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1

PARTIAL COMPATIBILISM: FREE WILL IN THE LIGHT OF MORAL EXPERIENCE

100%
Peroutka D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2022
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vol. 29
|
issue 1
2 - 25
EN
Partial compatibilism says that there are basically two kinds of freedom of the will: some free volition cannot be determined, while others can. My methodological choice is to examine what assumptions will appear necessary if we want to take seriously—and make understandable—our ordinary moral life. Sometimes, typically when we feel guilty about a choice of ours, we are sure enough that we, at the considered moment, actually could have taken a different option. At other times, however, typically when we are aware of some unquestionable moral reasons for a certain choice, we may perceive our choice as voluntary and free in spite of the fact that it is, in the given situation, unthinkable for us to choose otherwise than we actually do (there are situations when responsible agents, because of their strong moral reasons/motives, cannot choose differently). The assumption that experiences of the first kind are not always mistaken excludes our world being deterministic. Yet free will and determinism go together in some of those possible worlds which contain only the second kind of free volitions. Partial compatibilism represents a ‘third way’ between standard compatibilism and incompatibilism, a way to solve that old dilemma.
2

Podmiotowe uwarunkowania wolności realnej. Wokół Ingardenowskiej wersji kompatybilizmu

88%
Kobiela F.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2015
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vol. 43
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issue 4
5-20
EN
The paper presents and discusses Roman Ingarden's solution to the problem of free will vs. determinism. The solution is placed in the context of various philosophical positions related to the dilemma of determinism (hard determinism, libertarianism, compatibilism). Ingarden's position can be characterized as a non-revisionist compatibilism: the act of free will is understood as an event that is causally determined, but solely by internal causes. Freedom is thus conceived as a subject's independence from external causal determination. Real freedom (juxtaposed to the phenomenon of freedom) is ontologically possible in a moderately deterministic world containing relatively isolated systems. This theory does not require any revision of social practices based on the conviction of the existence of free will.
3

FREEDOM, POWER AND CAUSATION

75%
Pink T.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2019
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vol. 26
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issue 1
141 – 168
EN
Freedom or control of how we act is often and very naturally under-stood as a kind of power—a power to determine for ourselves how we act. Is freedom conceived as such a power possible, and what kind of power must it be? The paper argues that power takes many forms, of which ordinary causation is only one; and that if freedom is indeed a kind of power, it cannot be ordinary causation. Scepticism about the reality of freedom as a power can take two forms. One, found in Hume, now often referred to as the Mind argument, assumes incompatibilism, and concludes from incompatibilism that freedom cannot exist, as indistinguishable from chance. But another scepticism, founds in Hobbes, does not assume incompatibilism, but assumes rather that the only possible form of power in nature is ordinary causation, concluding that freedom cannot for this reason exist as a form of power. This scepticism is more profound—it is in fact presupposed by Hume’s scepticism—and far more interesting, just because freedom cannot plausibly be modelled as ordinary causation.
4

JE NEDOROZUMENIE MEDZI KOMPATIBILISTAMI A INKOMPATIBILISTAMI LEN VERBÁLNE?

75%
Kollárik T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 9
768 – 784
EN
The goal of this paper is to show that disagreement between compatibilists and in-compatibilists about compatibility of free will with determinism is merely verbal, since although one side of the dispute claims that free will is compatible with determinism, whereas the other side denies it, they in fact ascribe to the expression „free will“ a different meaning. One can thus accept both the compatibilist thesis as well as the in-compatibilist thesis, as these two do not constitute a contradictory pair. My method consists in analysing the meaning of the phrase being an ability to do other-wise as a property of abilities and the meaning of the phrase having an ability to do otherwise as a property of agents. The outcome of conducted analysis enables me to make an unbiased comparison of necessary conditions which compatibilists and in-compatibilists expect to hold if agents are to have the ability to do otherwise. It is shown, as expected, that these conditions are not the same.
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