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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 6
472 – 484
EN
The paper deals with the analyses of the third paradox from the Cicero's work Stoic Paradoxes (Cic. Parad. 20 – 26). This paradox is trying to defend the controversial stoic claim, that sins and virtues are alike (Aequalia esse peccata et recte facta). In the paper the author tries to present two interpretative solutions to the question of determining the sources of stoic ideas in this paradox. The first solution suggests that Cicero argues here with the ideas of early Stoicism and approaches the philosophical view of Panaetius as a representative of Middle Stoicism. The second solution interprets this passage in terms of early Stoicism. The author of the study is finally inclined to conclude, that it is more probable that Cicero based this passage on early Stoic sources.
EN
Terms like cultura animi, παιδεία, Bildung, etc. refer more or less to the same concept. Its history is centuries long, but the author of the present article analyses it only with regard to the most common ways of understanding culture. The most important among the properties of this concept (cultura animi, etc.) is the fact that it is inextricably connected with the human individual and the fact that it is judgemental, normative (it refers only to something positive). However, the theory of culture has been dominated by non-judgemental approaches and by the definition of culture as a separate object which does not constitute a quality of a human being. The notion of cultura animi is so distant from this that it would be difficult to regard it as one of the notions of culture.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 3
183 – 194
EN
The paper deals with the interpretation of the thought of Appius Claudius Caecus, who, according to tradition, belongs to the first Roman philosophical authors. At the beginning of this paper, the author presents four models of interpretation of the beginnings of Roman philosophy (historical and cultural, idealizing, class, literary) in the thinking of Marcus Tullius Cicero. Later the author deals with the thinking of Appius Claudius Caecus in two issues. The first group of problems concerns the association of Appius Claudius Caecus thinking with the philosophy of Pythagoreism. The second group of problems concerns the status of this author in the interpretation of the beginnings of the history of Roman philosophy.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 2
93 – 104
EN
The paper deals with three problems concerning Cicero’s reflections on Chrysippus’ theory in his De fato: 1) methodological differentiation between two types of sympatheia; 2) the critique of the stoic secondary causes; 3) the conception of powerful independent human will. The author comes to the conclusion that the sphere affected by sympatheia and secondary causes is with all probability divided by Cicero into two heterogeneous spheres: natura and fortuna. Due to this distinction the everyday life activities are not determined by the stoic fatum anymore. The conception of a powerful will gradually cultivated to be able to decide correctly and independently, is to underline his conviction. Further, other problematic theories incommensurable with independent human will can be thus rendered anew and more correctly.
EN
The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favour of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the non-universal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The genuine form of the argument seems to be given in different form and far closer to logical fatalism and its purpose is not to defend laziness. If the historical argument has to lead to a logically satisfactory solution, some additional assumptions and additional tuning is needed.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 3
246 – 255
EN
Critical reflections on Homer´s work have been an integral part of Greek philosophy from its very beginning. In ancient Roman philosophy Homer excited the interest of Marcus Tullius Cicero. The aim of the article is to outline Cicero’s reflections on Homer as well as to explore one of the most original Cicero’s interpretations of Homer focusing on the mythological story of Philoctetes, the king of Thessaly. It is shown, how the Roman philosopher used the figure of Philoctetes as an original interpretative means to illustrate not only various ethical theories (such as the Stoic conception of virtue or Epicurean conception of pain), but also physical theories (such as Sceptic theory of necessary causes) as well as logical theories and principles (e.g. rejecting the bivalence principle).
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 8
677 – 692
EN
This article aims to show that it is impossible to put Cicero’s testimonies regarding The Fabius Argument in a consistent inferential order. Either we must suppose that additional premises are tacitly assumed in the text or we must compare it with other sources, which leads to inconsistencies in the proof’s reconstruction. Cicero’s reconstruction of the progression of the argument has formal shortcomings, and the paper draws attention to some of these deficiencies. He interpreted sources in a revised and intentionally simplified way, with the aim of undermining the views of his opponents, casting them as inconsistent and similar to views held by Diodorus. Rather than being a consistently interpreted argument faithfully transcribed from the Stoic sources, Cicero’s Fabius Argument is ultimately anti-Stoic.
EN
The author makes Don Quixote a patron of today’s theory of culture — which increasingly draws on an etymological understanding of culture — in order to demonstrate how the modern, hegemonic notion of culture can be undermined through him. We can pass from the Ciceronian metaphor of culture as cultivation of the spirit to the quixotic practising of values, the most important among them is freedom — the basis of man’s second birth in culture. Don Quixote as a model of homo culturalis is the subject who creates himself and builds his own authenticity in axiocentric madness. This authenticity is expressed by: “I know who I am.” A reflection on the quixotic “cultivation of the spirit” leads to a definition of quixotism as the maximum level of culturing the individual. The article ends with a presentation of the figure and work of the Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives, who restored the term cultura animi, forgotten in the Middle Ages, to the reflection on human nature, thus giving an impulse to reflection on culture becoming independent in modern European thought.
EN
The article analyses and compares different passages of Cicero's dialogue De oratore and Quintilian's Institutio oratoria, which bring up the issue of using humour and jokes by speakers in order to gain a rhetoric victory and win the listeners over.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 5
401 - 409
EN
The term prudentia has been introduced into Latin philosophical writings by M. Tullius Cicero as a counterpart of the Greek virtue phronesis. Probably he used it in order to underline his intellectual affinity with some ethical and physical aspects of Plato’s, Aristotleʼs or Stoic thought; or maybe he let himself inspire by the older Latin intellectual tradition. As far as the content of his writings, Cicero holds to the Stoic definition of phronesis in the sense of a practical aspect of knowledge, which should be the virtue mainly of the people involved in politics. Unlike sophia prudentia was related to human community: it included rhetorical, intellectual, anticipatory, acting as well as decision making capacities. All of these competences should be practically achieved in the course of one’s life; however, the climax of their improvement was supposed to come in mature years. Cicero’s prudentia thus embodied the ethical aspect of human self-fulfilment for the benefit of the rest of the community.
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