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1

Słaba wola – w stronę eksternalizmu motywacyjnego

100%

Milczarek K.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

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2022

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issue 73

145-162

PL

Jedną z fundamentalnych kwestii podnoszonych w dyskusji nad problemem słabej woli jest spór o zasadę internalizmu motywacyjnego. Zgodnie z jej treścią osąd sprawcy, że lepiej wykonać pewne działanie, pociąga chęć wykonania tego działania. W artykule omawiam argumenty wysuwane w obronie tej zasady, aby dowieść, że nie dostarczają one wystarczająco dobrych racji na rzecz jej wiarygodności. Na podstawie tych argumentów formułuję warunki działania akratycznego, które składają się na eksternalistyczną analizę słabej woli. Zaproponowana koncepcja ma pogodzić dwa twierdzenia: po pierwsze, że praktyczny osąd nie jest tożsamy z pragnieniem, oraz po drugie, że w przypadku zwyczajnych działań istnieje związek logiczny między przyczynami działania a samym działaniem. W tym celu wskazana zostaje norma racjonalności, która jest naruszana przy działaniu akratycznym.

EN

One of the fundamental issues raised in the discussion of the problem of weak will is the dispute over the principle of motivational internalism. According to the principle, an agent’s judgment that it is better to perform a certain action entails a desire to perform that action. In this paper, I discuss the arguments for the principle in order to show that they do not provide sufficient reasons for its plausibility. On the basis of these arguments, I formulate the conditions for acratic action in order to provide an externalist analysis of weak will. The aim is to reconcile two claims: that practical judgment is not equivalent to desire, and that in the case of ordinary actions there is a logical connection between the causes of the action and the action itself. For this purpose, the norm of rationality that is violated in acratic action is identified.

2

Ontologický obrat v kulturní antropologii a jeho relativistická příchuť: Co všechno se Grinchovi nepovedlo

99%

Paleček M., Risjord M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2015

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vol. 63

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issue 5

667-688

EN

Recent writing associated with the so-called “ontological turn” provokes many theoretical questions. Anthropologists associated with the ontological turn deny the representationalist framework, where cultures are treated as clusters of beliefs that operate like different perspectives on a single world. These authors speak about many “worlds” instead of many cultures, and therefore it seems to imply a kind of relativism. We argue that, unlike earlier forms of relativism, the ontological turn in anthropology is not only immune to the arguments of Donald Davidson’s “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, but it affirms and develops the antirepresentationalist position of Davidson’s subsequent essays.

3

Matafora jako marzenie języka. Koncepcja metafory Donalda Davidsona

80%

Filipczuk M.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

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2016

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vol. 28/1

217-243

EN

In his article What metaphors means Donald Davidson points out that there is an "error and confusion" in claiming "that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning". Metaphor has no special meaning, says Davidson and gives a number of arguments to support his controversial thesis. "If a metaphor has a special cognitive content, why should it be so difficult or impossible to set it out?" – he asks rhetorically. Davidson makes many remarks about the effects of a metaphor; he shows that metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use and denies that the metaphorical sentences have any special cognitive content. "For a metaphor says only what shows on its face – usually a patent falsehood or an absurd truth... given in the literal meaning of the words". In the first part of my paper, I analyse Davidson’s concept of metaphor in terms of his own assumptions. First, I argue that Davidson narrows the commonsense use of “meaning”, which is much wider than he makes it out to be. Secondly, if metaphors belong exclusively to the domain of use, it is only when language is used in a peculiar, untypical way (drawing our attention to the paradoxical coincidence of words within metaphor) that a sentence can be considered metaphorical. If so, all we do is violate the everyday use of language, or even modify its rules, and let the context influence the meaning of words within the metaphor. We don't make those words mean something other than they usually mean. The last part of my paper deals with Davidson's claim that interpretation is the work of imagination and creation. I argue that the understanding of metaphor has a dynamic structure. If metaphorical sentences say something with suggestive indefiniteness, it is because metaphor is a kind of task that lies before a reader or a listener, a variant of ancient gnome. It is true that it is all about the effect but usually the effect is not instantaneous. Following Coleridge, I view understanding in terms of growth. It leads an individual to undertake an attempt to grasp certain objective truths. What we notice thanks to extraordinary metaphors in literature and philosophy is that they illuminate us somehow. Our task is then to express this effect in language. Therefore, contrary to what Davidson claims, the possibility of multiple interpretations do not necessarily question the objective cognitive content of a metaphor.

4

Metafory w nauce

80%

Czarnocka M., Mazurek M.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2012

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vol. 48

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issue 1 (191)

5-26

EN

We analyze critically the most important contemporary conceptions of metaphors in science, i.e., those proposed by Max Black, Rom Harré, Thomas S. Kuhn, and Donald Davidson. We also present an alternative view on the metaphor essence. This view states that a metaphor is the conclusion of deductive reasoning; its premises are a description of the secondary object of the metaphor and the thesis on similarity between the secondary and primary objects. The metaphorical character is created by referring in the metaphor exposition to the whole reasoning and to its usual elliptic character.

5

"(In)distinct Languages": Revisiting the Dualism of Literal and Literary Meaning in Roman Jakobson and Donald Davidson

80%

Mijatović A.

Slavia Meridionalis

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2021

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vol. 21

PL

W artykule poddano analizie relacje między językiem dosłownym a językiem literackim, występujące w strukturalizmie i filozofii analitycznej. W rozważaniach istotna była konfrontacja koncepcji języka poetyckiego Romana Jakobsona i Donalda Davidsona oraz ich związku z ogólną ideą języka, jaką można znaleźć w ich pracach. Rozważając ponownie argumenty Jakobsona i Davidsona, autor proponuje porzucić dualistyczne hipotezy, zasadzające się na opozycji między językiem dosłownym a językiem niedosłownym oraz między językiem dosłownym a językiem literackim. Twierdzi, że pojęcia znaczenia pierwszego i dosłownego są niezbędne w innych typach interpretacji. Hipoteza dualistyczna wymaga modelu kaskadowego, który ukazuje przejście od dołu do góry przez hierarchicznie ułożone poziomy znaczeń. Zamiast tego autor zarysowuje wielowarstwową strukturę języka z dwoma poziomami: mimetycznym i semiotycznym i wskazuje na konieczność zastąpienia modelu kaskadowego palimpsestowym modelem współbieżności, łączenia i mieszania warstw znaczeniowych.

EN

The paper traces the relationship between the literal and literary language that is found in structuralism and analytic philosophy. The paper’s gist provides a comparative account of Roman Jakobson’s and Donald Davidson’s notions of poetic language and their relation to the general idea of language as it is given in their work. In reconsidering Jakobson’s and Davidson’s arguments, I propose abandoning the dualistic hypotheses of the oppositions between literal and non-literal language, and between literal and literary language. I contend that the notions of first and literal meanings are necessary for other types of interpretation. The dualistic hypothesis requires the cascade model, which displays a bottom-top transition across hierarchically arranged levels of meanings. Instead, I outline the multilayered structure of language with two thresholds: mimetic and semiotic. Therefore, the cascade model should be replaced with the palimpsest model of concurring, merging, and blending layers of meanings.

6

Erazm i Luter o wolnej woli

71%

Hołówka J.

Gdański Rocznik Ewangelicki

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2017

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vol. 11

197-223

EN

The author discusses the controversy between Erasmus and Luther over free will. He recapitulates the position of Erasmus who identified three conceptions of free will attributing them to Pelagius, Duns Scotus and Martin Luther, respectively. Erasmus firmly rejected only the last one. The author also presents the Luther’s view that the exercise of free will would collide with the working of divine grace that forcesto reject the existence of free will. This controversy revitalizes a mediaeval problem, still highly inspirational. Is God at least partly responsible for our sins? Was He accountable for hardening the pharaoh’s heart (Ex 4: 21)? Was it approved by God that Judas would betray Jesus? Erasmus proposes an interesting solution to this problem that the author of this article finds bright and proper. It is based on the distinction between ‘the necessity of the consequence’ and the ‘necessity of the consequent’. The ‘necessity of the consequence’ is the acceptance of a logical implication together with its antecedent. In this case the consequent is entailed by logical inference (by ponendo ponens). Acceptance of this formula is equivalent to acting as an accomplice. The ‘necessity of the consequent’, however, is limited to the endorsing of the implication together with its consequent, but without accepting the antecedent. On these conditions the endorsement is no more than a concession for the occurrence of the fact implied, but it does not involve a volitional partnership in the act. To be more specific: God hardened the pharaoh’s heart and thereby He acted in collusion with the pharaoh. In the case of Judas, however, God only condescended that Judas would betray Jesus without cooperating in the act. Thus the will of pharaoh’s was weakened, or presumably deactivated, while Judas was free to act as he pleased, availing himself of his free will.

7

Donalda Davidsona obrona obiektywności

71%

Kozyra W.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2018

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issue 1

8

Absolutyzm logiczny a ontologia

50%

Wilk A.

Filozofia i Nauka

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2017

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vol. 5

289-297

EN

The text considers the link between logic and ontology in the context of the problem of future truth. The main issue examined in this paper is the following one: the classical logic is strongly insensitive to the ontological determinism-indeterminism problem.

PL

Tekst jest poświęcony związkowi między logiką a ontologią w kontekście problemu prawdziwości zdań o przyszłości. Jednym z rozważanych problemów jest „niewrażliwość” logiki klasycznej na ontologiczny problem determinizm-indeterminizm.

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1 Edukacja Filozoficzna

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