, do jaké míry Tomáš ve svém určení předmětu metafyziky následuje tohoto arabského myslitele. Objasnění poměru metafyziky a „posvátné vědy“ umožňuje porozumět důvodům, jež Tomáše vedly právě k převzetí Avicennova onto-teologického pojetí. Autor zastává tezi, že Tomáš paradoxně nepřijal novoplatónské teologické pojetí metafyziky a přiklonil se k Avicennovi proto, aby si uvolnil místo pro vlastní „posvátnou vědu“, která je ovšem vytvořená podle modelu novoplatónské teologie.
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The  Internal Sense(s) in Early Jesuit Scholasticism

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EN
Against the background of the medieval theory of internal senses of Avicenna and Aquinas the author presents a survey of the theories of internal senses as advocated by the early Jesuits, namely by Francisco de Toledo (1534–1596), Manuel de Góis (1543–1597), one of the so-called Conimbricenses, and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Although all these Jesuits consider Aquinas’s tenet of the four really distinct interior senses to be the probable view, each of them takes a more or less reductionist stance against it. In Suárez this eliminativist approach even results in the theory of the single interior sense called phantasy. In conclusion, this Jesuit reductionism is compared to the Zeitgeist of the classical early modern philosophy exemplified by the names of Descartes and Locke.
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The article analyzes the role of matter (materia prima) in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, from both the systematic and historicalphilosophical aspect. It shows that Arab tradition (Avicenna and Averroes) and its interpreters from the first half of the 13ᵗʰ century played an important and very complex role in his reception of philosophical tools derived from Aristotle. The article also presents the process by which Aquinas was able to unite hylomorphism with the metaphysical theory of real distinction esse/essentia, which paved the way for a non-dualistic conception of man.
RU
В данной статье рассматривается медицина арабского мира в период ее расцвета от пророка Мухаммеда до начала XIII века и появление европейских исследовательских центров. В золотой век ислама медицина этого периода быстро развивалась. В то время было создано множество терапий и препаратов, применяемых в несколько измененном виде и по сей день. Без них не было бы многих открытий в области болезней, эпидемий, хирургии, анатомии, диетологии, офтальмологии или терапии. В статье ставится задача показать поперечное разделение медицины в исламском мире с VII по XIII век, обозначив наиболее важные достижения в этой области.
EN
This article concerns the medicine of the Arab world during its heyday from the Prophet Muhammad to the beginning of the 13th century and the emergence of European research centers. During the golden age of Islam, the medicine of this period developed rapidly. At that time, many therapies and drugs were created, used in a slightly changed form to this day. Without them, there would not be many discoveries in diseases, epidemics, surgeries, anatomy, dietetics, ophthalmology, or therapies. The article aims to show a cross-sectional division of medicine in the Islamic world from the 7th to the 13th century, outlining the most important achievements in this field.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2022
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vol. 70
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issue 3
325-346
EN
In the paper, I discuss the interpretation of the Thomistic theory of universals put forward in Paweł Rojek’s book Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne [Tropes and Universals: Ontological Investigations] in the context of the issue of hidden nominalism. My aims are threefold. (i) I suggest a more precise definition of a universal that enables a defence of basic claims by Rojek concerning hidden nominalism; (ii) I show that the interpretation of Aquinas put forward by Rojek does in fact collapse into hidden nominalism; (iii) I offer another interpretation of the Thomistic theory of universals based on the theory of triplex status naturae that seems free from the trap of hidden nominalism.
PL
W artykule dyskutuję z interpretacją tomistycznej teorii uniwersaliów w książce Pawła Rojka Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne w kontekście problematyki „ukrytego nominalizmu”. Stawiam sobie w nim trzy cele. (i) Proponuję uściślenie definicji powszechnika, pozwalające bronić zasadniczych tez Pawła Rojka dotyczących ukrytego nominalizmu; (ii) pokazuję, że zaproponowana przez Pawła Rojka interpretacja Akwinaty sama popada w ukryty nominalizm; (iii) proponuję, w oparciu o teorię triplex status naturae Awicenny, inne odczytanie tomistycznej teorii uniwersaliów, które wydaje mi się unikać pułapki ukrytego nominalizmu.
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ONTOLOGY: UNREAL REALITY

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EN
The article examines the difference between ontology and metaphysics. It shows that as soon as the composition of being from essence and existence is treated as purely mental or in a “reified” way (where essence and existence are independent elements), then essence as essence becomes a thing, and then simply becomes a being, or what is called reality. Both versions in which the real difference disappears or in which the road leads to “reification,” influence the treatment of essence as independent, where essence as thing fills the field of reality. However, if essence was only possibility, then (1) the reality also would be merely possible, (2) the realistic field of philosophical terminology would get curtailed, and (3) there would be no terms to maintain the difference between reality and possibility, between metaphysics and ontology.
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Istnienie pierwszym aktem bytu

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EN
From the perspective of existential Thomism, and following Aristotle’s philosophy of being (metaphysics) as the nucleus and keystone of the whole philosophy, seeking there the most important claims of St. Thomas, the article asks the three following questions: 1) What is the novum of Thomistic metaphysics? 2) What was Thomas’ way of thinking that led him to formulate the thesis that existence is the act of being? 3) Would anyone else have discovered the uniqueness of existence if Thomas Aquinas had not done it? The answers to these questions were formulated in reference to Gilson’s views and his concept of the history of philosophy and to the study of the concept of being in the texts of Thomas Aquinas and the historical sources of that concept. 1) Thomas proposed a new understanding of the structure of being, in which existence is the act that makes essence real and constitutes being’s potency, together making a real individual being. Thus, Thomas formulated a new existential theory of being, overcoming the limitations of Aristotle’s theory, and consistently explaining the issue related to esse (a problem that Avicenna and his followers - Parisian theologians of the 13th century could not solve). 2) Thomas Aquinas - with the help of Avicenna’s metaphysics - outdistances Aristotle’s essentialism, perceiving being as composed of existence and essence. Then, examining thoroughly the proposition of the Arab philosopher, he sees there inconsistency of attributing the position of accident to existence. According to Avicenna the element of being considered as the cause of the reality of being became - at the same time, as the accident - an unimportant component of essence. That is why Thomas Aquinas recognized that existence is the act of everything that makes essence, which transcended Avicenna’s theory, and thus he formulated his own existential version of the metaphysics of being. 3) It seems that nobody else but Thomas Aquinas would have put up a thesis that existence is the first act of being. And what would have been if Thomas Aquinas had not done it? It is hard to say as we have no historical data to let us discuss it. Similarly, it is impossible to answer this question even assuming Gilson’s thesis that the detailed claims of a given philosophy are the conclusion of the set of principles adopted at the beginning because Thomas did not have such a set of principles as at the starting point he modified the principles of Aristotle and Avicenna. Would someone else have made the same modifications, thus creating a “Thomistic” set of principles? The history of philosophy analyzes the things that actually happened and left their mark; it has no interest in things that did not take place and leave any trace. This could be an area for historical and philosophical fantasy, if it ever exists, but we try to stay in the field of the history of philosophy.
EN
The aim of the paper is to deal with the problem of emotion in the context of medieval discussion on mind-body problem. The paper focuses particularly on joy and pleasure (delectatio, gaudium) as an example of intersection of mental and corporeal emotional phenomena in Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas. Both Aquinas’s treatise of the passions of the soul in the Summa Theologiae and parallel works and Avicenna’s philosophical and medical works reflect the problem of the way in which the unity of the person, soul and body, is experienced and displayed in emotion. Firstly, it has to be said that although an ‘emotion’ (passio) can be considered as an unified state of mind, neither Thomas nor Avicenna considered ‘emotion’ in this way. Rather, they recognized ‘emotion’ as a set of components, of bodily involvement, intentionality, objectivity, behavioral suggestions, even a sense of ecstasy, etc. Both Avicenna and Aquinas consider joy as a conglomerate of corporeal and mental elements. Avicenna argues, that emotions of the soul, such as joy, pain, fear and anger, are also called the emotions of the spirit, since they are accompanied by cardiac and spiritual changes, as he says in De medicinis cordialibu. Analogically, Aquinas distinguishes in STH Prima Secundae formal and material aspect of emotion: the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate (STH, I-II, q. 44, a. 1, co.:) So, a central issue of my paper is the question how they could think the various mental and physiological features of emotion of joy together. Although they both refer to Aristotle’s psychology, their answers seem to differ significantly. The difference is about the specific role of estimation in the plane of sensual and intellectual cognition. For Thomas estimation is definitely sensual cognitive power; however Avicenna argues that estimation takes part in the intellectual evaluation of the objects intended. Also, there is a different account of intellectual emotion. Whereas Thomas says that emotion is a result of cognition and inasmuch there are sensual and intellectual cognition, there are accordingly sensual and intellectual emotions (passions and affection), Avicenna introduces the power of estimation which is affective evaluation for both sensual and intellectual cognition. So, one could say that Thomas elaborates two theories of emotion (theory of affection is not compatible with the theory of passions), whereas Avicenna develops an unitary theory of emotion.
EN
While expressing his innovative theory of existence (esse) as an act of being in many his texts Thomas Aqunas recalls different historical sources to support his thesis: Aristotle’s views, Arabic philosophers’ depictions, mainly of Avicenna, Boethius’ distinction entia quo od entia quod and some theses of Liber de causis. In earlier subject literature, mainly Gilson’s influence (in Poland it was under Krąpiec’s influence) adopted a view about religious inspirations of Thomas’ thesis and that the only philosophical way to his thesis is an analysis of Avicenna’s depictions which are contained mainly in work De ente et essentia. Every other Thomas’recalls should be treated as some earlier ploy for a protection against possible reservations. The first statement which arises during the analysis of historical sources which Thomas refer to expressing his theory of existence (esse) as an act of being is ascertaining that reasoning is a crucial argument to accept esse as an act of being. It should be emphasized that in his theory of esse Thomas Aquinas does not refer to argument of Revelation. The result is that Thomas expressed this thesis only in a philosophical area within the analysis of structure of real being. The attitudes which are recalled sometimes are used by Thomas Aquinas as a background or context by which he states his view. Recalled statements sometimes are a reference to the authority. It seems that the erudition recalled by Thomas in a matter which is interesting for us appears in a different aspects. That is why it should be make a fuss of that the issue of existence (esse) did not appear with Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics or Avicenna’s metaphysics. It seems that it was on the contrary: the issue of existence (esse) was worrying Plato and earlier philosophers, Aristotle, and Neoplatonists, Boethius and Arabic philosophers. So Thomas’ thesis about existence (esse) as an act of being is a result of the analysis of the issue which is existed in the history of philosophy
EN
The main purpose of this review of opinions on the therapeutic properties of stibnite is to demonstrate that the 16th and 17th-century experiments of alchemists with stibnite and its compounds, although they did not “rejuvenate an old man” (Paracelsus), nor did they “eliminate all poisons from the human body” (Basilius Valentinus), were nevertheless appreciated by official medicine not only in the abovementioned period but still in the 20th century.
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