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1

TICHÝ AND FICTIONAL NAMES

100%
Glavaničová D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2017
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vol. 24
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issue 3
384 - 404
EN
The paper examines two possible analyses of fictional names within Pavel Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The first of them is the analysis actually proposed by Tichý in his (1988) book The Foundations of Frege’s Logic. He analysed fictional names in terms of free variables. The author will introduce, explain, and assess this analysis. Subsequently, he will explain Tichý’s notion of individual role (office, thing-to-be). On the basis of this notion, he will outline and defend the second analysis of fictional names. This analysis is close to the approach known in the literature as role realism (the most prominent advocates of this position are Nicholas Wolterstorff, Gregory Currie, and Peter Lamarque).
2

AN INFERENTIALIST ACCOUNT OF FICTIONAL NAMES

100%
Lee B. D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2022
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vol. 29
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issue 3
290 – 326
EN
The goal of this paper is to present and defend an inferentialist account of the meaning of fictional names on the basis of Sellars-Brandom’s inferentialist semantics and a Brandomian anaphoric theory of reference. On this inferentialist account, the meaning of a fictional name is constituted by the relevant language norms which provide the correctness conditions for its use. In addition, the Brandomian anaphoric theory of reference allows us to understand reference in terms of anaphoric word-word relations, rather than substantial word-world relations. In this paper I argue that this inferentialist account has many important merits over its rival theories. One important merit is that it explains why we can use fictional names to make true statements, even if they lack bearers. As a consequence, this theory allows us to use fictional names without committing ourselves to an implausible ontology of fictional entities. Another important merit is that it provides a uniform semantic account of fictional names across different types of statements in which fictional names are involved.
3

FICTIONAL TELLERS A RADICAL FICTIONALIST SEMANTICS FOR FICTIONAL DISCOURSE

88%
Predelli S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
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issue 1
76 – 106
EN
This essay proposes dissolution of the so-called ‘semantic problem of fictional names’ by arguing that fictional names are only fictionally proper names. The ensuing idea that fictional texts do not encode propositional content is accompanied by an explanation of the contentful effects of fiction grounded on the idea of impartation. After some preliminaries about (referring and empty) genuine proper names, this essay explains how a fiction’s content may be conveyed by virtue of the fictional impartations provided by a fictional teller. This idea is in turn developed with respect to homodiegetic narratives such as Doyle’s Holmes stories and to heterodiegetic narratives such as Jane Austen’s Emma. The last parts of the essay apply this apparatus to cases of so-called ‘talk about fiction’, as in our commentaries about those stories and that novel.
4

MEANINGS OF FICTIONAL NAMES

75%
Salis F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2021
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vol. 28
|
issue 1
9 – 43
EN
According to Millianism, the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. According to anti-realism about fictional entities, there are no such entities. If there are no fictional entities, how can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names? Our best theory of fiction, Walton’s theory of make-believe, makes the same assumptions but lacks the theoretical resources to answer the question. In this paper, I propose a pragmatic solution in terms of two main dimensions of meaning, a subjective, psychological dimension and an intersubjective, public dimension. The psychological dimension builds on the notion of mental files; the public dimension builds on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. The account is coherent with two main theoretical principles, parsimony and uniformity. Furthermore, it satisfies three explanatory conditions posed by the intentionality of our thought and discourse about fiction, object-directedness, counter fictional imagining and intersubjective identification.
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