Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help

  1. 1 Filozofia (Philosophy)

Authors help

  1. 1 Čana T.

Years help

  1. 1 2015

Results found: 1

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  CLAIMS OF LOGIC
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

BOGHOSSIAN O NEZDÔVODNITEĽNOSTI EPISTEMOLOGICKÝCH NÁROKOV LOGIKY

100%
Čana T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 8
620 – 632
EN
This paper deals with the epistemological claims of logic. Scepticism is a position in the philosophy of logic, according to which the „fundamental logical truths“ such as „Modus ponens is a valid rule of inference“, are unjustifiable. In his quest for a „plausible epistemology for logic“, Paul Boghossian subjected this position to an original criticism. He argues that the unique status of fundamental logical truths should also be justified. Otherwise, nothing can be really justified. He tries to demonstrate that, under such circumstances, the sceptical position does not represent „the stable platform to stand on“, either. The aim of this paper is to critically reconsider Boghossian’s attack on this position.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.