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Slippery Slopes and Other Consequences

100%
Hinton M. D.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
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2018
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vol. 27
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issue 4 Special Issue on Logic, Cognition, Argumentation. Guest Editors: Mariusz Urbański, Michiel van Lambalgen and Marcin Koszowy
453-470
EN
The aim of this paper is to illustrate where previous attempts at the characterisation of Slippery Slope Arguments (SSAs) have gone wrong, and to provide an analysis which better captures their true nature. The first part describes Walton’s [10] arguments in support of his views on SSAs and also considers the characterisations put forward by other researchers. All of these are found wanting due to their failure to capture the essence of the slippery slope and their inability to distinguish SSAs from other consequentialist forms of argument. The second part puts forward a clearer analysis of what is special about SSAs and proposes an argumentation scheme which allows them to be easily distinguished from other arguments from consequences.
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Slippery Slopes Revisited

88%
Hinton M.
Studia Semiotyczne
|
2020
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vol. 34
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issue 2
EN
The aims of this paper are to illustrate where previous attempts at the characterisation of slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have gone wrong, to provide an analysis which better captures their true nature, and to show the importance of achieving a clear definition which distinguishes this argument structure from other forms with which it may be confused. The first part describes the arguments of Douglas Walton (2015) and others, which are found wanting due to their failure to capture the essence of the slippery slope and their inability to distinguish SSAs from other consequentialist forms of argument. The second part of the paper puts forward a clear analysis of what is special about SSAs: it is argued that all SSAs, properly so-named, claim that reaching a certain conclusion, A, involves the negation of a thitherto accepted principle, P, and that that principle is necessary to argue against further conclusions (B, C, …, Z) which are considered unacceptable.
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