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1

CAN BUNDLE THEORY EXPLAIN INDIVIDUATION?

100%
Schmidt M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2005
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vol. 12
|
issue 1
62-71
EN
Bundle theory reduces particulars to bundles of properties. Bundle theorists have been working to explain individuation within an ontology of repeatable properties, but the outcomes are not satisfactory. Even the trope approach toward properties is not capable of establishing individuation. This article argues that bundle theorists are wrong in searching for individuators within the bundles of properties. Rather, individuation should be established within ontologically more fundamental level of events. Events, with their spatial and temporal character, enable us to individuate the bundles of properties involved and this is one of the reasons for the superiority of bundle theory to other competitive theories of substance.
2

PAMÄŤ, REKOGNÍCIA A OSOBNÁ IDENTITA V KLASICKEJ INDICKEJ FILOZOFII

75%
Rozemberg A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
|
issue 3
224 – 234
EN
The problems of the self (ātman) and personal identity over time were thoroughly analysed in the classical Indian philosophy. The Buddhist philosophers rejected the Brahmanical commitment to a permanent unitary self which persists through changes of body and mind, and held that the self is a mere conceptual or thought construction (prajñāpti): there is no reality in the self; when we look more closely at what we call ‘I’, we will find only a stream of perceptions. Contrarily, the orthodox (āstika) philosophers argue that many common phenomena like memory or recognitive perception (pratyabhijñā) could not take place, if the rememberer and knower were different. One must endure through time as the same identical subject to be able to remember, have desire, commitments, responsibility etc. In favour of the classical Brahmanical position the author argues that if a person is nothing more than a bundle of different fleeting psycho-physical states, none of them can be plausibly explained. The paper brings out also some connections between the Indian and the Western debates over the personal identity problem.
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