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A Matemática como linguagem analítica em R. Carnap

100%
Borges de Meneses R. D.
Społeczeństwo i Edukacja. Międzynarodowe Studia Humanistyczne
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2014
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issue 2(14)
15-35
EN
Logical empirism, which the metaphysical and seeks to discover the truth about the world exclusively through the natural sciences, owes its name two of its basic tenets, namely: the view that the solution of a philosophical problem requires a logical analysis of the languages in which the problem is stated, and that therefore logic plays a central role in philosophy, and the empiricist principle that any significant theory which is not of a purely logical or mathematical character must be testable by reference to empirical evidence. Carnap’s work provides, among other thing, a precise elaboration of, and a broad theoretical basis for these tenets and it develops the technical tools for the pursuit of philosophy as logical analysis. R. Carnap shall see that he furnished instruments for deduction, that is, for the transformation of formulations of factual and contingent knowledge. However, logic and mathematics not only supply rules for transformation of factual sentences but they themselves contain sentences of a different non-factual kind. On this article I explain the linguistic sense to Mathematics, and the philosophical foundations. However the logic language plays a very important role to the logical foundations of mathematics and Mathematics is to analytic language according to R. Carnap.
2
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Radykalny behawioryzm jako filozofia nauki

89%
Marek N.
Semina Scientiarum
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2011
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vol. 10
EN
A common problem appearing in the discussions is connecting behaviorism with positivism. The main goal of this article is to show that this alliance is not legitimate – main principles of the Skinnerian science rather point to the Mach’s empiricism, pragmatism and operationalism than to Carnap’s project. Secondly it will be shown that behaviorism is most importantly the philosophy of science. In the last part we will consider the main points appearing in the critique of behaviorism and try to give an answer to them.
3
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Typology of ethical theories based on the criterion of moral judgement and their applicability in the auditor’s and accountant’s professions

88%
Nowak M.
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
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2017
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issue 474
41-52
EN
The article analyses accountant’s and auditor’s ethics from the meta-ethical point of view. The purpose of the paper is to determine which type of ethical theories has the best applicability to the judgment of accountant’s and auditor’s deeds. The author uses the ethical theories typology introduced by Carnap in order to analyze their applicability to auditor’s and accountant’s profession. According to the findings of the article, the nominalitstic approach to ethics has the highest applicability to the accountant’s and auditor’s ethics.
4
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Koło Wiedeńskie. Podstawowe założenia i próba krytyki

71%
Tryścień R.
Kultura i Wychowanie
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2023
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vol. 24
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issue 2
125-145
EN
The works of the Vienna Circle introduced a new era. Radical thoughts that were supposed to consolidate the existing empirical science and remove all metaphysics in order to build a real, scientific philosophy proved to be a mistake. The radical assumptions led to absurd conclusions. The Vienna Circle was guided by the principle of verification which sought to establish whether a sentence was meaningful or not. Yet this principle was not free of the assumptions that it was supposed to indirectly remove – metaphysical assumptions. In this article, I present the views of the Vienna Circle that are often overlooked in various publications. The central point of the text will be an attempt to discuss the criticism of the Vienna Circle’s assumptions.
PL
Działalność Koła Wiedeńskiego rozpoczęła nową erę. Radykalne przemyślenia, które miały z jednej strony ugruntować istniejącą naukę empiryczną, a z drugiej usunąć wszelką metafizykę i w konsekwencji zbudować prawdziwą, naukową filozofię, okazały się błędem. Radykalne założenia, które miały na celu uporządkowanie wiedzy, wbrew intencji doprowadziły do absurdalnych wniosków. Koło Wiedeńskie kierowało się zasadą weryfikacji, która miała rozstrzygnąć, czy dane zdanie jest zdaniem sensownym, czy bezsensownym. Niemniej jednak sama zasada, choć prosta w swoim wysłowieniu, nie była wolna od założeń, które miała pośrednio usunąć – założeń metafizycznych. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest prezentacja poglądów Koła Wiedeńskiego wraz z istotnymi, często w różnych publikacjach pomijanymi zagadnieniami. Natomiast centralnym punktem tekstu będzie próba przedstawienia krytyki podnoszonej w założeniach Koła Wiedeńskiego.
5
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Czy sądy metafizyczne mówią coś o świecie? Wittgensteinowskie źródła deflacjonizmu metafizycznego i jego modele

63%
Kolodziejczyk S.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2014
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issue 27
27 - 63
XX
Many of contemporary philosophers argue against metaphysics putting forward a thesis that metaphysical claims are deflationary. This way of thinking seems to be not only persuasive but above all it rightly expresses a main difficulty of metaphysical inquires. In this paper I am trying to shed a little light on the problem of deflation of metaphysical judgments. In the first section I refer to some Wittgenstein's ideas from Tractatus logico-philosophicus and I focus on the phenomenon of manifestation as a possible source of deflation of metaphysics. The second section is devoted to the Wittgenstein's concepts of language games on the one hand and rules on the other; both of them are a key to understanding of the deepest dimensions of deflationary metaphysics. The third section is an elaboration of three models of deflation of metaphysical expressions: 1. deflation in regard to the informative status of metaphysical judgments; 2. deflation in regard to the metasemantic properties of judgments about the world, and 3. deflation in regard to the semantic ground of ontological judgments. The fourth and last part of the paper is an exposition of two crucial problems which metaphysics has to face with. I call the first of them 'a problem with conceptualization of the metaphysical experience', whereas the second one is labeled 'a problem with semantic inclusion of metaphysical expressions into judgments about facts'.
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