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EN
The paper is composed of three parts. In the first part the authoress deals with the criteria of demarcating science elaborated by philosophers of science, in the second she discusses the presence of demarcation within science itself, and in the third part she refers to the external socio-economical and political system as a source for still different criteria of demarcation.
EN
The main purpose of the paper is to reconstruct insights into the borders of science. This task is undertaken within sociology of scientific knowledge. The article presents a synthesis of the concepts provided by three different programmes within sociology of scientific knowledge.: neo-Durkheimian approach of Stephan Fuchs, historical analyses by Steven Shapin of Edinburgh School and empirical studies of Harry M. Collins and Trevor Pinch concerning the modern science. The main conclusion of the article is that problem of demarcation is rather practical and sociological than theoretical and philosophical.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 8
644 – 655
EN
The paper highlights Popper’s falsifiability as the demarcation criterion neither of science nor of empirical science, but of empirical content. The difference is of utmost importance for several reasons. First, it shows that the most widespread criticisms of Popper’s criterion are misguided. Second, it sheds new light on the relations between being empirical and being scientific. Third, it explains what still remains typical of empiricism after it has been purged from the three dogmas as described by Quine and Davidson. The paper elaborates on all the three points.
EN
Wojciech Sady has proposed that the hallmark of scientific theory depends heavily on the existence of a set of mutually connected empirical applications of the theory in question. The author claims that from the point of view of his philosophical interests the main merit of the new criterion of demarcation is that it gives a new support for his own analyses of the philosophical hard core of an evolutionary theory. He founds also a few faults of Sady's proposal. The major one is that he drew his conclusion from a detailed analysis of Roentgen's discovery only, and as such it does not necessarily fit to every scientific activity in every epoch in the history of science. It seems that it does not fit e.g. to more and more popular string theory in physics which does not have any empirical applications. Probably Sady has formulated only a sufficient condition for a theory with the scientific status, not a necessary one. Also his a-historical standpoint is very doubtful.
EN
Is psychology like another empirical discipline, say physics or biology, or is it fundamentally different? The principal aim of the article is to demonstrate that the last two revolutions in psychology were made for the sake of science. Chomsky, Fodor, Pylyshyn battled against the behaviorist point of view. Lakoff, Johnson, Langacker fought against syntactocentrism of Chomsky's generative grammar. From Chomsky's point of view Skinner's behaviorist theory is not science, but from the perspective of Langacker's cognitive grammar Chomsky's theory of competence is not science either. That is the reason why the questions: what is science?, who is a scientist?, and how is the world 'science' to be used?- are so important. Such reconstruction of the scientific practice is to some extence consonant with Kuhn's analysis of the history of science.
EN
The paper evaluates W. Sady's criterion of demarcation between science and non-science according to a metacriterion proposed by L. Laudan. The outcome of the examination is rejection of Sady's proposal. First, it is not-adequate, as it eliminates all discoveries not made in a systematic, planned way, even if they are of scientific importance and contribute to development of science. Secondly, it is not sufficiently precise, at it gives only the necessary condition of scientific status. Additionally, this short review points out some other flaws in Sady's theory.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 8
610 – 619
EN
The problem of demarcation may take on many forms. A philosopher may ask what is a typical of “true knowledge”, or whether science provides it, and if it does, what the reasons are. Thus he faces a demanding task of specifying the particularity of science as such because he has to find necessary as well as sufficient conditions of distinguishing between science and non-science. Add the urge to distinguish between meaningful and meaningless language expressions, and you get the ambition typical for the 20th century logical empiricism. The primary aim of the paper is to sum up a critical rationalist’s criticisms of demarcation criteria proposed by logical empiricism. The secondary aim is to link the criticisms, which are roughly known in our country, with the better known opinions of W. V. Quine and D. Davidson on three dogmas of empiricism.
EN
Criteria of demarcation to distinguish science from non-science are considered. The author argues that formal criteria, for example, proposed by logical empiricism, tried to fulfill simultaneously two tasks: (a) to find a logical standard of science, and (b) to discriminate science as it is customary conceived in scientific communities. However, both tasks conceive of science in two different meanings. The issue (a) is addressed to science as a system of sentences, propositions, etc. suitable for logical analysis, but the issue (b) treats science as a social phenomenon. Hence it is difficult to expect that one simple formula could effectively distinguish science from non-science and be applicable to both conceptions of what science is like. On the other hand, philosophical analysis of science is too atrractive to be abandoned as an enterprise. At the end of the paper, an account of rationality of science is outlined which is based on the concept of fair game. The proposal contrasts rational thinking and irrational ways of stating and solving problems.
EN
The author would like to show that the problem of logical constants can be helped by treating the problem of relationship between logic and human reasoning. Thus he will present some parallels between the respective dilemmas and show that choice of a proof-theoretic answer in one case induces an expressivist choice in the other and the other way round, as well. This does not mean that other options are closed, though the two selected ones are thus given a new plausibility. Furthermore, the proof-theoretical demarcations of logical constants can provide missing details into the expressivist story, as they say which constants and why can actually perform the expressivist job.
EN
The paper focuses on the problem of identification of laws of nature and their demarcation from other kinds of regularities. The problem is approached from the viewpoint of several metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological criteria. Firstly, several dominant approaches to the problem are introduced. Secondly, the logical and semantic explicatory framework - Transparent Intensional Logic - is presented for the sake of clarification of logical forms of sentences that are supposed to express the laws of nature. Finally, a complementary strategy to the demarcation problem is proposed, including reconsideration of relevant metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological requirements and principles behind the former conceptions.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 7
530 – 544
EN
The demarcation of science is discussed in a wider context of differentiating the elements of scientific knowledge from non-scientific or pseudoscientific cognitive fields. The traditional epistéme/doxa approach fails in differentiating the scientific from non-scientific. To resolve the problem of demarcation the arguments of the demarcation relation have to be made explicit. The heuristics of the explication is seen in the concept of the theory of science. It is suggested that the pluralistic character of the contemporary science should not be conceived as a hindrance to solving the problem of demarcation. Further, the specification of the objects of demarcation on both sides of the demarcation relation makes the possibilities as well as limits of demarcation more visible.
EN
The article proposes an analytical description of axiomatic assumptions and theoretical languages co-existing in current Russian sociology. Analyzing metaphors, paradoxes and tautologies in sociologists’ public communication the author demonstrates how imperatives of Soviet sociology are reproduced in competition of “neo-Soviet” and “anti-Soviet” semantics. Defending “value sovereignty of science” principle, he examines the logic of “Soviet in post-Soviet” reproduction.
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