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1

Kartezjusz Chomsky’ego. Uwagi o znaczeniu myśli Kartezjusza dla badań Chomsky’ego nad językiem i poznaniem

100%

Sztajer S.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2015

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vol. 63

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issue 1

85-100

PL

Artykuł poświęcony jest zarówno odczytaniu myśli Kartezjusza przez Noama Chomsky’ego, jak i znaczeniu wybranych idei Kartezjusza dla rozwijanych przez Chomsky’ego koncepcji języka i poznania. Stawiam pytanie o rzeczywisty wpływ myśli Kartezjusza na koncepcje zaproponowane przez Chomsky’ego, przede wszystkim zaś na ideę tzw. lingwistyki kartezjańskiej. Stawiam tezę, że choć można wyróżnić kilka istotnych cech filozofii Kartezjusza, które miały wpływ na koncepcję Chomsky’ego, przekonanie o istotnej inspiracji kartezjańskiej wydaje się nieuzasadnione. Kartezjusz nie odegrał żadnej istotnej roli w kształtowaniu się tradycji językoznawczej, która rzekomo zachowała ciągłość do XIX wieku i której oddziaływanie dostrzegalne jest we współczesnym językoznawstwie. Określenie „lingwistyka kartezjańska” nie odnosi się do żadnego spójnego zbioru poglądów na język, zaś rzekomych reprezentantów lingwistyki kartezjańskiej nie łączą wspólne założenia na tyle istotne, by można ich włączyć do tej samej tradycji.

EN

The article focuses on Chomsky’s interpretation of the philosophy of Descartes as well as on the importance of selected Descartes’s ideas for the theories of language and cognition developed by Chomsky. The main questions concerns the actual influence of Descartes on the theory proposed by Chomsky, especially on the so called Cartesian linguistics. The thesis is advanced that although it is possible to point out several Cartesian ideas that influenced Chomsky’s thought, it cannot be said that this influence was essential to the development of his theory of language and cognition. Descartes played no essential role in the development of the linguistic tradition that continued until the 19th century and that is still visible in the present day linguistics. The term “Cartesian linguistics” does not refer to any coherent body of knowledge concerning language. The alleged representatives of Cartesian linguistics do not share any essential assumptions and thus they cannot be seen as representatives of the same tradition.

2

Descartes i problem nieśmiertelności duszy ludzkiej

100%

Kopania J.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2014

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vol. 62

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issue 4

9-32

PL

Descartes argumentował, wychodząc od swej słynnej tezy „Myślę, więc jestem”, o której sądził, że jest jedynym twierdzeniem niepowątpiewalnym, że udowodnił istnienie jedynie dwóch substancji: materialnej i duchowej, które są całkowicie różne, odrębne i autonomiczne w swych działaniach. Od czasu, gdy pisał swoje Medytacje o pierwszej filozofii, żywił głębokie przekonanie, że może także udowodnił nieśmiertelność duszy ludzkiej na mocy tezy o jej substancjalnej odrębności. Jednakże w trakcie pisania Medytacji, a szczególnie w rezultacie dyskusji ze swymi oponentami, przekonał się, że na gruncie jego filozofii taki dowód jest po prostu niemożliwy. W artykule ukazuje się tok myślenia Descartes’a oraz proces zastępowania metafizycznego punktu widzenia etycznym punktem widzenia.

EN

Descartes argued, starting from his famous thesis “I think, therefore I am” which he thought to be the only unquestionable proposition, that he succeeded in proving that there are only two substances – material and spiritual – which are entirely distinct, separate, and autonomous in their actions. From the time he wrote his Meditations on First Philosophy he was deeply convinced that he was also able to prove the immortality of the human soul by virtue of the claim of its substantial distinctness. However, when writing his Meditations, and especially as a result of the discussions with his opponents he became convinced that on the ground of his philosophy such a proof was simply impossible. This article presents Descartes’ way of thinking, and the process of replacing the metaphysical point of view with the ethical point of view.

3

W poszukiwaniu ostatecznej pewności – Kartezjańskie cogito i Ebnerowskie słowo

99%

Skorulski K.

Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny

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2015

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issue 2(236)

92-114

EN

The original experience, traditionally regarded as the beginning of philosophy, is analysed here in terms of certainty, based on the two thinkers from different eras: René Descartes and Ferdinand Ebner. Descartes, as we know, sees absolute certainty in the experience of cogito, while Ebner sees it in the current experience of speech, especially in the expression “I am”, taken in the personal actuality of it being spoken. However, it seems that the experience of Descartes is also based on the specific current experience of speech, interpreted, however, as a thought, and the actually experienced “I”is transformed to ego, to a “thinking substance”. The purpose of this discussion is to show that cogito is to be regarded as secondary relative to the “word in its actuality”. The consequence of this fact is the need for a new, “not Cartesian” rationality that could be called dialogical.

4

On The (Im)Possibility of Philosophical Teaching According to the Pathos of the Philosopher

99%

Schoof C.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2019

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issue 2

147-152

EN

In this essay I expose two historical examples of the ambivalence of the place of philosophical knowledge in society. The symptomatic starting point is Aristotle’s char- acterization of the philosopher. Then, through the specification of Descartes’s views on philosophy, culture, the human and the artificial, I will show that there exists certain tension between the development of philosophy as a free knowledge available to every- one and philosophy as a specialized knowledge only suitable for initiates. Nowadays, when philosophy is in a critical situation maybe because of that ambivalence, the need arises to overcome this problem and democratize it.

5

Descartes, Foucault, Derrida

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Karel K.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2010

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vol. 58

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issue 2

171-202

EN

The article offers a detailed interpretation of Foucault’s and Derrida’s readings of the passages about madness and dreaming in Descartes’ First Meditation. The article begins by focusing on Descartes’ text and Foucault’s original reading of it in his History of Madness, a reading clearly determined by the overall direction of Foucault’s first great book. It then inquires into Derrida’s criticism of Foucault in “Cogito and the History of Madness”, and shows how Foucault, in his rejoinder, „My Body, This Paper, This Fire“, subtly changes his original line of interpretation. In fact, Foucault’s new reading, strongly emphasising the meditative dimension of Descartes’ text, directly anticipates the key issues treated by Foucault in his final period. As for Derrida’s dialogical approach to Descartes’ Meditation, the article submits that it may have been directly influenced by a passage on dreaming from Descartes’ later Search for Truth. Besides these particular points and some further detailed analyses, the article summarises the wider implications of the dispute for our understanding of the philosophical positions of both thinkers.

6

Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences, plus la Dioptrique, les Météores et la Géométrie qui sont des essais de cette méthode

99%

Błaszczyk P., Mrówka K., Descartes R.

ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

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2014

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vol. 4

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issue 2

439-446

7

Nauka Kościoła wobec wyzwań czasu post. Wokół encykliki papieża Franciszka Fratelli Tutti. O braterstwie i przyjaźni społecznej

85%

Zarębska M.

Polonia Journal

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2021

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issue 14

33-53

EN

Encyclical Fratelli tutti is the second social Francis´ encyclical. It is entirely devoted to the problems of the modern world. Its message is patronized by the teaching of Saint Francis. In its main problems, it refers to the entirely of its autor´s teaching. First of all, it is an encyclical Laudato si´ of the year 2015. At the same time, the apostolic exhortation on Pope Francis from 2013 Evangelli Gaudium deserves special attention. In the later, the pope presents four „principles”. 1. „Time is greater than space”. 2. „Unity prevals over conflict”; 3. „Realities are more important than ideas”; 4. „The whole is greater than the part”. These principles mean in practice that there is a place for everyone in social life. And this is where brotherhood is expressed. This is the „spirit” of the teaching of Saint Francis. The text of the encyclical opens new perspekctives for teaching of the Church

8

Pascal a problem sceptycyzmu

85%

Kleszcz R.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2011

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issue 15

139-160

EN

Skepticism is a doctrine which holds the possibilities of knowledge to be limited. There are many types of skepticism (practical /theoretical, partial/total, moderate/ radical, etc). Scepticism as a philosophy began with Pyrrho of Elis (365–275 BC). The rediscovery of the skeptical texts during Renaissance affected the development of modern sceptical currents. In France philosophical statements of skepticism were offered by Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592). Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) great French mathematician, scientist, inventor an religious thinker was familiar with Montaigne sceptical ideas. Pascal refers to Montaigne as the most illustrious defender of skepticism. Blaise Pascal point of view is original. Whenever he insists that no proof is ever certain but simultaneously he adds that skepticism is untenable because we have reasons to believe.

9

Pewność jako perspektywa poznawcza. Anty-nowożytne pojęcie pewności

85%

Gurczyńska-Sady K.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2012

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issue nr 20

65-81

EN

The article presents new understanding of the certainty which appears in the 20th century in relation to revolutionary changes of the important for the philosophy notionsas: the subject, the existence, the cognition, or the knowledge. The author is makingthe presentation by pointing to the new, comparing to the modern tradition, sourceof the knowledge. Describing her new figure as the sense, which is not reflectedby the subject but is freeing, the certainty is finding not in thecogito, located outsidethe world, but in thebehaviorof the embodied subject.

10

Pascal a problem sceptycyzmu

85%

Kleszcz R.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2011

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issue 15

139 - 160

EN

Skepticism is a doctrine which holds the possibilities of knowledge to be limited. There are many types of skepticism (practical /theoretical, partial/total, moderate/ radical, etc). Scepticism as a philosophy began with Pyrrho of Elis (365–275 BC). The rediscovery of the skeptical texts during Renaissance affected the development of modern sceptical currents. In France philosophical statements of skepticism were offered by Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592). Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) great French mathematician, scientist, inventor an religious thinker was familiar with Montaigne sceptical ideas. Pascal refers to Montaigne as the most illustrious defender of skepticism. Blaise Pascal point of view is original. Whenever he insists that no proof is ever certain but simultaneously he adds that skepticism is untenable because we have reasons to believe.

11

Why We Are Not “Persons”

85%

Cottingham J.

Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture

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2018

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vol. 2

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issue 1(3)

5–16

EN

To the question “What are we?”, the common-sense answer is “human beings”; but many philosophers prefer to say we are “persons”. This paper argues that the philosophical use of “person” (to mean, roughly, a conscious, rational agent) is problematic. It takes us away from the sound Aristotelian idea that our biological nature is essential to what we are, and towards the suspect Lockean idea that a person could migrate from one body to another. This dualistic Lockean conception is often laid at Descartes’s door, but Descartes himself in many passages underlines our status as human beings. There is a further danger in the idea of personhood as rational agency if (following Kant) it is seen as that which makes someone worthy of moral respect. Respect should be recognized as an inalienable and absolute human entitlement, independent of our circumstances, capacities, group-membership, qualifications or faculties.

12

Response to Essays on Are We Bodies or Souls?

85%

Swinburne R.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 69

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issue 1

119-138

PL

This paper consists of my responses to the comments by nine commentators on my book Are we Bodies or Souls? It makes twelve separate points, each one relevant to the comments of one or more of the commentators, as follows: (1) I defend my understanding of “knowing the essence” of an object as knowing a set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to be that object; (2) I claim that there cannot be thoughts without a thinker; (3) I argue that my distinction of “mental” from “physical” events in terms of whether anyone has privileged access to whether or not they occur, is a clear one; (4) and (5) I defend my account of metaphysical modality and its role in defending my account of personal identity; (6) I defend my view that Descartes’s argument in favor of the view that humans are essentially souls fails, but that my amended version of that argument succeeds; (7) I claim that my theory acknowledges the closeness of the connection in an earthly life between a human soul and its body; (8) I argue that my Cartesian theory of the soul-body relation is preferable to Aquinas’s theory of that; (9) I argue that a material thing cannot have mental properties; (10) I argue that any set of logically necessary conditions for an object to be the object it is, which together form a logically sufficient condition for this, mutually entails any other such set; (11) I deny that a dualist needs to provide an explanation of how the soul has the capacities that it has; and finally (12) I defend my view that souls have thisness, and claim that that is not a difficulty for the view that God determines which persons will exist.

13

Karteziánský reprezentacionalismus, nebo kognitivní realismus?

85%

Heider D.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2014

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vol. 62

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issue 1

101-123

EN

This review study looks at David Clemenson’s book Descartes’ Theory of Ideas from both the historical and systematic points of view. From the historical point of view, the theme of the (late) scholastic influences on Descartes’ theory of ideas is tackled, while from the systematic point of view Descartes’ theory is interpreted dealing with the question of Cartesian representationalism or direct (cognitive) realism. An analysis of the immediate Scholastic texts, written by Jesuits (and taught at the Jesuit college La Flèche, where the young Descartes studied) is used by Clemenson to support his argument for a so-called weak version of direct realism, actually identical with a weak version of representationalism. The author of this review study, despite appreciating the connection of these two levels, making possible a consistent interpretation of some of Descartes’ ostensibly contradictory statements, draws attention to certain deficiencies and obscurities concerning, primarily, the scholastic dimension of the subject-matter.

14

The Problem of the External World in René Descartes, Edmund Husserl, Immanuel Kant and the Evil Genius: A Perennial Problem for Philosophers?

85%

Allinson R. E.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2020

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issue 1

57-66

EN

The need to prove the existence of the external world has been a subject that has concerned the rationalist philosophers, particularly Descartes and the empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Taking the epoché as the key mark of the phenomenologist—the suspension of the question of the existence of the external world—the issue of the external world should not come under the domain of the phenomenologist. Ironically, however, I would like to suggest that it could be argued that the founder of the phenomenological school of thought, Edmund Husserl, also did not avoid the question of the existence of the external world. What I would like to suggest further is that Immanuel Kant grants himself illicit access to the external world and thus illustrates that the question of the external world is vital to the argument structure of the first Critique.

15

Swinburne’s Hyper-Cartesian Dualism

85%

Cottingham J.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2021

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vol. 69

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issue 1

23-31

PL

This paper maintains that Swinburne’s argument that the body is not essential to who I am is vulnerable to a similar objection to that put forward by Arnauld against Descartes: how do I know that my self-identification furnishes a complete and adequate account of the essential “me,” sufficient to show I could really continue to exist even were the body to be destroyed? The paper goes on to criticize Swinburne’s “hyper-Cartesian” position, that we are simply “souls who control bodies,” and thus only contingently human. This denial of our essential humanity compares unfavorably with Descartes’s own more intuitively attractive view that the human being is a genuine entity in its own right.

16

Charles-Claude Genest: Cartesianism and Theology

85%

Drozdek A.

Studia Teologiczno-Historyczne Śląska Opolskiego

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2022

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vol. 42

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issue 1

113-123

PL

Charles-Claude Genest (1639–1719) był księdzem katolickim, który w swoim wierszowanym dziele Zasady filozofii zaproponował dowód na istnienie Boga i na nieśmiertelność duszy. W tym przedsięwzięciu wykorzystał jako podstawę filozoficzną idee Kartezjusza, w szczególności zasadę Cogito, ontologiczny dowód na istnienie Boga oraz fizyczną teorię wirów i plenum. Jednak Genest wykorzystywał w swoich wywodach idee fizyko-teologiczne w znacznie większymstopniu aniżeli Kartezjusz.

EN

Charles-Claude Genest was a Catholic priest who in his versified work, Principles of philosophy, proposed evidence of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul. In this undertaking he used as his philosophical foundation the ideas of Descartes, in particular, his cogito principle, the ontological argument for the existence of God, and his physical theory of vertices and the plenum. However, Genest used in his arguments to a much larger extent physico-theological ideas than Descartes did.

17

Hermeneutyczna koncepcja podmiotu Martina Heideggera.

85%

Łojek S.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2017

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vol. 40

5-27

EN

Philosophy is hermeneutics. This statement by Martin Heidegger may be read as a call to practice philosophy in a new way and, therefore, to look critically at the whole philosophical tradition. But this new approach to philosophizing, different from the traditional one, implies different understanding of the essence of man. According to the author of Being and Time, the hermeneutical conception of humanity describes more adequately than any previous conceptions our factual experience of both ourselves and the surrounding reality. He strongly opposes it to the modern vision of subjectivity, which he derives from Descartes. This paper is an attempt at analyzing this opposition. Much attention is devoted to the examination of the general relationship between prevailing visions of reality and dominant views on the essence of man. In particular, I’m interested in the relationship, which is very important for Heidegger, between the scientific picture of the world and the modern conception subjectivity. I consider, too, the practical consequences of the prevalence of this particular image of humanity.

18

Źródła polskiego kartezjanizmu fenomenologicznego: Od Idei i percepcji do Człowieka i czasu

80%

Starzyński W.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2023

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vol. 71

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issue 3

63-92

EN

The aim of this article is to examine the sources of Polish phenomenological Cartesianism, which the author hypothesises to be found in Kazimierz Twardowski’s doctoral dissertation Idee und Perception: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung aus Descartes (1891). The dissertation is examined from the aspect of Brentano’s influence on it, which can be seen both at the level of epistemological solutions and in the concept of practising the history of philosophy. Although Twardowski corrects Brentano’s interpretation of Descartes, he remains on the ground of Brentano's descriptive psychology, which constitutes a certain preliminary version of phenomenology. The second part of the article reconstructs the Cartesian motif contained in Roman Ingarden’s egology as presented in his Człowiek i czas [Man and Time] (1937–1946), in order to conclude by characterising the common elements supporting the continuity and specificity of the Cartesian motif in the beginnings of Polish phenomenology.

PL

Celem artykułu jest zbadanie źródeł polskiego kartezjanizmu fenomenologicznego, które autor hipotetycznie sytuuje w rozprawie doktorskiej Kazimierza Twardowskiego Idee und Perception. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung aus Descartes (1891). Rozprawa jest badana w aspekcie brentanowskiego na nią wpływu, który daje się zauważyć zarówno na poziomie rozstrzygnięć epistemologicznych, jak i w koncepcji uprawiania historii filozofii. Choć Twardowski koryguje w niej kartezjańską interpretację Brentana, to pozostaje na gruncie brentanowskiej psychologii opisowej, stanowiącej pewną wstępną wersję fenomenologii. W drugiej części artykułu rekonstruuje się wątek kartezjański zawarty w egologii Romana Ingardena, jaką zaprezentował w Człowieku i czasie (1937–1946), by w konkluzji scharakteryzować wspólne elementy przemawiające za ciągłością i swoistością motywu kartezjańskiego w początkach polskiej fenomenologii.

19

Thomas Hobbes’s Elements of Law and His Third Objections to Descartes’s Meditations

74%

Wawrzonkowski K.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2020

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vol. 68

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issue 2

179-194

EN

In this article I endeavour to present the axis of the dispute between Hobbes and Descartes on the ground of Meditation, and its most important moments. I focus primarily on the analysis of the most important accusations made by Hobbes and the reconstruction of some of his views, which at the time could only be found in The Elements of Law, Nature, and Politics. This work was the first major and coherent attempt to speak out on cognitive-theory and social issues; I strive to defend the thesis that understanding the content of Objections requires knowledge of this work. The mature form of the work shows that the Englishman already had his views well thought-out and could feel quite confident in formulating from their perspective critical remarks on Descartes’s philosophy, to which, it seems, he may have owed quite a lot.

PL

Elementy prawa Thomasa Hobbesa a jego zarzuty trzecie do Medytacji Kartezjusza W niniejszym artykule staram się przedstawić oś sporu pomiędzy Hobbesem i Descartesem na gruncie Medytacji, oraz jego najważniejsze momenty. Skupiam się przede wszystkim na analizie najważniejszych postawionych przez Hobbesa zarzutów i rekonstrukcji wybranych jego poglądów, które wówczas można było odnaleźć jedynie w The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. Dzieło to było jego pierwszą większą i spójną próbą wypowiedzi na zagadnienia teoriopoznawcze i społeczne; staram się bronić tezy, że zrozumienie treści Zarzutów wymaga znajomości owego dzieła. Dojrzała forma dzieła świadczy o tym, że Anglik już wówczas miał swoje poglądy przemyślane i mógł czuć się dość pewnie formułując z ich perspektywy uwagi krytyczne względem filozofii Descartes’a, której jak się wydaje mógł on niejedno zawdzięczać.

20

In Pursuit of True Wisdom: How the Re-Emergence of Classical Wonder Should Replace Descartes’s Neo-Averrostic Sophistry

71%

Nehez J.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2020

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vol. 9

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issue 2

287-315

EN

Modern mathematical physics often claims to make philosophy obsolete. This presentation aims to show that the modern concept of wisdom fundamentally diverges with the thinking of Descartes, that, strictly speaking, at least in his metaphysical first principles, if not in his chief aim, he may be a sophist and no philosopher at all. Descartes denies the classical understanding of philosophy and thereby reduces the human person to an intellect separate from the body. Descartes initiated a popular understanding of sophistry that reverberates to today in our modern institutions of philosophy and science. But St. Thomas Aquinas anticipated this divergence and gave a defense of true wisdom in his writing against Averroes. This presentation concludes with what constitutes real philosophy and science as presented by St. Thomas Aquinas, namely sense wonder that creates a search for the true knowledge of the unity responsible for true causes of true effects. For a true restoration of philosophy and science we will need a reemergence and recovery of this understanding of wisdom.

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Kartezjusz Chomsky’ego. Uwagi o znaczeniu myśli Kartezjusza dla badań Chomsky’ego nad językiem i poznaniem

Descartes i problem nieśmiertelności duszy ludzkiej

W poszukiwaniu ostatecznej pewności – Kartezjańskie cogito i Ebnerowskie słowo

On The (Im)Possibility of Philosophical Teaching According to the Pathos of the Philosopher

Descartes, Foucault, Derrida

Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences, plus la Dioptrique, les Météores et la Géométrie qui sont des essais de cette méthode

Nauka Kościoła wobec wyzwań czasu post. Wokół encykliki papieża Franciszka Fratelli Tutti. O braterstwie i przyjaźni społecznej

Pascal a problem sceptycyzmu

Pewność jako perspektywa poznawcza. Anty-nowożytne pojęcie pewności

Pascal a problem sceptycyzmu

Why We Are Not “Persons”

Response to Essays on Are We Bodies or Souls?

Karteziánský reprezentacionalismus, nebo kognitivní realismus?

The Problem of the External World in René Descartes, Edmund Husserl, Immanuel Kant and the Evil Genius: A Perennial Problem for Philosophers?

Swinburne’s Hyper-Cartesian Dualism

Charles-Claude Genest: Cartesianism and Theology

Hermeneutyczna koncepcja podmiotu Martina Heideggera.

Źródła polskiego kartezjanizmu fenomenologicznego: Od Idei i percepcji do Człowieka i czasu

Thomas Hobbes’s Elements of Law and His Third Objections to Descartes’s Meditations

In Pursuit of True Wisdom: How the Re-Emergence of Classical Wonder Should Replace Descartes’s Neo-Averrostic Sophistry