Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 13

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
Vital interest of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) in struggle to achieve political power was to make its program attractive to a broad masses of Czechoslovak population. The Marx-Leninism, which became an ideological base of CPC, presented itself as the only relevant ideology capable of establishing a “socially just” society. Revolution as a road of the Communist regime to impose its rule was presented as unavoidable, because it was in harmony with laws of social progress formulated by Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx and Vladimir I. Lenin. The essential role in spreading ideology of the Marx–Leninism, according to leadership of CPC had propaganda. Despite strictly formulated principles of the Marx-Leninist ideology, communist propaganda during the existence of Czechoslovak Republic morphed in dependence on changing political development. Vicissitudes of form and content of communist propaganda in monitored period are traced in submitted paper. An emphasis is given to, till now, unpublished archival documents, deposited in Slovak and Czech archives. Invaluable source offering insight to concrete workings of communist propaganda is a contemporary press, primarily periodicals Pravda Chudoby and Pravda, which represented ideological views of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. A relevant source of information are social democratic Robotnícke noviny, which monitored closely development of its main rival CPC. A literature dealing with various aspects with history of Czechoslovak Communist Party was used where it was suitable to complement events by a more general description.
EN
Communist parties are generally associated with proletarian internationalism. How-ever, some communist parties have a double “face” – an internationalist one and nation-alist one. Present-day Czech communists successfully build on this tactic. My article will answer the following research questions: What causes the strong nationalist orientation of contemporary Czech communists? What type of nationalism does it represent? And is the outlined continuity between the interwar period and the present-day accidental or is it (at least partly) caused by certain objective political and/or social factors?
EN
This study presents an analysis of the images of the Soviet experiment in the daily press of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) during the interwar period. The author tests the hypothesis that the idealized image of Soviet socialism replaced the coherent political program of the CPCz and describes the mechanisms of political communication of the communist vision of an ideal society. The periodical press is seen as the medium through which communist authors explained their conception of social and political justice. The USSR was an ideal model of a socialist society that they wanted to achieve through revolutionary action. The text deals not only with the mechanisms by which communists created ideal images of Soviet socialism, but also with their strategies for defending themselves against criticism of the idealized image of the USSR by their political rivals.
EN
This article is devoted to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the influence of the concept of the People’s Front adapted within the scope of the Communist International, and its impact on the anti-systemic attitudes of Czechoslovak communists. The theoretical starting point is Sartori’s classic theory of the anti-systemic party. Within the scope of First Republic Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia undoubtedly represented an anti-systemic party, but the attitudes and intensity of manifestations underwent a certain development. The Communist International, and its Moscow leadership had a crucial influence on the policy of Czechoslovak communists. Its individual directives and concepts fundamentally affected what happened in the party. The core policies, or more precisely starting points, included the United Front and the People’s Front. The interpretation and realization of both of these policies were accompanied by ambiguity, and often conflicting interpretations. In spite of these facts, the People’s Front meant a fundamental turnaround in many respects, but of importance was that the objective, in the form of the proletariat’s dictatorship, remained unchanged. In the 1930s, under the influence of domestic and international situations, and shielded by the policy of the People’s Front, Czechoslovak communists managed to gradually connect with a significant part of society. The reason for their success was the obscuring of anti-systemic attitudes, complemented by a populist approach, and last but not least an appeal to national sentiment. The active support for the policy of the People’s Front, and the devotion to the Communist International maintained the Moscow leadership’s favor. The future aft er World War II was proof of how effective such an approach was.
EN
This thesis analyses the position of the Czech National Front in late-normalisation Czechoslovakia. The National Front brought together authorised political parties and various mass organisations. It was a critical legitimizing instrument of the authoritarian government of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia during the communist period. T he thesis outlines the attempt of the Czechoslovak communists to meet the demands of democratisation during the period of perestroika in the late 1980s by the more active National Front and its associated organisations. Archival documents of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the National Front, together with contemporary media, show how important propaganda role the more active Czech National Front was to play. The reality was that the Communists did not allow other parties and organisations associated with the National Front to have a fundamentally greater share of political power until November 1989. Paradoxically, it was only at the end of 1989 that the Czech National Front really sought an independent position in the political system. But by then the National Front had only a few months of political life left.
6
Content available remote

Role "ledna" v diskurzu pražského jara

75%
EN
Despite disparaging undertones surrounding the term “populism” in public debate, the phenomenon remains an elusive and contested concept among political theorists. This paper suggests utilising Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populism to offer a new perspective on the dynamics of the so-called Prague Spring. The Prague Spring appears to be a unique period in Czechoslovak history, almost as ungraspable as defining or understanding populism seems unattainable in political theory. Laclau’s understanding of populism, however, may draw attention to the layers of the political development that have previously been neglected, i.e., the discourse and rhetoric of political representatives, and, therefore, lead to a deeper understanding of Prague Spring’s dynamics. Thus, the paper applies a key category of Laclau’s theory, the “empty signifier”, to grasp the notion of “January”. The thrust of the paper’s argument is that after the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in January 1968, the name “January” emerged through uncensored media channels and started being used by various actors as an empty signifier to constitute the “people”.
EN
Slovak national (and Czechoslovak state) history, which is typical for the relationship between the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and the Democratic Party (DP) and their struggle for political power. This relationship escalated especially after the loss of the parliamentary elections in May 1946, when the Slovak communists commenced a militant attack with the goal of discrediting their chief political opponent – the Democratic Party – using all possible methods. The purpose of this paper is to point out the causes that provoked the unprecedented actions of the Slovak Communists as early as 1947, to draw attention to the responsibility of western powers for the economic and subsequently also the political situation in the country, whereas this paper also discusses the differences between the CPS and the DP, the cohesiveness of the CPS and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which was willing to surrender significant restriction of the authority of Slovak national bodies in return for power in the state, and also points out the unjustified therminus historicus, which continues to be declared in Slovak historiography in relation to the period from 1945 to 1948.
EN
This paper considers the first attempts to write a history of camping. Against a background of the struggle between the communist and the so-called non-political campers Bob Hurikán wrote a book focusing on the topography of the settlements which affected subsequent perception of the history of camping. Bob’s work was to be counterbalanced by a book written by Géza Včelička, but due to the death of the author it remained unfinished. It nevertheless offers some illuminating insights about the origins and the development of this subculture.
EN
The Cold War became, apart from other things, a conflict of two radically different ideologies. Both sides led a fight in various fields — radio broadcasting can be seen as one of the most significant. The study discusses certain aspects of the KSČ’s perception of western “enemy” broadcasting during the late 1940s and the early 1950s. The first part debates the basic principles of communist propaganda and the so-called counterpropaganda. Afterwards, attention is focused on the Monitoring Service of the Czechoslovak Radio. Finally, the last part analyses communist perspective of several major campaigns that occurred in broadcasts of western radio stations — special concern was given to the Voice of America.
CS
Studená válka se, kromě jiného, stala střetem dvou radikálně odlišných ideologií. Tento zápas se promítl do řady oblastí, střet na radových vlnách lze bez nadsázky považovat za jeden z nejvýznamnějších. Studie se zabývá vybranými aspekty vztahu Komunistické strany Československa vůči západnímu “nepřátelskému” vysílání na konci čtyřicátých a počátku padesátých let. První část analyzuje základními principy komunistické propagandy a tzv. protipropagandy, druhá se poté věnuje monitorovací službě Československého rozhlasu. Poslední část představí, jakým způsobem KSČ vnímala několik hlavních kampaní, které se objevily ve vysíláních západních stanic — zvláštní zřetel je přitom kladen zejména na Hlas Ameriky.
EN
This article attempts to characterize the organizational transformation of the Czechoslovak army between 1950–1956. Plans for expanding the army, necessitated by the worsening international situation, were formulated in September 1950. The implementation of these plans was accelerated after the agreements that were made during a conference held between the 9th–12th January 1951 in Moscow, which was attended by the leaders and defence ministers of the so-called People’s Democracies and their Soviet counterparts. The main goal was to deploy combat-ready and adequately equipped armed forces in the event of a war with NATO countries by 1953. The size of the Czechoslovak army in 1953 – the peak period of its development – reached 300,000 soldiers. The expansion of the army was carried out under the constant supervision of the Soviet General Staff and numerous Soviet military advisers. Organizational patterns, systems of training and combat preparations that were employed by the Soviet military were introduced into the Czechoslovak armed forces. The admittance of Czechoslovakia into the Warsaw Pact in 1955 was in fact confirmation that the Czechoslovak army was now subordinate to an external authority. As a result of the extensive development of organizational structures and equipment from the Second World War, the Czechoslovak army in the mid-1950s remained poorly trained and generally used outdated armaments and equipment, thus its readiness to meet the requirements of the contemporary battlefield was questionable.
RU
В данной статье делается попытка охарактеризовать организационные преобразования чехословацкой армии в 1950–1956 гг. Планы по расширению армии, вызванные ужесточением международной обстановки, были сформулированы в сентябре 1950 г. Их реализация была ускорена в результате договоренностей, предпринятых представителями партийных руководящих органов и министрами обороны государств т. н. народной демократии в январе 1951 г. в Москве. Основная цель заключалась в развертывании боеспособных и хорошо оснащенных вооруженных сил на случай войны со странами НАТО к 1953 г. Численность чехословацкой армии в 1953 г., на пике ее развития, достигла 300 тыс.солдат. Расширение армии происходило под постоянным контролем Советского Генштаба и многочисленных советских военных советников. В чехословацкие вооруженные силы внедрили советские организационные схемы, системы обучения и боевой подготовки. Вступление Чехословакии в Варшавский договор в 1955 г. было, по сути, легализацией фактического положения, то есть подчинения чехословацкой армии внешнему диспозиционному центру. В результате экстенсивного развития организационных структур и использования вооружения, берущего своё происхождение еще в годы Второй Мировой войны, чехословацкая армия в середине 1950-х годов оставалась плохо натренированной структурой, и как правило, анахронично вооруженной, а ее готовность соответствовать требованиям тогдашнего поля боя стояла под вопросом.
PL
Artykuł przynosi próbę scharakteryzowania przemian organizacyjnych armii Czechosłowacji w latach 1950–1956. Implikowane zaostrzającą się sytuacją międzynarodową plany rozbudowy armii zostały sformułowane we wrześniu 1950 r. Ich realizacja została przyśpieszona w wyniku ustaleń narady przedstawicieli kierownictw partyjnych i ministrów obrony państw tzw. demokracji ludowej w styczniu 1951 r. w Moskwie. Zasadniczym celem miało być wystawienie do 1953 r. gotowych do walki i odpowiednio wyposażonych sił zbrojnych na wypadek wojny z państwami NATO. Liczebność armii czechosłowackiej w 1953 r. – szczytowym okresie rozwoju – sięgnęła 300 tys. żołnierzy. Rozbudowa armii odbywała się pod stałym nadzorem radzieckiego Sztabu Generalnego oraz licznych radzieckich doradców wojskowych. Doszło do wprowadzenia w czechosłowackich siłach zbrojnych radzieckich wzorców organizacyjnych, systemu szkolenia i przygotowania bojowego. Przynależność Czechosłowacji do Układu Warszawskiego od 1955 r. było w istocie zalegalizowaniem stanu faktycznego – podległości armii czechosłowackiej wobec zewnętrznego ośrodka dyspozycyjnego. Na skutek ekstensywnego rozwoju struktur organizacyjnych oraz wyposażenia w uzbrojenie wywodzącego się z lat II wojny światowej armia czechosłowacka w połowie lat pięćdziesiątych pozostawała strukturą słabo wyszkoloną, na ogół anachronicznie uzbrojoną, której gotowość do sprostania wymogom ówczesnego pola walki stała pod znakiem zapytania.
EN
The study maps out changes in the membership base of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and changes in moods, opinions and attitudes of party members at the end of the 1980s, i.e. at the time when the crisis of the normalization regime was increasing. To this end, the author makes use of, in particular, information reports prepared by the party apparatus on the basis of letters and complaints of party members and other citizens addressed to Communist Party leaders, other internal documents of the party, and period public opinion polls. He systematically identifies and examines each of the problematic areas which were regularly reflected in these documents: dropping interest in the membership in the Communist Party, manifestations of disobedience among party members, violations of party standards, and corruption; criticism of slow implementation of reforms, or, on the other hand, of too fast-advancing and far-reaching democratization; dissatisfaction with information presented by the media, alleged ideological defensive, and yielding to “opposition elements”; concerns about the future of socialism and a potential return of capitalism, also in connection with developments in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary; national resentments, particularly in relation to the Hungarian minority in southern Slovakia and the government’s plans to establish German military cemeteries in the territory of Czechoslovakia; historical resentments, especially as regarded a partial reevaluation of the period of the first Czechoslovak Republic and the foundation period of the Communist regime; and, last but not least, various, mostly verbal anti-Communist incidents reflected in the letters and complaints. The author states that the empirical data on the development of the membership base of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and opinions of party members presented in the study does not confirm a conclusion to the effect that the policy of the Communist Party leadership enjoyed support of an overwhelming majority of party members, which was what party reports and excerpts from the letters mentioned above might suggest. He also examines the reasons why supporters of conservative and dogmatic opinions prevailed over “liberal” party members among the critical voices. In his opinion, the growing dissatisfaction among party members made a significant contribution to the helplessness of leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in dealing with accumulating problems of the country, which became fully manifest after November 17, 1989.
CS
Předkládaná studie mapuje změny ve složení členské základny Komunistické strany Československa a v náladách, názorech a postojích straníků na konci osmdesátých let minulého století, tedy v době, kdy narůstala krize normalizačního režimu. Autor k tomu využívá především informační zprávy, které na základě dopisů a stížností členů KSČ i dalších občanů adresovaných komunistickému vedení sestavoval pro toto vedení stranický aparát, další vnitrostranické informační materiály a dobové výzkumy veřejného mínění. Systematicky identifikuje a probírá jednotlivé problematické oblasti, které byly v těchto písemnostech pravidelně reflektovány: klesající zájem o členství ve straně, projevy neposlušnosti ve stranických řadách, porušování stranických norem a korupce; kritika pomalého zavádění reforem, či naopak příliš rychlé a dalekosáhlé demokratizace; nespokojenost s informováním médií, údajnou ideologickou defenzivou a ustupováním „opozičním živlům“; obavy o osud socialismu a z návratu kapitalismu, také v souvislosti s vývojem v Sovětském svazu, Polsku a Maďarsku; nacionální resentimenty, zejména ve vztahu k maďarské menšině na jižním Slovensku a k záměrům vlády zřídit na československém území německá válečná pohřebiště; historické resentimenty, zvláště s ohledem na částečné přehodnocování éry první Československé republiky a zakladatelského období komunistického režimu; a konečně různé, většinou verbální protikomunistické incidenty, které v dopisech a stížnostech rezonovaly. Autor konstatuje, že prezentovaná empirická data o vývoji členstva KSČ a jeho smýšlení nepotvrzují závěr, že by se politika komunistického vedení těšila podpoře naprosté většiny straníků, jak o tom stále ujišťovala stranická hlášení z regionů i svodky ze zmíněných dopisů. Zamýšlí se přitom také nad důvody, proč mezi kritickými hlasy zřejmě převažovali zastánci konzervativních či dogmatických pozic nad stranickými „liberály“. Tato rostoucí nespokojenost v členské základně podle něj významně přispěla k bezradnosti vedení KSČ při řešení hromadících se problémů země, která se naplno projevila po 17. listopadu 1989.
EN
The article discusses the visions of the village outlined by Klement Gottwald, the leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In practice, this vision was realized by the communist regime between 1949–1960.
PL
W artykule omówiono wizję wsi zarysowaną przez Klementa Gottwalda, przywódcę Komunistycznej Partii Czechosłowacji. W praktyce wizja ta zrealizowana została przez reżym komunistyczny w latach 1949–1960.
EN
The article deals with the early phase of the political career of the leading communist functionary Miloš Jakeš (1922-2020), who later became a member of the new "normalization" leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ) after the suppression of the Prague Spring and served as its General Secretary from 1987 to 1989. This early era of his life is linked to his work in the Moravian region of Zlín (later renamed Gottwaldov). The author frames his study with Jakeš's entry into the KSČ in June 1945 and his departure for the Prague Party headquarters in autumn 1952. He first describes Jakeš's origins in the poor conditions of the South Bohemian village of České Chalupy and his war years at the Baťa factory in Zlín, where he completed his apprenticeship as an electrical engineer. Here, the author pays close attention to the possible influence of Bataism - a specific ethic and way of organizing work - on the formation of Jakeš's personality. He then describes Jakeš's rise and activities in the regional structures of the communist youth organisation, the Communist Party and the public administration, where he served, among other things, as a member of the Boards of the District and Regional Committees of the KSČ and as chairman of the United National Committee (Jednotný národní výbor, JNV) in Gottwaldov. Here, the author traces how he contributed to the collectivization of agriculture in the Gottwaldov region after 1948. The author not only attempts to answer questions related to Jakeš himself, such as what brought him to the communist movement, what positions he had in the changing political circumstances and whether he was always a conformist functionary, but he also tries to deepen our existing knowledge on how the new power elites were formed during the establishment and consolidation of the communist dictatorship. In many ways, he argues, Jakeš fit the profile of the new regional party cadres during high Stalinism and embodied the type of functionaries who based their success on adherence to the currently valid official party line, which they tried to put into practice by taking into account the specifics of a particular region. The fact that the head of an industrial urban centre of 50,000 inhabitants was a man of barely thirty years of age, of low social origin, without any significant qualifications or long political experience, illustrates the enormous social mobility in post-war and especially post-1948 (after the communist takeover) Czechoslovakia.
CS
Studie se zabývá dosud opomíjenou počáteční fází politické kariéry předního komunistického funkcionáře Miloše Jakeše (1922–2020), který se později po porážce pražského jara stal členem nového, normalizačního vedení Komunistické strany Československa a v letech 1987 až 1989 stanul v jejím čele jako generální tajemník. Tato etapa je spjata s jeho působením v regionu moravského města Zlín (později přejmenovaného na Gottwaldov) a je ohraničena Jakešovým vstupem do KSČ po druhé světové válce v červnu 1945 a jeho odchodem do pražského ústředí na podzim 1952. Autor nejprve přibližuje Jakešův původ v chudých poměrech jihočeské vesnice České Chalupy a jeho léta učednická v Baťových závodech ve Zlíně, kde se za války vyučil elektrokonstruktérem. Všímá si přitom možných vlivů „batismu“ jako specifické etiky a způsobu organizace práce na utváření Jakešovy osobnosti. Studie líčí Jakešův vzestup a aktivity v regionálních strukturách Svazu české mládeže, komunistické strany a veřejné správy, kde vykonával mimo jiné funkce člena předsednictev okresního výboru i krajského výboru KSČ a předsedy Jednotného národního výboru v Gottwaldově (fakticky primátora). Zvláštní pozornost přitom věnuje jeho podílu na kolektivizaci zemědělství na Gottwaldovsku po roce 1948. Autor se nesnaží odpovědět jen na otázky spojené se samotným Jakešem, například co jej přivedlo ke komunistickému hnutí, jaké postoje zastával v měnících se politických poměrech a zda byl vždy konformním funkcionářem, ale na Jakešově regionální dráze se pokouší prohloubit dosavadní poznání procesu utváření nových mocenských elit během nastolování a upevňování komunistické diktatury. Jakeš podle něj v mnoha směrech zapadal do profilu nových stranických regionálních kádrů v období vrcholného stalinismu a zosobňoval typ funkcionářů, kteří svůj úspěch založili na dodržování aktuálně platné oficiální linie strany, při jejímž uvádění do praxe se snažili zohledňovat specifika konkrétního regionu. Skutečnost, že v čele padesátitisícového průmyslového městského centra formálně stanul sotva třicetiletý muž nízkého sociálního původu, bez výraznější kvalifikace a delších politických zkušeností, pak ilustruje enormní sociální mobilitu v poválečném, a především poúnorovém Československu.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.