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1

Making a Mark-Time Changing Politics from Estonia: An Alternative Idea for the British, Bulgarian and Estonian EU Presidency

100%

Fischer D.-H.

Baltic Journal of European Studies

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2016

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vol. 6

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issue 1

175-191

EN

Estonia is famous among politicians for its e-Governance policies. One core ingredient for this progress is the abolishment of outdated technologies and standards as this kind of legacy policy slows down the innovation process. This short paper adapts the Estonian approach towards legacy policy and proposes a political symbol initiated by the EU Presidency Trio of the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Estonia. The entire topic was inspired by the motivation of the Estonian government to use the presidency to make a mark for Estonia. The twice-yearly occurring process of introducing and disabling the summertime, is not only annoying but has also almost exclusively negative impacts. Meanwhile, the summertime itself comes with many aspects of questionable impact and even opposing empirical results, but it also has some generally agreed upon positive influences. This paper takes side against the process of changing times, but does not take position for one of the possible solutions. This short article shall only inform and show the possibilities in regard to the summer time, the EU presidency and the political symbolism of celebrating the centenary of the First World War.

2

The ‘Trio Presidency’ of the Council of the European Union: Towards More Continuity?

86%

Raik E.

Baltic Journal of European Studies

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2015

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vol. 5

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issue 1

19-35

EN

This article addresses the Council presidency trio mechanism codified in the Lisbon Treaty with a particular focus on the continuity question in the Council's decision-making framework. The aim of the article is to explore the effect of the formalised trio programme on continuity in the Council's decision-making process. To this end, the article looks at how the trio mechanism has evolved over time and how it functions in practice. While some analysts have been sceptical about the usefulness of the trio programme, these findings demonstrate that the launch of this institutional tool has improved the continuity in the Council's decision-making process. The positive effect on continuity results from three main factors-the trio programme as a formal tool in the Council's institutional tool-kit; the existence of political will among the presidencies to cooperate; and, lastly, the guiding role of the Council Secretariat. The article presents evidence gathered by tracing the preparations of joint trio programmes from 2007 to 2012.

3

The political system of the European Union and the politological and political determinants of the activity of the EU Council and the European Council

61%

Czachór Z.

Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej

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2019

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issue 13

31-42

PL

Jeżeli przyjąć, iż relacja Rada UE – Rada Europejska w kontekście poziomego podziału władzy opiera się na systemie checks and balances, czyli systemie „hamulców i równoważników”, nacisk musi zostać położony na równowagę, a nie oddzielenie władz/podmiotów ją wykonujących. Dlatego kompetencje i władza państwa i Unii Europejskiej są w formule tej relacji do pewnego stopnia wymieszane i nakładają się na siebie. Jednocześnie każdy z podmiotów dysponuje uprawnieniami decyzyjnymi, tworząc mechanizm politycznego oddziaływania. Władza Rady UE i Rady Europejskiej odseparowane są w sensie instytucjonalnym (strukturalnym i personalnym), ale nie funkcjonalnym, gdyż w rzeczywistości ich uprawnienia są ze sobą powiązane. Wynikiem konkurencji o władzę jest tu jej dzielenie, które opiera się na „wspólnym korzystaniu”, a więc łącznym wykonywaniu jej funkcji, zadań i ról. Uprawnienia jednej władzy nie powinny być bezpośrednio ani całkowicie wykonywane przez żadną z pozostałych władz i żadna z władz nie powinna uzyskać zdecydowanej przewagi nad innymi. To przesłanie towarzyszyć musi zarówno prezydencji Rady UE, jak i Przewodniczącemu Rady Europejskiej.

EN

If the relationship between the EU Council and the European Council in the context of the horizontal division of power is based on a system of checks and balances, the emphasis must be on balance rather than on the separation of authorities/entities exercising power. For this reason, the powers and authority of the states and of the European Union are to some extent mixed up in this relational formula, and they overlap. At the same time, each entity has decision-making powers creating a mechanism of political influence. The powers of the EU Council and the European Council are separated in terms of institutions (structures and personnel) but not of functions, because their powers are interrelated. The competition for power here results in its being shared, which is based on the ‘joint exercising’ of power and thus the joint performance of certain systemic functions, tasks and roles. The powers of one authority should not be performed directly or completely by any of the remaining authorities, and none of the authorities should gain a definite advantage over the others. This should be the message for both the presidency of the EU Council and for the President of the European Council.

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2 Baltic Journal of European Studies

1 Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej

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1 Raik E.

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Making a Mark-Time Changing Politics from Estonia: An Alternative Idea for the British, Bulgarian and Estonian EU Presidency

The ‘Trio Presidency’ of the Council of the European Union: Towards More Continuity?

The political system of the European Union and the politological and political determinants of the activity of the EU Council and the European Council