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1

Społeczne funkcjonowanie wiedzy i nauki w filozofii Paula Feyerabenda – ideologie, interakcje i kosmologie

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Lampart J.

Folia Philosophica

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2021

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vol. 46

1-19

EN

In his article, Jakub Lampart addresses the social, cultural, and historical functions of various forms of knowledge (and of science in particular) as they can be reconstructed on the basis of the few descriptive remarks found in Paul Feyerabend’s works in the three periods of his scholarly career: moderate, transitional, and radical. Lampart interprets Feyerabend’s views on the relationship between knowledge and society as influenced by the following: the early concepts of Karl Popper (in the moderate period), some of the theses of Benjamin L. Whorf and the late Ludwig Wittgenstein (in the radical period). The article also contains: a) a juxtaposition of Feyerabend’s views with the theories of these thinkers; (b) an attempt to explain Feyerabend’s use of the term “ideology”; (c) a description of two trends characterizing different systems of knowledge: isolation and interaction; d) a description of the two types of ideal members of a given tradition: rationalists and pragmatists.

PL

W artykule przedstawiono obraz społecznego, kulturowego i historycznego funkcjonowania różnych form wiedzy (w szczególności nauki), jaki daje się zrekonstruować na podstawie nielicznych opisowych uwag Paula Feyerabenda pojawiających się w jego pracach w trzech okresach twórczości: umiarkowanym, przejściowym i radykalnym. Poglądy Feyerabenda na relację wiedzy i społeczeństwa zostają zinterpretowane jako ukształtowane pod wpływem: wczesnych koncepcji Karla Poppera (okres umiarkowany), następnie niektórych tez Benjamina L. Whorfa i późnego Ludwiga Wittgensteina (okres radykalny). W artykule zaprezentowano ponadto: a) zestawienie poglądów Feyerabenda z koncepcjami wymienionych myślicieli; b) próbę wyjaśnienia użycia przez Feyerabenda słowa „ideologia”; c) opis dwóch tendencji cechujących różne systemy wiedzy: izolacji, interakcji; d) opis dwóch typów idealnych członków danej tradycji: racjonalistów, pragmatyków.

2

Amodernistyczna filozofia Paula Feyerabenda

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Mączka D.

Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris

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2018

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vol. 41

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issue 2

77-97

EN

Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy, mainly due to his radically pluralistic claims, may be regarded as an example of postmodern philosophy of science. At the same time Feyerabend’s thought contains some strictly modern ideas and noticing those ideas is important for proper reading of his works. In this paper, in order to properly understand this conceptual tension, I compare Feyerabend’s philosophy with Bruno Latour’s idea of amodernity. The first part of the paper presents modern and postmodern themes present in Feyerabend’s works. The second part elucidates the concept of amodernity expounded by Latour in the essay We have never been modern. In the third part I show that Feyerabend’s philosophy displays all of the most important features of amodern way of thinking (in Latour’s sense). In the final section I discuss how the interpretation of Feyerabend’s thought as an example of amodern philosophy may be fruitful in further research.

3

Mit i mity w filozofii Paula Feyerabenda

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Mączka D.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2017

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vol. 39

97-116

EN

This paper explores the usage of the concept of myth in Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. First three parts of the paper are devoted to analysis of lectures in which Feyerabend, following Karl Popper, contrasts two philosophical attitudes: mythical dogmatism and criticism of pre-socratics. The next two parts cover Popper’s and Feyerabend’s anti-dogmatic remedies – criticism and humanism. It is shown that, although their critiques of the dogmatic form of life bear many similarities, they differ substantially on the axiological level. While Popper considers rational criticism to be the best way of opposing dangerous myths, Feyerabend uses critical rationalism as a tool that may serve this function but is not effective universally. The final part of the paper shows how Feyerabend’s usage of the concept of myth shifted in his late, more pluralistic and pragmatic works, where he regarded every human practice as a form of nature- and value-dependent myth.

4

The Origin of Modern Physical Science: Some Passages from A Theory of Wonder

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Munévar G.

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

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2022

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vol. 19

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issue 2

1-41

EN

The triumph of the Copernican revolution is commonly associated with the introduction of the scientific method, mainly by Galileo. The nature of science presumably depends on the way observation passes judgment on theory. This is how, according to empiricism, the practice of science improves our worldviews. Some historically inclined philosophers of science, most notably Kuhn and Feyerabend, have insisted on paying attention to what Galileo actually said and did. Shockingly, he drives a dagger through the heart of empiricism: observation does not have such priority over theory, because observation itself assumes theory. This is what he argues when dismantling Aristotle’s Tower Argument, according to which a stone dropped from a tower falls straight down to the base of the tower. If this is so, the Earth cannot rotate, for it would carry the tower with it, making our observation of the stone’s flight wildly different. According to Galileo, to conclude that the stone really falls vertically requires the assumption that the Earth does not move – the theoretical issue in question. Given Galileo’s proper understanding of the nature of science, I view Feyerabend’s principle of proliferation as the realization that a good strategy for the latter is to elaborate radical alternatives and, on their basis, reconsider what counts as evidence. Moreover, a science produced by human brains should be analyzed on the basis of evolutionary theory and neuroscience. From that perspective, we may be able to defend a sensible notion of relativism. These considerations have led me to the main arguments of my new book, A Theory of Wonder: Evolution, Brain, and the Radical Nature of Science (Philosophy of Science, Vernon Press, Wilmington - Malaga 2021). I hope to entice the reader into a discussion of some of the issues developed there.

5

Austrians-in-the-World. Conversations and Debates About Planning And Development

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Friedmann J., School of Community and Regional Planning U. o. B. C., jrpf@mail.ubc.ca

European Spatial Research and Policy

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2014

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vol. 21

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issue 1

EN

John Friedmann has taught at MIT, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, UCLA, the University of Melbourne, the National University of Taiwan, and is currently an Honorary Professor in the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. Throughout his life, he has been an advisor to governments in Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, Mozambique, and China where he was appointed Honorary Foreign Advisor to the China Academy of Planning and Urban Design.

6

Humanistyczne „zwroty” w perspektywie metodologicznej

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Strzelecki R.

Dydaktyka Polonistyczna

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2022

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issue 8 (17)

183-221

PL

Artykuł dotyczy „zwrotów” kształtujących oblicze dzisiejszej humanistyki i ujmuje ich specyfikę w perspektywie i ocenie metodologicznej. „Zwroty” zostały odniesione do ich najbliższego kontekstu badawczego, czyli nowej filozofii nauki: Poppera, Lakatosa, Laudena, Feyerabenda i Kuhna. Wykazano wszelkie zbieżności i uchybienia orientacji „zwrotów” wobec przyjętych tam założeń. Okazało się, że realizują te założenia w niewielkim stopniu. Zostały również przybliżone ujęcia „zwrotów” dokonane przez innych badaczy. Ponadto wykazano ich stosunek do tradycji humanistyki i uchybienia wobec tej tradycji. Jednak kluczową cechą „zwrotów” jest ich odejście od współczesnej logiki nauki, racjonalności i rozumności poznania naukowego oraz od zasad ogólnej metodologii nauk. Zostały też omówione najważniejsze przykłady redukcjonizmu ontologicznego i naruszania statusu bytowego człowieka. Nadużycia te przedstawiono na przykładzie czterech wybranych „zwrotów”: performatywnego, „ku rzeczom”, biologicznego i cyfrowego w wersji transhumanistycznej.

EN

The paper deals with ”turns” that shape the face of today’s humanities, and captures their specificity in perspective and provides methodological evaluation of them. The ”turns” were referred to their immediate research context, i.e. the new philosophy of science: Popper, Lakatos, Lauden, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. All convergences and irregularities in the orientation of ”turns” in relation to the assumptions made there were shown. It turned out that they implement these assumptions to a limited extent. The approaches to ”turns” proposed by other researchers were also broadly discussed. Moreover, their attitudes to the tradition of the humanities and breaches from this tradition were demonstrated. However, a key feature of ”turns” is their departure from the modern logic of science, rationality of scientific cognition, and the principles of the general methodology of science. The most important examples of the ontological reductionism and of the violation of the ontological status of man were also discussed. These abuses are illustrated based on four selected ”turns”: performative, ”towards things”, biological and digital in the transhumanist version.

7

Feyerabend i Lenin a zasada partyjności

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Kilian K. J.

ΣΟΦΙΑ. Pismo Filozofów Krajów Słowiańskich

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2013

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issue 13

139-154

RU

Статья касается малоизвестной темы в творчестве Поля К. Фейер-абенда: − попытки адаптироваться Ленинский принцип партийности для нужд философии науки. Этот принцип и, метод разнообразного предс-тавления, автор использует для подтверждения принципа пролиферации американского философа.

EN

The paper concerns little-known aspect of Paul K. Feyerabend’s intellectual activity, namely, the attempt to adopt the Lenin’s principle of partisanship in the philosophy of science. The partisanship principle together with Feyerabend’s method of multiple representation were conceived as means to strengthen prin-ciple of proliferation.

8

Popper : dogmatyzm : dialektyka

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Kościuszko K.

Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo

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2015

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issue 21

9-24

PL

W artykule udowadniam tezę, że Popper - mimo programowych haseł swego krytyczne go racjonalizmu - jest dogmatykiem, że ma np. dogmatyczno-negatywne podejście do dialekty- ki. Choć krytykuje dialektykę sam jest dialekty- kiem. Widać to w Popperowskiej filozofii ma tematyki. Również jego falsyfikacjonizm jest stanowiskiem dogmatycznym. Powołuję się przy tym na Feyerabenda, Kuhana i Lakatosa.

EN

In this article I justify the thesis that K. R.Popper - in spite of the policy statement of his critical rationalism - is a dogmatist, e.g. his approach to the dialectics is dogmatically negative. Although he criticises the dialectic, he is a dialectician himself. It is evident in his phi losophy of mathematics. His falsificationism is a dogmatic attitude, too. In the argumentation, I refer to Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Lakatos.

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1 Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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1 European Spatial Research and Policy

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