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1

THE GUARANTEES OF FREEDOM OF THE JUDGE'S CONSCIENCE IN CIVIL LAW PROCEDURES (Gwarancje swobody sumienia sedziego w procesie cywilnym. Sumienie sedziego jako kategoria prawna)

100%
Lazarska A.
Studia Prawnicze
|
2008
|
issue 3(177)
EN
Judges are subordinated to the constitution and laws. Judges vow to administer justice not only according to law. They take an oath to administer justice according to their conscience. The conscience defines behavioral directives based on the category of 'good' and 'evil'. Conscience is a hypothetical ability or faculty that distinguishes whether our actions are right or wrong. There are seven guarantees of freedom of the judge's conscience in civil law procedures. First, judges are independent; they are subordinated only to the constitution and laws. Judges are privileged to immunity and cannot be dismissed. Second, Judges are obliged to implement the actions specified in the law, while following the principle of impartiality and equal treatment of all citizens, but they have the right to interpret legal regulations. Third, judicial discretion, vague terms, general clauses and decision margins allow for individual decisions. Fourth, evidence confirming facts in the case are evaluated in accordance with the principle of free evaluation of evidence. Fifth, the resolution of a case is not based on the mechanical deduction of consequences based on guidelines, being the general norms, but on the identification of an optimal solution. During the evidence hearing the judge considers and simultaneously determines which norms should be applied to the specific case and determines the legal grounds for the decision. Sixth, the judge has the right to 'votum separatum'. Finally, judges are not obliged to apply judgment. Judges have the freedom of thought and making decisions. The judge's decisions in every case can't be mechanical deductions. This is rather more like finding the best solution and conviction of the optimal, well- argued decision, justified by the applied legal regulations and the conscience. The conscience causes that the judge's verdicts are just and have human dimensions.
2

Czym jest sumienie a czym być powinna klauzula sumienia

100%
Nowacka M., Kopania J.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2014
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vol. 42
|
issue 4
63-79
EN
The conscience clause is a legislative provision granting a person the right to refuse to perform an activity which is in agreement with legal regulations but in disagreement with a person’s conscience. Conscience is understood as knowing what is good and what is bad with the urge to do what is good. It is argued in this article that the conscience clause in fact refers not to conscience in its proper sense but to the set of moral convictions held by an individual and felt to be in agreement with his/her conscience. As a result, the so-called conscience clause in fact obscures the authentic voice of conscience. This article proposes a limited understanding of the legal concept of the conscience clause as a provision which overtly refers to the moral convictions held by an individual.
3
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BOGUSLAW WOLNIEWICZ'S STANDPOINT ON THE ISSUE OF EUTHANASIA (Stanowisko Boguslawa Wolniewicza w kwestii eutanazji)

100%
Smakulska J.
Archeus. Studia z bioetyki i antropologii filozoficznej
|
2009
|
vol. 10
45-61
EN
In the article, the author discusses a Polish philosopher Boguslaw Wolniewicz's standpoint on the issue of euthanasia. On the one hand his standpoint is convergent with moral doctrine of the Church, particularly the Catholic Church, namely by acknowledging that the final criterion of ethical permissibility of a deed is individual conscience. On the other hand the standpoint differs in dissimilar spheres of values to which conscience refers: in Christian doctrine it is a sphere of definite final values set by God while in Boguslaw Wolniewicz's ethics it is a sphere of temporal personal dignity of man.
4

JÓZEF TISCHNER'S EGOLOGY

88%
Borowicz A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2007
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vol. 35
|
issue 3
57-86
EN
This article is devoted to the problems of the philosophy of the ego which Józef Tischner developed in the early 1970s, especially in his dissertation, 'The Phenomenology of the Egological Conscience'. The main challenge of his early papers was to examine the original experience of the self as a value, or as a 'personal ego', making a choice between the opposite groups of positive and negative values against the background of 'horizontal values', arranged according to the hierarchy described by Max Scheler. The authoress examines the relationship between different levels of the egological experience: the somatic ego, the cognitive ego and the personal ego, mentioned above. The article presented also discusses the Hegelian relationship between hermeneutical comprehension and phenomenological cognition in Tischner's early book. She finds his theory of the self as a surmounting of the formalistic consequences of Heideggerian 'Dasein' and the inconsistencies of the Husserlian, Schelerian and Ingardenian concept of the ego. It is also susceptible to the objections of analytical philosophy and Neopositivism against Hegelian metaphysics and Husserlian phenomenology and this is its main imperfection. However, it is probably the most interesting modern continuation of the Augustinian current in anthropology.
5

FENOMÉN SVEDOMIA A PERSONÁLNA IDENTITA ČLOVEKA

88%
Korený P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 3
275-285
EN
The inaugural explores the phenomenon of conscience as including the reference to the first person and his/her identity: the conscience is intrinsically mine. The word mine refers here not only to the fact, that the voice of conscience comes from inside of me, but also to my being addressed by it and connected through it with my genuine Self as a distinctive individual. In the first instance the voice of conscience is directly related to our actions, but if we let it to develop in its full strength, it can make us to reflect on who we essentially are. It is the concept of personal identity enforced 'in one's own production' which enables us to explain this linkage. In conclusion the author shows the difference between the genuine conscience of an individual, created in living contacts with a community of morals, and a wrong individuality of conscience, which is just a subjective feeling or a believing heart of a lonely individual rooted entirely in herself/himself.
6

HUMANISTICKÁ ETIKA ERICHA FROMMA

88%
Zimovčáková M.
Motus in verbo: časopis mladej vedeckej generácie
|
2013
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vol. 2
|
issue 1
6 – 15
EN
This paper deals with the problem of humanism as the basis of understanding man in the world. It presents trends that predetermined its direction and then became the basis of humanistic philosophy. It is based on the formation of humanistic ideas in the background of Greek culture and the medieval Christianity. At the same time it presents Fromm’s humanistic ethics as the «science of the art of living», in which he understands man as a whole, as a being that is responsible for itself and its existence.
7
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Svědomí jakožto kritérium správného jednání

75%
Štěpinová M.
Studia theologica
|
2006
|
vol. 8
|
issue 4
55-65
EN
St. Thomas Aquinas' definition of the conscience is well known. Nevertheless, from one point of view it is surprising. According to him, it is the same human reason which (designated as practical reason) can consider one and the same thing as being good and (designated as conscience) bad at the same time. To understand his conception of the conscience, it is necessary to look into the historical background. St. Thomas developed his conception of conscience explicitly in relationship with the Augustinian tradition of higher and lower reason, with Aristotle's explication of an incontinent man and with the contemporary discussion on synderesis; and he connected it implicitly with the problem of 'two wills' from the Augustinian tradition and with the question of man's possibilities to act rightly. The article aims to explain the content of Aquinas' conception of the conscience on the basis of its historical background.
8
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REASONS, MOTIVES, AND MORAL IDENTITY (Racje, motywy, tozsamosc moralna)

75%
Gornicka J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 8
5-20
EN
The authoress asks what is moral identity: is it psychological or only heuristic being; is it normative structure dependent on reason or something dependent on emotional motives; is it a kind of reaction and behavior or a specific indescribable experience? The article shows several philosophical projects to construct moral subjectivity. The authoress claims that both personal identity and moral subjectivity are concepts referring to psychological reality and normative reality. They are useful for social life, law and pedagogy but philosophically controversial. We are part of empirical world and we are universe for ourselves. There are first-person analyses of human conscience and third-person analyses of human character as natural fact. These are two main ways to treat moral subjectivity.
9

Sumienie w ujęciu Roberta Spaemanna

75%
Kożuchowski J.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2018
|
vol. 46
|
issue 3
89-101
EN
This analysis of the concept of conscience proposed by the outstanding contemporary German thinker Robert Spaemann focuses on several selected aspects: first, a look at this complex phenomenon from two sides, namely its negative aspect (what conscience is not) and positive (what conscience appears to be), then a juxtaposition with other contemporary theories, and finally an analysis in terms of its origin. This shows that Spaemann understands conscience in the classical spirit of Thomas Aquinas. It is not the source of moral law, nor does it appear to be an authority deciding what is morally good or bad, but rather it constitutes a binding moral judgement which takes the form of a call or an appeal. It is emphasised that conscience, seen in the perspective of its origins, is defined by Robert Spaemann, similarly to Viktor Frankl, as an innate ability, a tool for knowing good from bad. No researcher dealing with the philosophy of this eminent thinker has ever pointed out this similarity. The article emphasises and discusses the most original dimension of Spaemann's theory, i.e. presenting it as the most distinctive personal sign. The final considerations attempt to show why, in what sense, and under what conditions the question of conscience is connected with the question of mystery. This analytical aspect has not been directly addressed by Spaemann in his considerations, therefore the article attempts to complement his theory in this respect. Also, the author explains the originality of the German thinker's approach, and offers a concrete indication of where Spaemann's thinking coincides with that of Thomas Aquinas.
10

Translating Havel: Three key words (domov, svědomí, and klid)

63%
Danaher D. S.
Slovo a slovesnost: časopis pro otázky teorie a kultury jazyka (Slovo a slovesnost: A journal for the theory of language and language cultivation)
|
2010
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vol. 71
|
issue 4
250-259
EN
This study sketches a semantic analysis of three Czech words - domov (home), svedomi (conscience), and klid (rest, quiet, calm) - in comparison with their English translation equivalents. It is argued that they are key words in Havel's thought in that they represent recurring concepts in his writing that cut across both time periods (the pre- and post-1989 Havel) as well as genres. The import of these concepts also cuts across socio-historical -isms: these words not only tell us something about human identity within a totalitarian context, but ought to tell us, who live outside of that context, something about ourselves. While each of these words refers to a more or less distinct realm of human experience, their collective resonance in Czech evokes a similar feel: all have an air of the philosophical or transcendent about them. It is this element of their conventional meanings in Czech that provides fertile ground - a ground that does not exist in quite the same way in English - for Havel's cultivation of them into key components in his understanding of human identity in the modern world.
11

SVEDOMIE AKO „INÉ V TOM ISTOM“. RICŒUR, LEVINAS: DVE ODLIŠNÉ NEEPISTEMOLOGICKÉ PERSPEKTÍVY

63%
Sucharek P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 9
845-859
EN
The essay compares Ricour's and Levinas's conceptions of the constitution of conscience in the sense of German Gewissen. Beginning with Ricour's basic distinction between 'identity-idem' and 'identity-ipse' it shows the proper place of conscience in his conception. For Ricour conscience is a finite category of otherness as related to the self, i.e. its most interior, intrinsic otherness. For Levinas, on the other hand, conscience - the other in the same - is an initiatory category, which is described in terms of absolute passivity, persecution and substitution. In conclusion Ricour´s critique of Levinas' category of 'the Other' is examined on the background of Levinas' conception of subjectivity as a vocation for Good.
12

Prawda w blasku myśli i działań Jana Pawła II

63%
Drożdż M.
Studia Socialia Cracoviensia
|
2011
|
issue 2(5)
23-47
EN
In his entire life John Paul II was “a genuine man”, and he still is a witness of Truth, a witness of the truth about God, the truth about man, the truth about the world, the truth in history, the truth of conscience, the truth in the media, the truth in education and upbringing, etc. It can be said that he not only resides in “the refulgence of truth”, but he constantly reveals it for the contemporary man. My analyses aim to show the timelessness of his genuineness that is to show truth in the refulgence of John Paul II’s ideas and activities. By being a witness of truth, John Paul II expresses a deep conviction that the search for “ultimate truth”, universal truth, is a fundamental duty of every single human being. Therefore, John Paul II’s teachings and activities can by all means be regarded as the refulgence of Truth in which a genuine man can be formed and shaped – a man of upright and genuine conscience.
13

Czy grzechy innych mogą być moimi?

51%
Zwoliński A.
Studia Socialia Cracoviensia
|
2009
|
issue 1
89-108
EN
Can the sins of others be mine? The problem of so called others’ sins. In many situations a sin could not possibly have taken place had it not been for a prohibition, an encouragement of others, inappropriate advice, others’ praise or even aid followed by silence, lack of punishment or even acquittal of the sins of others. The mystery of sins of others is the fact that the architects of immense evil may be those who have not previously shown any predisposition or inclination to such atrocities. „The death of man” is the most tragic consequence of sins of others. The present study is an attempt to analyze his phenomenon.
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