Search results

1

Jana Dunsa Szkota pytanie o metafizykę

100%

Surzyn J.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

|

2011

|

vol. 23

5-23

EN

The understanding of scholasticism metaphysics presented in textbooks to the history of philosophy would be comprises universally in the patern dominated by followers of Thomas Aqiunas's conception. However one should be value different metaphysical conceptions of this period of scholasticism, in this the first of all so criticized by Thomas's pupils thought of John Duns Scotus. It is possible put, that Scotus's metaphysics states very important alternative for Aquinas's metaphysics, though - it should be strongly underline - at all it not locates itself in so sharp opposition in relation to solution of Aquinas. To be visible influence Scotus's thought in later centuries, for example his metaphysical intuition we can see at F. Suarez, Ch. Wolff, and also I. Kant. The novum of Scotus's approach to metaphysics in large reduction depends thereon that he asks about conditions of metaphysics possibility. This resulted with perspective of later development of metaphysics two momentous decision in its area. firstly, Scotus captured metaphysics with perspective of transcendental then it means he understood metaphysics as transcendental science. Secondly, basis of such metaphysics resulted in execution 'the criticism of reason'. From this perspective Scotus proposed understanding of the metaphysics as science on the first adequate object of human intellect. The object of it is being as being (ens inquantum ens) and in consequence the metaphysics according to Scotus is science on being and its transcendental proprieties. The metaphysics is so transcendental science - scientia transcendens.

2

El voluntarismo en Escoto: voluntad y libertad

100%

Gordillo Álvarez-Valdés L.

Studia Ełckie

|

2012

|

vol. 14

95-115

EN

The article reveals reasons of the voluntarism of Duns Scotus. In his conception of freedom, understood as the freedom of will, Duns Scotus endows will with priority. Will becomes a real rational power, followed by intellect that is a natural power. Then ethical and anthropological consequences emerge to show a new way of understanding man. The reasons of the voluntarism of Scotus are analyzed in their historical context. To return his omnipotence to God, Scotus has to prioritize an infinite and limitless willingness in God, understood as charity. Through his will also man relates with God and reaches his ends in praxis. This means a break with tradition since man is to discover le raison d’être of the things not by his ratio, but by his praxis which directs him and allows him to achieve his goals.

3

Scotus on Sense, Medium, and Sensible Object

88%

González Ginocchio D.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2017

|

vol. 65

|

issue Special Issue 2

61-78

EN

This paper aims to examine some of Scotus’s key notions on perception in his Commentary on the De anima, focusing on the notions of sense, medium, and object. I will keep two main points of interest at hand: first, Scotus’s understanding and reception of the philosophy of perception advanced by his contemporaries, in light of his own theory of the faculties, objects, and the perfection of their respective acts; second, the distinction and classification of the external senses according to their perfection.

4

Étienne Gilson, Duns Scotus, and Actual Existence: Weighing the Charge of ‘Essentialism’

88%

Helms A. C.

Studia Gilsoniana

|

2017

|

vol. 6

|

issue 3

331-364

EN

Étienne Gilson juxtaposes what he calls Aquinas’s “existentialism” to what he calls Scotus’s “essentialism.” For Gilson, “existentialism” is philosophical truth, the only view compatible with an authentically Christian metaphysic, while “essentialism” is a Hellenic mistake that seduces Christian philosophers by appealing to the idolatrous desire to reduce reality to what is intelligible. In this paper, the author attempts to describe the difference between “essentialism” and “existentialism” as understood by Gilson. Then, he assesses the case for attributing “essentialism” to Scotus, based on an assessment of Scotus texts and secondary scholarship.

5

Řád lásky podle Bonaventury

75%

Machula T.

Studia theologica

|

2018

|

vol. 1

91-104

EN

One of the important questions concerning the theological virtue of charity is the order of charity. It is a simple problem of the succession in the expression of charity in relation to various people. It is obvious that we are obliged to love all people, but they have a different grade of perfection and dignity. It is also impossible to express our charity to all people in the same way and in the same intensity, because our time, strengths and means are limited. This is why the question of order in our expression of charity is so important. The beginning of our considerations on the order of charity deal with the celebrated verse from Gal 6:10, which explicitly provides a preference to people of the same religion. The idea of the order of charity was a standard part of various commentaries and tracts on the theological virtue of charity of the first Christian centuries. This paper is focused on a commentary on this question in the writings of a very important representative of High Medieval Scholasticism St. Bonaventure. His concept is continuously compared with some other important authors of this era, the Dominicans Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and the Franciscan John Duns Scotus.

6

Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream of Rational and Intuitive Enlightenment

75%

Lodge P.

Dialogue and Universalism

|

2022

|

issue 1

203-219

EN

This paper is a new translation and interpretation of the essay by Leibniz which has come to be known as “Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream.” Leibniz used many different literary styles throughout his career, but “Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream” is unique insofar as it combines apparent autobiography with a dreamscape. The content is also somewhat surprising. The essay is reminiscent of Plato, insofar as Leibniz describes a transition from existence in a cave to a more enlightened mode of being outside of it. But, in contrast with the usual identification of Leibniz as a “rationalist,” the mode of being that is valorised involves cognition that is intuitive and supra-rational. The paper begins with the translation followed by an interpretation of the essay. I conclude by considering the ramifications of my interpretation for our conception of Leibniz’s philosophy.

7

K niektorym aspektom chápania cnosti u Viliama Ockhama

75%

Nemec R.

Studia theologica

|

2017

|

vol. 3

25-44

EN

The aim of this article is to focus on some specific perspectives of Ockham´s ethics theory. His interpretation of Aristotle´s virtue ethics was different from his contemporaries. Ockham (with D. Scotus) shifted the traditional standpoint of the various Aristotelian schools from a focus on reason and reasonable purposes toward the will and its internal/external acts. The will is faculty, in accordance with reason, which brings out an internal act and only this act can be free. Nothing else, apart from the will and its acts, can be necessarily free and thus virtuous. Nothing except for interior acts of the will can be fully virtuous. The perfect virtue is the only internal capacity of the will, although always dependent on the "telos" – the end of the will. Ockham presents 5 degrees of virtues and especially the heroic one, being the highest of all virtues.

8

More Aristotelian than Aristotle. Duns Scotus on Cognizing Singulars

75%

Novák L.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2017

|

vol. 65

|

issue Special Issue 2

79-100

EN

At least from Plato and Aristotle onward the common wisdom of the entire philosophical tradition, hardly ever questioned, was that while universals are grasped by the intellect, individuals are perceived by the senses. Even in the “moderately realistic” Aristotelian-scholastic setting (perhaps best represented by Aquinas) where universals are situated “in rebus”, this axiom naturally generated the idea of two separated realms of objects of cognition – individuals and universals – whose ontological status, mutual relations, etc. would, in turn, be philosophically investigated. In my reading, Scotus does not share this common preconception at all; rather, he takes the position that ultimately there is only one single realm of cognized objects – the individuals or particulars. Thus, although it may be argued that his theory of cognition does not represent any radical departure from the moderate-realistic, Avicenna-inspired paradigm of the 13th century, but rather a specific elaboration of it, a closer look reveals that Scotus takes an entirely new perspective on the problem and reinterprets the old approaches from a new standpoint. And yet, this new perspective can at the same time be understood as being merely a consistent completion of the anti-Parmenidean and anti-Platonic movement in philosophy initiated by Aristotle – namely that of epistemic rehabilitation of the world of ordinary particular things. Scotus’s epistemic thought can thus be described as simultaneously consistently traditional and revolutionary.

9

Erazm i Luter o wolnej woli

63%

Hołówka J.

Gdański Rocznik Ewangelicki

|

2017

|

vol. 11

197-223

EN

The author discusses the controversy between Erasmus and Luther over free will. He recapitulates the position of Erasmus who identified three conceptions of free will attributing them to Pelagius, Duns Scotus and Martin Luther, respectively. Erasmus firmly rejected only the last one. The author also presents the Luther’s view that the exercise of free will would collide with the working of divine grace that forcesto reject the existence of free will. This controversy revitalizes a mediaeval problem, still highly inspirational. Is God at least partly responsible for our sins? Was He accountable for hardening the pharaoh’s heart (Ex 4: 21)? Was it approved by God that Judas would betray Jesus? Erasmus proposes an interesting solution to this problem that the author of this article finds bright and proper. It is based on the distinction between ‘the necessity of the consequence’ and the ‘necessity of the consequent’. The ‘necessity of the consequence’ is the acceptance of a logical implication together with its antecedent. In this case the consequent is entailed by logical inference (by ponendo ponens). Acceptance of this formula is equivalent to acting as an accomplice. The ‘necessity of the consequent’, however, is limited to the endorsing of the implication together with its consequent, but without accepting the antecedent. On these conditions the endorsement is no more than a concession for the occurrence of the fact implied, but it does not involve a volitional partnership in the act. To be more specific: God hardened the pharaoh’s heart and thereby He acted in collusion with the pharaoh. In the case of Judas, however, God only condescended that Judas would betray Jesus without cooperating in the act. Thus the will of pharaoh’s was weakened, or presumably deactivated, while Judas was free to act as he pleased, availing himself of his free will.

10

“In Harmony with Reason”: John Duns Scotus’s Theo-aesth/ethics

63%

Bychkov O.

Open Theology

|

2014

|

vol. 1

|

issue 1

EN

Over the past two decades, the debate has intensified over the nature of John Duns Scotus’s (meta) ethics: is it a purely voluntarist “divine command” ethics or is it still based on rational principles? The former side is exemplified by Thomas Williams and the latter by Allan Wolter. Scotus claims that even the divine commandments that are not based on natural law are still somehow “in harmony with reason.” But what does this mean? Richard Cross in a recent study claims that God’s reasons for establishing certain moral norms are “aesthetic.” However, he fails to show clearly what is “aesthetic” about these reasons or why God’s will would follow “aesthetic” principles in legislating moral norms. This article clarifies both points, first, by painting an up-to-date picture of what constitutes “aesthetic” principles, and second, by providing a more accurate model of the way the human volitional faculty operates and addressing the problem of the “freedom of the will” from a present-day point of view.

11

Tomasz z Akwinu i Duns Szkot o przygodności, wolności i indywidualności

63%

PALUCH M.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

|

2017

|

vol. 65

|

issue 4

23-36

PL

Tekst jest próbą przedstawienia fundamentalnych perspektyw, które są konieczne dla zrozumienia stanowiska Akwinaty na temat przygodności, wolności i indywiduacji w zestawieniu z propozycją Dunsa Szkota. Autor stara się wziąć pod uwagę ostrzeżenie É. Gilsona: niewiele da porównywanie wybranych szczegółów wspomnianych pozycji filozoficznych bez zrozumienia fundamentalnej różnicy między porównywanymi metafizykami. Pierwsza część artykułu przedstawia różnicę rozumienia relacji między naturą i wolą. Duns Szkot interpretuje wolę, przeciwstawiając ją naturze, i rozumie prawdziwie osobowe, wolne i chrześcijańskie działanie w opozycji do deterministycznych działań natury. Dla Akwinaty prawdziwie osobowe działanie może być wpisane w naturę jako jej wolne dopełnienie. Różnica jest ufundowana w rozmaitych interpretacjach filozofii Arystotelesa. Druga część opisuje różnicę w rozumieniu transcendencji boskich działań. Tomasz posługuje się bardzo mocnym rozumieniem transcendencji, które pozwala przyjąć tezę: niezmienność (= konieczność) woli Boga uzyskuje swoje cele zarówno przez konieczne, jak i wolne (!) działania stworzeń (por. De veritate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Szkot szuka bardziej intuicyjnie dostępnego rozumienia relacji między boskimi i ludzkimi działaniami. Z tego powodu opisuje boskie działania jako przygodne, podejmowane w wiecznym „teraz”. Trzecia część zajmuje się doktryną indywiduacji. Duns Szkot proponował rozwiązać problem przez odwołanie do słynnej formy haecceitas. Chociaż dla Tomasza nośnikiem indywidualności po zindywidualizowaniu bytu jest także forma jako źródło substancjalności i chociaż Tomasz musiał być świadomy trudności klasycznego stanowiska, odwołującego się do Arystotelesa (materia jako główny czynnik indywiduacji), trzyma się stanowczo arystotelesowskiego rozwiązania, nieznacznie je przeformułowując (materia quantitate signata). Były najprawdopodobniej dwa powody wiernego podążania Tomasza za Arystotelesem, mimo wątpliwości Alberta Wielkiego i Bonawentury: chęć podkreślenia hylemorficznej struktury bytu i próba wskazania trwałej podstawy dla pojęciowych genera. Ostatni problem prowadzi do najważniejszej metafizycznej różnicy między analizowanymi propozycjami. Duns Szkot jako esencjalista musi wpisać wszystko, co rzeczywiste, w porządek istotowy. Tomasz artykułuje rzeczywistość bytu, biorąc pod uwagę istotę i istnienie. Jego stanowisko daje tym sposobem więcej możliwości do odczytania bytu.

EN

The paper attempts to present the fundamental perspectives which are necessary to understand Aquinas’s position on contingency, freedom and individuation in order to compare his thinking with Duns Scotus’s. The author wants to take into account Gilson’s warning: it is useless to compare chosen details of the aforementioned philosophical proposals, if there is no understanding of the deep difference between the metaphysical systems of the two philosophers. The first section presents the difference in the understanding of the relationship between nature and will. Duns Scotus interprets the will as opposed to nature and sees a truly free and Christian person acting as opposed to the deterministic operations of nature. For Aquinas the truly personal acting may be inscribed in nature as its free fulfilment. The difference is based on the different readings of Aristotle’s philosophy. The second section describes the difference in the understanding of the transcendence of the divine actions. Thomas uses a very strong concept of transcendence that allows him to accept the thesis that God’s immutable (= necessary) will achieves its purposes through the necessary and free (sic!) actions of the creatures (cf. De veritate, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3). Duns Scotus looks for a more intuitive understanding of the relationship between divine and human acting. Because of that he describes the divine actions as contingent, undertaken in the eternal “now”. The third section deals with the doctrine of individuation. Duns Scotus’s proposed solution to this problem is his famous form haecceitas. Although the form as the source of substantiality is the sign of individuality for Thomas, as well, in his case this has been achieved through individuation, and although he must have been aware of some difficulties in the classical Aristotelian position (matter as the main factor in individuation), he sticks to the Aristotelian solution, only slightly reformulating it (materia quantitate signata). There are two reasons for his fidelity to Aristotle in spite of doubts expressed by Albert the Great and Bonaventure: the stress on the hylemorphic structure of being and the attempt to articulate the consistency of the conceptual genera. The last problem leads to the main metaphysical difference of the analysed proposals. Duns Scotus as an essentialist has to inscribe everything that is real within the order of essence; Thomas articulates reality by taking into account essence and existence. His position opens wider possibilities for the understanding of being.

12

Das Individuationsprinzip bei Duns Scotus (1265-1308)

54%

Börsig-Hover M.

Roczniki Wydziału Nauk Prawnych i Ekonomicznych KUL

|

2005

|

vol. 1

|

issue 1 Prawo

37-52

PL

Problematyka jednostkowienia bytu osoby ludzkiej według Dunsa Szkota stanowi bardzo ważną problematykę filozoficzną, także ważną i interesującą dla prawnika i ekonomisty z tej racji, że człowiek stanowi zarówno rację ekonomii, jak też jest podmiotem praw i obowiązków wraz z posiadaniem prawa do stanowienia porządku prawnego. Stąd znajomość antropologii jest dla prawnika warunkiem sine qua non. Chociaż temat ten powraca w refleksji filozoficznej, np. Honnefeldera, M. A. Krąpca, B. Walda, A. Schmidta, U. Zielińskiego, to warto ciągle na nowo podejmować to wyzwanie. Krótki zarys biograficzny poprzedza teoriopoznawcze stanowiska Szkota w jego relacji do stanowiska Tomasza z Akwinu, by skupić uwagę na samej zasadzie jednostkowienia, którą Skotus pojmuje jako haecceitas w samej formie substancjalnej człowieka jako bytu osobowego. Tezy Edyty Stein, Martina Heideggera oraz Ericha Przywary w tej kwestii dodatkowo ubogacają analizę tej złożonej problematyki, w dalszym ciągu aktualnej m.in. dla filozoficznego namysłu nad człowiekiem oraz nad ekonomią i polityką.

13

O dwóch średniowiecznych koncepcjach celowości natury: Duns Szkot i Chatton

51%

Majcherek K.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

|

2017

|

vol. 65

|

issue 1

43-62

PL

Artykuł stanowi próbę zarysowania kilku istotnych wątków dwóch istotnych średniowiecznych koncepcji celowości. Twórcami owych koncepcji są Jan Duns Szkot i Walter Chatton. Autor skupia się na trzech zagadnieniach: (1) argumentach na rzecz przyjęcia teleologii naturalnej, (2) statusie ontologicznym celu, (3) statusie Boga jako przyczyny celowej. Dokonywane analizy mają pokazać, iż wiele poglądów wygłaszanych przez Dunsa Szkota i Chattona stanowiło podważenie wcześniejszej scholastycznej wizji całościowej teleologii, która swą najbardziej dojrzała postać otrzymała w myśli Tomasza z Akwinu, przygotowując nadejście nowożytnej krytyki celowości.

EN

This article seeks to outline several important themes of two medieval conceptions of final causality, whose authors are John Duns Scotus and Walter Chatton. The author focuses on three issues: (1) the arguments for natural teleology, (2) the ontological status of the end, (3) the status of God as a final cause. The aim of the analyses presented here is to show that many opinions presented by Duns Scotus and Chatton were undermining the previous scholastic vision of holistic teleology, which reached its most mature form in the thought of Thomas Aquinas — and in that way they have paved the way towards the modern critique of teleology.

14

Suareza Disputationes Metaphysicae i średniowieczne teorie transcendentaliów

51%

Blandzi S., Darge R.

ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

|

2013

|

vol. 3

|

issue 1

177-197

15

ONTOLOGY: UNREAL REALITY

51%

Jaroszyński P.

Studia Gilsoniana

|

2014

|

vol. 3

321-334

EN

The article examines the difference between ontology and metaphysics. It shows that as soon as the composition of being from essence and existence is treated as purely mental or in a “reified” way (where essence and existence are independent elements), then essence as essence becomes a thing, and then simply becomes a being, or what is called reality. Both versions in which the real difference disappears or in which the road leads to “reification,” influence the treatment of essence as independent, where essence as thing fills the field of reality. However, if essence was only possibility, then (1) the reality also would be merely possible, (2) the realistic field of philosophical terminology would get curtailed, and (3) there would be no terms to maintain the difference between reality and possibility, between metaphysics and ontology.

16

Habitus w koncepcji Arystotelesa i jego średniowiecznych komentatorów

51%

Płotka M., Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie

Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris

|

2015

|

vol. 31 (4)

PL

Projekt został sfinansowany ze środków Narodowego Centrum Nauki przyznanych na podstawie decyzji numer DEC-2012/05/D/HS1/03518.

EN

The purpose of this article is to present a theory of habitus in the philosophy of Aristotle and his medieval commentators. The first part of the article – which is the introduction to the problems of habitus – displays Aristotelian account. In the second part I present the development of this concept in the thirteenth century followers of Aristotle, i.e. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. The third part is devoted to the discussion of late medieval modification of the Aristotelian theory in account of Gerald Odonis, John Duns Scotus, John Buridan and Paul of Worczyn.

17

Anima forma corporis: problém interpretace

51%

Novák L.

Studia theologica

|

2015

|

vol. 1

70-94

EN

The article raises the question about the content of the Catholic dogma defined at the Council of Vienne stating that the rational human soul is the form of the human body and arrives at the conclusion that there is no single generally accepted meaning in the theological tradition, but rather two radically differing lines of interpretation: a “thomistic” one tending to a more “monistic” interpretation of human nature, and a “reistic” one, resulting in a strongly pronounced dualism. Both of the interpretations are found to be laden with serious difficulties; the author contrasts various aspects of these interpretations, exposing their problems, and finally suggests that further philosophical and theological work is needed to provide an acceptable interpretation of the dogma of Vienne.

Refine search results

Jana Dunsa Szkota pytanie o metafizykę

El voluntarismo en Escoto: voluntad y libertad

Scotus on Sense, Medium, and Sensible Object

Étienne Gilson, Duns Scotus, and Actual Existence: Weighing the Charge of ‘Essentialism’

Řád lásky podle Bonaventury

Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream of Rational and Intuitive Enlightenment

K niektorym aspektom chápania cnosti u Viliama Ockhama

More Aristotelian than Aristotle. Duns Scotus on Cognizing Singulars

Erazm i Luter o wolnej woli

“In Harmony with Reason”: John Duns Scotus’s Theo-aesth/ethics

Tomasz z Akwinu i Duns Szkot o przygodności, wolności i indywidualności

Das Individuationsprinzip bei Duns Scotus (1265-1308)

O dwóch średniowiecznych koncepcjach celowości natury: Duns Szkot i Chatton

Suareza Disputationes Metaphysicae i średniowieczne teorie transcendentaliów

ONTOLOGY: UNREAL REALITY

Habitus w koncepcji Arystotelesa i jego średniowiecznych komentatorów

Anima forma corporis: problém interpretace