Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 6

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Daesh
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Propaganda Daesh

100%
PL
The aim of the article was to show the diversity of Daesh propaganda. It consists of the of political, religious and social narratives. They have one task - to convince the world that the newly created ‘caliphate’ is a fact: it has the ability to defend its territory, no matter of how great is the efforts of ‘crusaders’, moreover, is an efficient state, which is an ideal home for Sunnis. Brutality is the element with which the propaganda Daesh primarily connotations, appears very frequently. It has specific role - to deter opponents. This reason why so often presents „hunting” on Iraqi soldiers, and mass executions. This brutality, in connection with mercy, meeting the needs of justice and belonging, makes propagandas an efficient tool for building ‘caliphate’.
EN
The creation of the “Caliphate” is one of the greatest threats to international order. So, it is reasonable to attempt to determine the nature of this organisation. The various schools in the area of ​​international relations are helpful in this regard. For this purpose, the characteristics of Daesh are shown in the first part of the article. In subsequent sections of the conclusions to the first part, the most important research schools have been compared. According to the accepted assumption, the school of realism is the most appropriate for the study of Daesh. However, other schools can contribute to a better understanding of the organisation, showing the multidimensional and multifaceted threats for the international order coming from Daesh.
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie źródeł pozyskiwania funduszy przez Daesh począwszy od czerpania największych zysków z surowców naturalnych, podatków i wymuszeń przez inne nielegalne procedery związane z porwaniami dla okupu, handlem ludźmi, sprzedażą zrabowanych antyków, aż po wzbogacanie bazy finansowej zagranicznymi dotacjami, przejęciem banków, arbitrażem walutowym czy gromadzeniem pieniędzy za pomocą sieci społecznościowych. Warto zwrócić uwagę na tradycyjny sposób przesyłania pieniędzy przez terrorystów za pomocą systemu hawala oraz nowoczesnych transferów związanych z wykorzystaniem kryptowalut (np. Bitcoin) oraz kart prepaid. Ciągłe zmniejszanie się terenów kontrolowanych przez Daesh oraz utrata populacji niewątpliwie wpływa negatywnie na ich dalsze funkcjonowanie, a tym samym znacznie osłabia dywersyfikację dochodów. Jednak stopniowe zatrzymywanie ekspansji terytorialnej może, lecz nie musi wskazywać na rozpad istniejącego tworu.
PL
A war on terrorism was verbally declared by US President G.W. Bush on 11 September 2001. This declaration was a response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The crash of the two planes, people throwing themselves from the burning towers, the smoke and the panic evoked enormous emotions. It highlighted shortly afterwards the distinction between the“us” and “them”. “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” (Bush, 2001). In this communication we will argue that the speeches on terrorism, which have been part of American politics for a long period of time, are finding their place in the Middle East. The emergence of Daesh reframed the speeches in this part of the world and created a new terminology of modern Islam, real Islam, etc. These speeches became the way that leaders of countries use to justify their participation in the war against this entity. Among these countries is Jordan. In this paper, we will focus on the construction of identities of “us” and “them” used in the propaganda of Daesh and the speeches of king Abdullah II especially after the horrible death of the Jordanian Pilot Muath Al Kassassbeh using the Critical Discourse Analysis Methods.
Zoon Politikon
|
2017
|
issue 8
313-338
PL
Powstanie w czerwcu 2014 r. tak zwanego Państwa Islamskiego (Daesh) na terenie Iraku i Syrii, w szczególności zaś jego szybkie sukcesy terytorialne, w tym poparcie, jakim zaczęło się Daesh cieszyć wśród niektórych środowisk radykalnych na Bliskim Wschodzie, ale i w wielu państwach Europy, było szokiem zarówno dla establishmentów rządzących w regionie, jak i dla przywódców Zachodu. W celu zapobieżenia rozszerzenia się Daesh na kolejne państwa regionu administracja Baracka Obamy zorganizowała Globalna Koalicję Przeciwko Daesh. W działania przeciwko Deash włączyła się również Rosja oraz Iran, jednak głównym celem obu krajów jest zapobieżenie upadku reżimu w Damaszku. Utrata przez Daesh większości terytorium w 2017 r. nie oznacza wyeliminowania tej organizacji w tym radykalizmu z Bliskiego Wschodu. Pojawiły się natomiast nowe punkty zapalne, w tym związane z kwestią kurdyjską, jak również problem powrotów zradykalizowanych bojowników do krajów pochodzenia.
EN
The establishment in June 2014 of the so-called Islamic State (Daesh) in Iraq and Syria, in particular its rapid success territorial, including support, which began Daesh enjoying among some circles of radical Middle East, but also in many European countries, it was a shock for both for of the establishment's rulers in the region and for Western leaders. In order to prevent Daesh from spreading to other countries in the region, Barack Obama's administration organized a Global Coalition Against Daesh. In these actions against the spread of Daesh Russia and Iran was also included, but the main goal of both countries is to prevent the fall of the regime in Damascus. The loss by Daesh majority territory in 2017 does not mean the elimination of the organization radicalism of the Middle East. There are however some new flashpoints, including those related to the Kurdish issue, as well as the problem of radicalized fighters returning to their countries of origin.
EN
The study of warfare, throughout its history, as well as efforts to legally regulate the resort to war and the conduct of war, were concentrated exclusively on one form of warfare - interstate conflict. Only since the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York in 2001 and the following ‘Global War on Terrorism’ has a discussion on a potentially new kind of warfare - asymmetric warfare - moved into the spotlight. Despite all the scientific attention, the concept of asymmetric warfare remains undefined or ill-defined until today, resulting in a proliferation of its use and limiting its value. Hence, restraint in the use of the term is necessary, in order to reinforce its analytical value and applicability. Defining asymmetric warfare as a conflict among opponents who are so different in their basic features that comparison of their military power is rendered impossible, is such an attempt to limit the term to a substantially new form of warfare, witnessed in a conflict that is often commonly called the Global War on Terrorism. The past two years, since the upsurge of the so-called Islamic State to the forefront of the salafi jihadi movement, have witnessed a significant change in this war. Superficial analysis could lead to the conclusion that the proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate on the territories of Iraq and Syria (for now) seems to have recalibrated this conflict into traditional inter- state war again, making the concept of asymmetric warfare obsolete and diminishing it into just a short-term aberration in the history of warfare. Nothing could be further from the truth. The enemy in the Global War on Terrorism was and remains a global and territorially unrestricted ideological movement whose numbers cannot even be estimated, which fights its battles wherever it chooses to, and whose ultimate goal is the annihilation of the international system of sovereign states, not the creation of a new state within this system. The Islamic Caliphate in its current boundaries is nothing more than the “model Islamic state”, as envisioned by Osama bin Laden in his 1996 fatwa as part of Al Qaeda’s 200 year plan for the establishment of God’s Islamic World Order. This grand strategy is the guiding blueprint of the salafi jihad that is waged against the Westphalian state system in a war that is truly asymmetric. We have to adjust to this strategic asymmetry if we are to prevail in this struggle, fighting a long war against an indefinable enemy on battlefields that are still unknown.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.