Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  DURKHEIM EMILE
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

SOCIÁLNE REPREZENTÁCIE – KOGNITÍVNY VÝSKUMNÝ PROGRAM

100%
Kanovský M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2008
|
vol. 63
|
issue 5
397-406
EN
The paper gives an explanation of some ontological and epistemological commitments of a cognitive research program dealing with the social representations, which has been coined by Dan Sperber, namely of the epidemiology of representations. Social representations are described as causal chains linking together mental representations and public productions. The importance of the psychological aspects and external, historical aspects is stressed as necessary in explaining social phenomena. The paper reviews critically Durkheim's concept of social phenomena and an epistemologically more plausible alternative is offered.
2

ON MORAL AND PEDAGOGICAL ASPECTS OF DURKHEIM'S UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIALIZATION (K moralnim a pedagogickym aspektum Durkheimova pojeti socializace)

100%
Strouhal M.
Pedagogický časopis (Journal of Pedagogy)
|
2010
|
vol. 1
|
issue 1
25-48
EN
The text deals with different aspects of Durkheim's theory of socialisation. It mainly focuses on Durkheim's understanding of a person and on his specific individualism, which is one of the central concepts of his theory of education. The text addresses Durkheim's idea that every society is in the first place a fountain of moral life, and that every morality embraces a religious aspect. 'Religious' in this context means a relation with the sacred, i.e. sacrosanct principles. When we consider Durkheim's claim that the fibre of moral relations is the essence of social bonds, and that every society is a moral community sui generis, a question arises before us: What should the actual (moral) education be like considering the fact that our so called post-modern society emphasizes moral pluralism as the principal moral ideal?
3
Content available remote

ON THE (NON-)CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF RULES: CONTRASTING DURKHEIM AND BUCHANAN

100%
Valentinov V.
Sociológia (Sociology)
|
2007
|
vol. 39
|
issue 6
522-534
EN
The paper examines the viewpoints of James Buchanan and Emile Durkheim on the question whether the maintenance of social order can be understood as resulting from contractual exchange of rational individuals. It is argued that neither Buchanan's normative individualism requires considering the maintenance of social order as an outcome of an exchange process, nor Durkheim's notion of moral integration requires embracing methodological holism. On this basis, the paper proposes an individualist understanding of social order as collective self-sufficiency rather than exchange. The broader implication of this argument is that institutions must be generally viewed as based on variable combinations of self-sufficiency and exchange as alternative mechanisms of gratifying human wants.
4

K PREDPOKLADOM A SÚVISLOSTIAM FAKTU V SOCIÁLNOM POZNANÍ

72%
Sedová T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 7
613-624
EN
The paper examines the nature of the social fact in social knowledge on the background of the differences between sciences and social sciences. The applied approach is historical (E. Durkheim, M. Weber, M. Mauss, J. Searle), as well as one based on differentiation between Humean conception of fact and the conceptions, in which facts are seen as determining the truth values of our propositions. Intentionality and the structure of social facts in terms of Searle's construction of the social are underlined as well as the weakness of his conception. In conclusion it is asserted that the construction of facts in social sciences is impossible without psychological vocabulary and concepts, which contents are conceived - contrary to Searle's internalism - in terms of externalism.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.