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Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2023
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vol. 78
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issue 3
165 – 179
EN
David Enoch attempts to develop a general theory of authority, not by defining the concept of authority or identifying a normative reason for obeying its commands but by describing the mechanism of commanding. According to Enoch, commands are part of a broader phenomenon, the so-called robust reason-giving, which includes promises and requests in addition to commands. Crucial to the theory of robust reason giving is the intention of the person providing the reason. In other words, commanding, promising, or requesting can only be done by someone who can form a complex intention, that is, to have a will of his own. In Enoch’s view, adult human beings, not small children and animals, form sufficiently complex intentions. Yet it seems young children and perhaps even animals can request, that is, of providing reasons robustly. This incoherence needs to be resolved if a theory of robust reason-giving, and hence a general theory of authority, is to be plausible. In this text, I have suggested how to understand the requests of small children and animals. Their speech acts resembling requests can be relatively unproblematic considered as communicating needs or wishes or merely triggering motivational reasons-giving. If we do not classify their speech acts as robust reason-giving, the theory of robust reason-giving (at least on this issue) remains coherent and can form the basis of a general theory of authority.
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