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FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT CONTEXTUALISM

100%
Davies A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 3
557 – 580
EN
It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they employ the right kind of predicate as their “F”. In this paper, I present an argument against this assumption. Focusing on the special case when the expression of interest is a predicate, I present a series of examples in which the same pairs of sentences are employed, but in different contexts. In some cases, we get an impression of faultless disagreement and in some cases we don’t. I identify a pattern across these contexts and conclude that faultless disagreement is made possible, not by a special kind of predicate, but instead by a special kind of context.
2

ILLOCUTIONARY DISAGREEMENT IN FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT

100%
Karczewska N.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 3
531 – 556
EN
The debates over the problem of faultless disagreement have played a major role in shaping the landscape of today’s semantic theories. In my paper, I argue that even though the existent of contextualism-friendly proposals explain a lot of disagreement data by specifying various ways in which speakers may use subjective predicates, neither provides a satisfactory account which would explain what all the subjective disagreements have in common. In particular, what is lacking is an explanation of the persistent auto-centric cases (Lasersohn 2004), i.e., disagreements in which each speaker utters a subjective sentence while openly and knowingly occupying his or her own perspective. In my paper, I offer a solution which consists in supplementing the standard contextualist semantics with an explanation of this most problematic class of cases, which is possible due to re-describing the phenomena in speech act nomenclature.
3

PRAVDIVOSTNÝ RELATIVIZMUS A BEZCHYBNÉ NEZHODY

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 7
549 – 561
EN
The paper deals with the so-called faultless disagreement which arises when two speakers believe in contradictory propositions, though neither of them makes any fault. This phenomenon is said to arise with respect to propositions about taste and similar propositions. The faultless disagreement is often used to support various versions of truth-conditional relativism. The main aim of the paper is to argue that what appears to be a faultless disagreement is by no means one. For an air of disagreement between speakers disappears once we (i) make it clear what notion of contradiction is invoked and (ii) explicitly adopt a relativistic notion of truth that is at most implicitly assumed in the relevant literature.
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