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1

TOWARD A DEMARCATION OF FORMS OF DETERMINISM

100%
Marko V.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2017
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vol. 24
|
issue 1
54 – 84
EN
In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explicitly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to demarcating its various forms.
2

REJECTION OF FATALISM ABOUT THE PAST

80%
Yehezkel G.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2016
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vol. 23
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issue 4
525 – 538
EN
In this paper the author defends the rejection of fatalism about the past by showing that there are possible circumstances in which it would be rational to attempt to bring about by our decisions and actions a necessary and sufficient condition, other things being equal, for something which we see as favourable to have occurred in the past. The examples he puts forward are analogous to our attempts to bring about the occurrence of future events, and demonstrate the symmetry between the past and the future in this respect.
3

ON EVERYTHING IS NECESSARILY WHAT IT IS

80%
Blum A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2023
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vol. 30
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issue 3
278 – 280
EN
It is argued that if everything is necessarily what it is, then given the equivalence ‘p≡[a= (℩x)(x=a&p)]’, it follows that whatever happens or is the case, had to happen or had to be the case.
4

LOOKING FOR LAZY ARGUMENT CANDIDATES

70%
Marko V.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2011
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vol. 18
|
issue 3
363 – 383
EN
The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved on historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favour of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalists but plausible for some of the non-universal of part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The genuine form of the argument seems to be given in different form and far closer to logical fatalism and whose purpose is not to defend laziness. If the historical argument has to lead to the logically satisfactory solution, some additional assumptions and its additional tuning are needed.
5
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TRAGIC SITUATIONS ANALYSIS ON THE EURIPIDES' 'HECUBA', IBSEN'S 'ROSMERSHOLM'AND ASSOULINE'S 'CLIENT' (Sytuacje tragiczne. Próba analizy na podstawie Hekabe Eurypidesa, Rosmersholmu Henryka Ibsena i Klientki Pierre'a Assouline'a)

61%
Glab A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2010
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issue 12
183-201
EN
The article tries to describe and analyze the tragic situations which are central issues of three works of art: Euripides' Hecuba, Ibsen's Rosmersholm and Assouline's Client. The language of describe is language of Max Scheler's phenomenology of tragism. Tragism is present as an objective property of world. The article presents the essence of phenomenology of tragism in reference four conditions: (1) tragic phenomenon occurs only in world of values; (2) tragedy happens only when person is trying to live well and has deep commitments to others, but this commitments may be destroyed by circumstances that person couldn't prevent; (3) tragism happens by virtue of conflict between free will and fatalism; (4) problem with imputing of guilt.
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