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1

AN INFERENTIALIST ACCOUNT OF FICTIONAL NAMES

100%
Lee B. D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2022
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vol. 29
|
issue 3
290 – 326
EN
The goal of this paper is to present and defend an inferentialist account of the meaning of fictional names on the basis of Sellars-Brandom’s inferentialist semantics and a Brandomian anaphoric theory of reference. On this inferentialist account, the meaning of a fictional name is constituted by the relevant language norms which provide the correctness conditions for its use. In addition, the Brandomian anaphoric theory of reference allows us to understand reference in terms of anaphoric word-word relations, rather than substantial word-world relations. In this paper I argue that this inferentialist account has many important merits over its rival theories. One important merit is that it explains why we can use fictional names to make true statements, even if they lack bearers. As a consequence, this theory allows us to use fictional names without committing ourselves to an implausible ontology of fictional entities. Another important merit is that it provides a uniform semantic account of fictional names across different types of statements in which fictional names are involved.
2

FULL-FLEDGED DEFENCE OF PRINCIPLE-BASED ETHICS AGAINST MORAL PARTICULARISM

88%
Jalilian M. S.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
|
issue 8
608 – 625
EN
In this paper, I try to offer a full-fledged defence of principle-based ethics against moral particularism. My discussions not only refute particularists’ allegations against moral generalism but also provide a positive rationale for a principle-based approach in ethics. By borrowing insights from Brandom’s and Peregrin’s normative pragmatism, I describe the fundamental roles of moral principles. In my view, moral principles constitute morality, and they can function as default reasons in our moral deliberations. Moreover, I argue that my principle-based conception of ethics has advantages over particularism since it explains the phenomenological experience and covers basic intuitions in the moral domain that particularists have difficulty explaining.
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