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1

Aksjomat multiplikatywny Russela

100%

Lewandowska K.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2012

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issue 50

152-166

PL

We present the history of two parallel (and equivalent) discoveries: the axiom of choice and the multiplicative axiom. Firstly, we consider the origins of the formulation of the multiplicative axiom. Next, we concentrate on Russell’s attitude towards the role of this axiom, which is closely related to his philosophy of mathematics. We also highlight some diﬀerences between Russell’s and Zermelo’s propositions.

2

Pragnienie wpływu. Listy Stefana Themersona i Bertranda Russella

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Sroka H.

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2020

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vol. 74

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issue 1-2 (328-329)

343-349

EN

The article examines letters written by Stefan Themerson and exchanged with his years-long friend Bertrand Russell. By bringing the reader closer to political and social questions discussed by the correspondents the author of the article takes note of the character of “the desire for influence”, which may be mentioned in the case of this particular relation. The category applied by H. Sroka as a reversal of the Harold Bloom conception simultaneously introduces a new comprehension of intellectual and aesthetic independence thematized by the writer. An analysis of source material is preceded also by information about the range of the archive within which particular letters and other artefacts about Russell – collected by the avant-garde artist / author (i.a. press cuttings, invitations to parties/receptions, photographs, etc.) – function.

3

Mental Imagery in Bertrand Russell's Nobel Lecture What Desires Are Politically Important?

89%

Biskub I.

Language. Culture. Politics. International Journal

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2021

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vol. 1

85-97

EN

The article presents the analysis of the mental images of human desires and their verbalization techniques involved in Bertrand Russell's Nobel lecture delivered in 1950. Human desires are non-material mental constructs that are not clearly dened in the dictionaries, their verbalization being complicated by the issues related to rationality, psychology of thinking, objectivity, and the variability of individual behavioral reactions. The results of the research suggest that the verbalization of desires is essentially complicated by social and cultural stereotypes. It has been noted that storytelling can be applied as one of the most eective techniques to create the required mental imagery of desires in the recipient's mind. B. Russell's unique manner of dening such politically important desires as acquisitiveness, vanity, glory, love of power, excitement is carefully analyzed. The use of gurative language as well as conceptual and stylistic metaphors that facilitate the process of shaping mental images of desires have also been the focus of my attention. Special consideration has been given to the analysis of the verbalization means of the politically important desires.

4

Zjawisko a rzeczywistość – wpływ poglądów Bertranda Russella na koncepcję wielości rzeczywistości Leona Chwistka

89%

Femiak T.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2022

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vol. 58

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issue 1

47-72

EN

This article discusses the main publications of Bertrand Russell from 1905-1921 that inspired Leon Chwistek’s theory of the multiplicity of realities. It delineates the historical background of Chwistek’s account, emphasizing that the issues raised by Russell were just one of the many elements that influenced his theory of the multiplicity of realities, and compares the views of both philosophers.

PL

W artykule omówione zostały główne publikacje Bertranda Russella z lat 1905-1921 jako stanowiące inspirację dla powstania teorii wielości rzeczywistości Leona Chwistka. W ten sposób ukazano tło historyczne, tj. wpływ podnoszonych przez Russella zagadnień na postawę badawczą Chwistka (jedna z wielu składowych sytuacji problemowej, w której teoria wielości rzeczywistości była tworzona). Artykuł zawiera także zestawienie poglądów obu filozofów oraz ocenę podobieństw i różnic między nimi.

5

Historia plagiatów Wincentego Rzymowskiego odkrytych na łamach tygodnika ,,Prosto z Mostu”

89%

Kofin K.

Z Badań nad Książką i Księgozbiorami Historycznymi

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2019

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vol. Tom specjalny: Dla Niepodległej / Special Issue: For an Independent Poland

461-481

EN

The article presents stories of plagiarisms committed by Wincenty Rzymowski, a leading Polish journalist of the interwar period, the editor-in-chief of ”Kurier Poranny” and a member of the Polish Academy of Literature. Plagiarism was discovered by the editors of the right-wing weekly ”Prosto z Mostu”, edited and published by Stanisław Piasecki. Rzymowski in his journalism used excerpts from the work of the British thinker Bertrand Russell In Praise of Idleness and excerpts from the article of the French journalist Jean Prèvost, discussing the position of England against the Italian-Abyssinian conflict. The article focuses on the scope of plagiarism, the reactions of the Polish daily press and cultural weeklies, national, catholic, liberal-left and satirical, as well as the effects of the ruling of the Polish Academy of Literature, which pronounced on the accusation in consequence of which Rzymowski gave up from membership in Academy.

6

Mysticism and Early Analytic Philosophy

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Dobrzeniecki M.

Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne

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2021

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vol. 34

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issue 1

109-126

EN

Early analytic philosophy is known for its logical rigor that seems to leave no place for non-rational sources of knowledge such as mystical experiences. The following paper shows on the example of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein that despite of this early analytic philosophy was interested in mysticism and it also shows the roots of this interest. For Russell an application of logical methods to solving philosophical puzzled was an expression of a more fundamental striving – to know the world as it is, sub specie aeternitatis – which is mystical in nature. In turn early Wittgenstein’s philosophy sets the limits of meaningful propositions and provides the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown and what manifests itself in the world. The latter belongs to the realm of the mystical.

7

Bertranda Russella koncepcja monizmu neutralnego

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Jarocki J.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2016

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vol. 33

69-88

EN

The metaphysical view of Bertrand Russell, called neutral monism, is not widely known today, although its impact on the contemporary debate over mind-body problem is clearly visible. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: what was Russell’s neutral monism? Firstly, I present the views of Russell’s predecessors – Ernst Mach and William James. Then, I discuss Russell’s own thought which can be divided into three phases. The initial phase is the rejection of neutral monism (mainly because of Russell’s commitments to epistemology). The second phase – I call it the first neutral monism – appears in The Analysis of Mind, where he proposes a deflationary theory of the object and the subject. The last, third phase – called the second neutral monism, initiated in 1927 in The Analysis of Matter and An Outline of Philosophy – introduces the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Finally, I suggest that the agnostic metaphysics of Russell is too reductive for a dualist and too mysterious for a materialist. However, it might be also true that Russell’s view is more epistemological than metaphysical, and the frames of (misleading) Cartesian dictionary of mind/matter may be too narrow for neutral monism to be pertinently interpreted.

8

From Democritus to Bertrand Russell and Back

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Motte A.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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2019

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vol. 10

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issue 1

153-170

EN

Although Bertrand Russell is probably most famous for his “logical atomism,” it is his ethical thought that this article will attempt to contrast with the ethics of the founder of the ancient atomism: Democritus of Abdera. Russell has himself suggested certain affinity here. More concerned with practice than theory, both philosophers advocate a certain teleological and eudemonistic morality; furthermore, they both adopt the same approaches to various related topics. Yet, what had only been outlined by Democritus was extensively developed by Russell. Hence, it is worth examining whether there is any deeper common ground between the two: can Russell’s clarity throw some light on Democritus’ fragments?

9

The Place of Naïve Realism in Russell’s Changing Accounts of Perception

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Stubenberg L.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2024

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vol. 72

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issue 1

15-41

PL

W artykule przedstawiam miejsce, jakie naiwny realizm zajmuje w zmiennym stanowisku Russella co do percepcji. Argumentuję za poniższymi tezami. (1) Twierdzę, że we wczesnym okresie (lata 1898–1910) naiwny realizm, początkowo entuzjastycznie przyjęty przez Russella, może nie być realizmem odnośnie do percepcji, ale tezą z zakresu metafizyki lub semantyki. (2) Problemy filozofii (1912): Russell porzuca naiwny realizm (jeżeli w ogóle kiedykolwiek go głosił) i przedstawia wersję realizmu reprezentacyjnego odwołującą się do danych zmysłowych. (3) On Matter (1912): dostrzec tu można najskuteczniejszą próbę obrony przez Russella stanowiska bardzo bliskiego standardowej wersji realizmu naiwnego. Przedmioty percepcji – „zdroworozsądkowe przedmioty materialne, takie jak gąsienice i Cadillaki” – przeszły rzecz jasna poważną rekonstrukcję, finalny pogląd uchwytuje jednak ducha naiwnego realizmu. (4) Okres od 1914 do 1927 roku: choć stanowisko Russella w kwestii percepcji przeszło w tych latach znaczące zmiany – teorię danych zmysłowych zastąpił monizm neutralny – staram się pokazać, że w jego poglądach występuje pewna stałość, mianowicie przywiązanie do odróżnienia materii w fizyce i w rozumieniu potocznym. Jak sugeruję, percepcyjną relację do tej ostatniej (w kształcie zaproponowanym przez Russella) można z korzyścią potraktować jako zawężoną wersję naiwnego realizmu. (5) Okres po roku 1927: w ujęciu Russella przedmioty zdrowego rozsądku stają się percepcyjnie niedostępne. Tym, co postrzegamy, są percepty usytuowane w naszych prywatnych przestrzeniach. Jedyne przedmioty materialne, których owe percepty są częścią, to nasze mózgi, wszystkie inne zaś znajdują się poza zasięgiem naszej percepcji, a dostęp do nich zapewnia wyłącznie wnioskowanie. Jest to zarazem kres czegokolwiek, co mogłoby przypominać tradycyjny naiwny realizm w Russella ujęciu percepcji.

EN

In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy (1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a sense-datum version of representative realism. (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception-the “everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”-have, of course, undergone severe reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from 1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during this period-the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism-I try to show that the distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. (5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception.

10

Reprezentační schopnost soudu: Wittgensteinova odpověď a Russellovu mnohorelační teorii souzení

71%

Daňková Z.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2021

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vol. 69

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issue 3

489-508

EN

The goal of the article is to offer a new interpretation of Wittgenstein’s famous commentaries on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, according to which judging is a multiple relationship of a judging subject to particular judged elements. In 1913, Wittgenstein repeatedly tried to convince Russell that the possibility of judging nonsense was not ruled out in his theory, and this accusation was most often seen as a reference to the inability of Russell’s multiple relation theory to ensure the unity of the judgment. In the present article, however, I will try to show that Wittgenstein’s words can be grasped in another way, namely that the central theme becomes the (in)ability of the multiple relation theory to explain the basic feature of the judgment, i.e. its representational ability.

CS

Cílem předkládaného článku je nabídnout novou interpretaci Wittgensteinových slavných komentářů k Russellově mnohorelační teorii souzení, podle níž je souzení vícečetný vztah soudícího subjektu k jednotlivým souzeným elementům. Wittgenstein se v roce 1913 opakovaně pokoušel přesvědčit Russella o tom, že v rámci jeho teorie není vyloučena možnost souzení nesmyslu, přičemž je tato výtka nejčastěji považována za poukaz na neschopnost Russellovy mnohorelační teorie zajistit jednotu soudu. V předkládaném článku se však pokusím ukázat, že Wittgensteinova slova lze uchopit i jiným způsobem, totiž tak, že se centrálním tématem stává (ne)schopnost mnohorelační teorie podat vysvětlení základního rysu soudu, tj. jeho reprezentační schopnosti.

11

Počátky vědecké filosofie v USA : nový realismus

63%

Zámečník H. L., Vrabeľ O.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2019

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vol. 67

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issue 2

183-206

EN

This article aims to present the philosophical conception of the New Realism movement which formed at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States in reaction to the thinking of the idealist consensus, whose foremost representative was Josiah Royce. It also aims to reconstruct the basic procedure of argumentation of the programme of reform of philosophy proposed by the New Realism, and to subject to critical scrutiny the epistemological conception of direct realism. The New Realists were significantly influenced in their opinions by the work of Bertrand Russell, something which explains certain visible parallels with the programme of the Vienna Circle and with thinking that anticipates the philosophy of science. Last but not least, we aim to argue in favour of the view that New Realism is not a comprehensive philosophical conception, but rather the sum of the approaches found in the different New Realist thinkers. Despite this, however, some views of the New Realists are shown to be a still relevant and inspiring source for further philosophical investigation.

DE

Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, das philosophische Konzept der Bewegung des Neuen Realismus vorzustellen, die sich Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts in den USA als Reaktion auf die Gedanken des idealistischen Konsens mit seinem führenden Vertreter Josiah Royce formte. In diesem Beitrag soll auch die grundlegende Argumentationsweise der vom Neuen Realismus angeregten Philosophiereform rekonstruiert werden. Des Weiteren wird das epistemologische Konzept des direkten Realismus einer kritischen Analyse unterzogen. Die neuen Realisten gehen in ihren Ansichten insbesondere vom Werk Bertrand Russells aus, wodurch wir gewisse Parallelen zum Programm des Wiener Kreises sehen, bzw. zu den Gedanken, die die Wissenschaftsphilosophie antizipieren. Nicht zuletzt ist es unser Ziel, jene Interpretation argumentativ zu unterstützen, der gemäß der Neue Realismus kein abgeschlossenes Philosophiekonzept darstellt, sondern die Summe der Ansätze einzelner neorealistischer Denker. Dennoch erweisen sich einige Ansichten der Neorealisten als nach wie vor aktuelle und inspirative Quelle der weiteren philosophischen Untersuchung.

12

Bertrand RUSSELL, Badania dotyczące znaczenia i prawdy

63%

Russell B., Sochacki Ł.

ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

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2012

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vol. 2

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issue 2

425-429

13

Współczesna analityczna filozofia języka: wybrane zagadnienia

54%

Stalmaszczyk P.

Diametros

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2018

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issue 56

129-139

PL

Tekst stanowi recenzję Przewodnika po filozofii języka (pod red. J. Odrowąż-Sypniewskiej, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2016), ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem podobnych publikacji anglojęzycznych. Celem recenzji jest wskazanie głównych zagadnień podejmowanych przez współczesną analityczną filozofię języka, a także związki z językoznawstwem.

EN

This is a review article of a recently published guide to the philosophy of language, Przewodnik po filozofii języka (J. Odrowąż-Sypniewska (ed.), Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2016). The article presents this publication against a background of other monographs and guides devoted to the topic of the contemporary philosophy of language which have been published in English. It aims at highlighting the main issues discussed by this philosophy, as well as its relation to linguistics.

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Aksjomat multiplikatywny Russela

Pragnienie wpływu. Listy Stefana Themersona i Bertranda Russella

Mental Imagery in Bertrand Russell's Nobel Lecture What Desires Are Politically Important?

Zjawisko a rzeczywistość – wpływ poglądów Bertranda Russella na koncepcję wielości rzeczywistości Leona Chwistka

Historia plagiatów Wincentego Rzymowskiego odkrytych na łamach tygodnika ,,Prosto z Mostu”

Mysticism and Early Analytic Philosophy

Bertranda Russella koncepcja monizmu neutralnego

From Democritus to Bertrand Russell and Back

The Place of Naïve Realism in Russell’s Changing Accounts of Perception

Reprezentační schopnost soudu: Wittgensteinova odpověď a Russellovu mnohorelační teorii souzení

Počátky vědecké filosofie v USA : nový realismus

Bertrand RUSSELL, Badania dotyczące znaczenia i prawdy

Współczesna analityczna filozofia języka: wybrane zagadnienia