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1
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Dylemat więźnia jako przykład wykorzystania teorii gier

100%
Nogal P.
Zarządzanie i Finanse
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2012
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vol. 4
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issue 2
87-95
EN
The article presents the famous problem of game theory, which is the prisoner's dilemma. Therefore, the payoff matrix has been placed for each player. A key issue that was mentioned is Nash equilibrium. The issue was also discussed as an example drawn from the economic life. In addition, the application criteria using by players in the model was described. Mentioned criteria used by players in choosing their dominant strategy are rationality and utility.
2
Content available remote

SOME ONTOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS OF GAME THEORY ON EXAMPLE OF TRAVELLER'S DILEMMA AND PRISONER'S DILEMMA (Niektóre ontologiczne rozstrzygniecia Teorii Gier na przykladzie Dylematu Podróznika i Dylematu Wieznia)

100%
Jacko J. F.
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
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2009
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vol. 45
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issue 3-4
429-441
EN
The aim of the paper is analysis of some ontological solutions, presupposed in game theory for determining rational strategy and valuation of choice rationality in traveller's dilemma and prisoner's dilemma. Some conditions of those dilemmas are presented and examined that are necessary if those dilemmas are to be used for setting rational strategies in reality. Key words: game theory, ontological solution
3

Social-insurance pension systems as public goods

80%
Meszaros J.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
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2005
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vol. 52
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issue 3
275-288
EN
The study shows how the present social-security pension systems, assuming methodological individualism and employing the apparatus of repeated games, are in a multiple prisoner's dilemma situation. The study analyses this by formulating and proving three propositions: the dilemmas of demography, contribution payments, and the political class. These are confirmed using the so-called Selten thesis of repeated-game theory.
4

ON MATHEMATICAL MODELLING OF ECONOMIC PHENOMENA AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS (O matematycznym modelowaniu zjawisk gospodarczych i interakcji spolecznych)

80%
Drabik E.
Optimum. Studia Ekonomiczne
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2010
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issue 4 (48)
3-17
EN
The aim of this article is to present trends and tendencies which may be encountered while modelling economic phenomena, processes as well as social interactions, and to illustrate how the above modelling had been shaped over the years. The general theory of mathematical models has its own language which - in the case of economic models - takes its specific, strictly specified form, depending on the nature of described issues.
5

Game theory explanation to the failure of establishing public property

80%
Meszaros J.
Szociologiai Szemle (Sociological Review)
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2005
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vol. 15
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issue 1
23-40
EN
Nowadays we often face with the fact in our environment that certain public institutions and services do not really fulfill their tasks intended. Complaints regarding the low quality of public services are to be read in the daily press; we all experience the devastation of our environment. There are several scientific explanations to these phenomena. In this study the author aims to provide a quite simple explanation to these phenomena based on the rational choice theory and by using the terms of the game theory. First, he examines the key terms of this topic, then itemizes the problems of public property, and finally, by using the terms of the game theory, draws the following conclusion: assuming the members of a community follow their own interests, no public property shall be established, or existing public property shall fall into disrepair.
6

Trudne początki teorii gier: Zermelo i Steinhaus. Analiza porównawcza pierwszych badań z zakresu rozwiązywania problemów matematycznych o postaci gier

80%
Adamus M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2012
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vol. 40
|
issue 4
99 - 108
EN
This article presents the first problems that were analyzed in a manner that would a few years later be embraced by the expression game theory. Both texts are earlier than the book of Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann, but in my opinion both should be considered as fundamental and inspiring sources of the framework of the game analysis. The article of the Polish mathematician, Hugo Steinhaus, was almost unknown until the late sixties, due to the language it had been written in, and it still remains generally unknown even in Poland. I make an effort to show similarities of intellectual climate in Lwów as well as in other scientific centres, as well as to draw attention to Polish successes in an area that at the time was only an idea, not a ready and finished concept.
7

Decision theoretical and evolutionary explanations of social norms

80%
Orthmayr I.
Szociologiai Szemle (Sociological Review)
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2004
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issue 3
3-22
EN
Darwinian evolutionary theory denied that the history of living beings followed any conscious plan or definite aim. Evolutionary theorists of social development like Friedrich von Hayek also insist that rational calculation has a much more limited role in social life than usually assumed. Institutions and extended orders of social life evolved through the innumerable fumbling efforts of individuals who did not know what they were doing. Thomas Schelling, David Lewis, and Edna Ullmann-Margalit have, however, shown that rational choice theory can offer a valuable tool for analysing even the most eminent field of evolutionary social theory, the emergence of conventions and norms. In game theoretical terms, conventions solve a coordination problem in situtations with multiple equilibria when actors have to find the same equlibrium. Cristina Bicchieri later argued that the knowledge of the game being played and the self-evident principles of rationality were not sufficient to guarantee that an equilibrium would be attained. In the case of the emergence of norms, game theoretical analysis has to be complemented by evolutionary explanation. Brian Skyrms also emphasizes the superiority of dynamical models of evolution over the models of rational calculation in the explanation of large scale social processes. But neither Bicchieri nor Skyrms want to replace rational choice analysis by an evolutionary approach, they rather combine them. Skyrms calls his approach evolutionary game theory.
8

Neumann's game theory

80%
Koczy L. A.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
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2006
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vol. 53
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issue 1
31-45
EN
The study sets out to present the game-theory work of John (János) Neumann and show the place it occupies in the history of mathematics. It treats in detail the famous minimax theorem he devised and the Neumann-Morgenstern solution, as well as criticisms of it and the alternative concepts for a solution put forward over more than fifty years. The author reports on the present situation in game-theory research and its current problems and applications.
9

CAUSAL-MENTALIST VIEW OF PROPOSITIONS

80%
Joaquin J., Franklin J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2022
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vol. 29
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issue 1
47 - 77
EN
In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relater of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other non-mental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persistent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (implicit) atomic propositions in different minds. Coordination of them across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are applicable in philosophical analysis of the result).
10

KOORDINACE FISKÁLNÍ A MONETÁRNÍ POLITIKY SLOVENSKA PRIZMATEM TEORIE HER

80%
Janků J., Kappel S., Kučerová Z.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
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2015
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vol. 63
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issue 1
51 – 71
EN
The problem of monetary and fiscal policy coordination is discussed both in countries with independent economic policies and in countries with a single currency. The aim of this article is to discuss and empirically assess the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in Slovakia from Q1/2000 to Q2/2013, identify significant macroeconomic variables influencing the decisions of main economic-policy authorities in the analysed country and make conclusions concerning the cooperation of monetary and fiscal policies using the game theory approach. In the article, regression analysis and ordinary least squares methods are used. According to the empirical results, the conflict between monetary and fiscal policy in Slovakia is identified. The stabilizing role of fiscal policy and problematic stabilizing role of monetary policy is confirmed. It contrasts with the other states of the Visegrad group.
11

LITERÁRNÍ KRITIKA JAKO RPG

70%
Janoušek P.
Slovenská literatúra (Slovak Literature)
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2011
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vol. 58
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issue 5
417 – 424
EN
The study is a part of a more extensive work which deals with seeing literature as a competitive game and individual communication strategies used by the participants of the game, that is literature experts. From this point of view the role of a literary critic (a review writer) - beside those of a theoretician and a historian - appears to be one of the fundamental and constitutional roles. The study metaphorically compares the role to those taken on by RPG characters. That is simulation strategies where the players adopt chosen identities including certain possibilities and abilities, tasks and goals, and where playing the game consists of exploring a certain at first unknown or completely covered, space and successfully or unsuccessfully seizing, controlling and subjugating the space. According to the author, a critic within literary life similarly fulfils tasks, collects points and has only a relative freedom to choose their way, tasks as well as goals. Therefore the author characterizes and classifies various decisions the critics have to make while performing their roles in the game, the conditions under which they choose their tasks, as well as the methods they use to support their opinions and attitudes. Their natural goal is to reach such a position in a particular literary community they could influence through their reviews the assessing views of individual works of art as well as general issues of literary and social life and its current state. Apart from reasoning as an important element of literary criticism´s game strategies the author also finds it important for critics to try to appeal to potential readers emotionally, to draw their attention - in an adequate and well-timed manner - in the areas beyond reason such as impressions, feelings and affinities.
12

Konwencjonalne ujęcie strategii w rozstrzyganiu problemów koordynacyjnych

70%
Adamus M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2012
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vol. 40
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issue 1
143 - 166
EN
This article show how communication through language can be expressed in terms of game theory. The general idea and the main line of argumentation is based on David Lewis’ book Convention (Lewis 1969) and more recent works on game theory that develop the concepts of cooperation and equilibrium. The term agreement, in the sense given to it by game theory, is used to show how to justify the thesis of the conventional nature of language. In the first part of the article some general notions of game theory are presented. Game theory is supposed to examine strategies chosen by rational agents in order to obtain preferred outcomes and is thus a good tool for describing and predicting human behaviour. It applies to situations when subjects operate reasonably, taking into account the behaviour of other rational subjects, and thus can also be used in situations of language communication. Sustaining conventionalism with game theory is possible primarily because it satisfies two basic conditions: it is both a description and a justification. Only within a complex system is it possible to explain the normative character of language, which, like utility, is only a simplified scheme. Through the analysis of coordination problems and the use of the principles of rationality and utility, it is possible to anticipate the behaviour of agents. In this context normativeness should be regarded as striving for balance, and even if another way of understanding is a deviation of the system, it still can be explored and explained within it.
13

Why do family doctors (not) signal? Opportunities and limitations of the collaboration between family doctors and social service providers

70%
Kovacs B., Galig z., Valyi R.
Szociologiai Szemle (Sociological Review)
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2005
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vol. 15
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issue 4
36-55
EN
Public health and social welfare subsystems are principally linked together by mutual interests in the basic care of elderly people. Family doctor services are part of the social information system that promotes revealing unfulfilled needs. On the other hand, taking the needful into social care would make the work of family doctors considerably easier. As a consequence, family doctors' signalling should be a general practice everywhere. But social workers experience the contrary. In order to explain the difference between the unity of interest in principle, and the weak collaboration in reality, a theoretical model was elaborated and tested empirically. The authors found that social service providers' preferences are not evident for family doctors, therefore, their willingness to advise depends on their opportunity of obtaining information.
14
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On the Limits and Possibilities of Causal Explanation with Game Theoretical Models: The Case of Two Party Competition

61%
Mueller G. P.
ASK. Research and Methods
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2012
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vol. 21
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issue 1
69-85
EN
Regression-based path- and structural equation-models have two major drawbacks, if they are used for the causal explanation of social phenomena: they are too deterministic and neglect the intentions of the concerned actors as a central driving force of the analysed processes. In order to explain the distribution-effects of two party competition, this article proposes an alternative modelling approach, which is based on the mathematical theory of repeated games. The article explores the limits and possibilities of this approach with regard to the causal explanation of social phenomena and compares the results with the capabilities of the regression approach. It turns out that game theoretical models are especially useful for explaining the non-presence of social phenomena under given causal conditions.
15

An Application For Ethical Decision-Making

61%
Popescu C. O.
Mekhanizm Rehuluvannya Economiky
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2011
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vol. 2 (52)
38-45
EN
Scientific literature of different domains proposes different tools and methodologies for taking decisions in matters of ethical bearing. When faced with such a situation, people who do not have this theoretical background may disprove it, and instead make more subjective and personal choices. The present study seeks to investigate this aspect, as well as people’s availability to involve and take responsibility for ethical issues.
16
Content available remote

Ontologia myślenia strategicznego

61%
Jacko J. F.
Homo Ludens
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2009
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issue 1
113-121
EN
The article introduces a general definition of strategies and describes some of its ontological assumptions. The work shows that all strategies have some common structures that include the aims and means of carrying out a particular strategy, the context it takes into account and the relations between them and the principles of effectiveness and efficiency. Special attention is devoted to the assumption of rationality in strategies and their similarities to games. In this context the article explains some applications of game theory in strategies.
17

APPLICATIONS OF THEORY OF REDISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS TO ANALYSIS COMPETITIVITY

61%
Budinský P., Valenčík R.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
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2009
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vol. 57
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issue 3
291-306
EN
Theory of redistribution systems is an application and at the same time extension of Game Theory. It deals with functioning of institutions, establishments, firms and others social systems, in that pay-offs are redistributed in contrast to achievement of individual players. The redistribution is usually allowed by a coalition, formed inside of redistribution system, that disposes of dominance over the pay-offs' redistribution. Redistribution equation describing all possibilities of pay-offs' redistribution in Elementary Redistribution System and enabling to create and to test a computerized model of Elementary Redistribution System. Based on that, it is possible to model different types of bargaining, kinds of equilibrium - included Pareto optionality and Nash equilibrium - and in connection with it also chaining of simple redistribution systems into the combined ones.
18
Content available remote

Czym jest gra? Uwagi o analogicznej wieloznaczności pojęcia gry. Kontekst nauk o zarządzaniu

51%
Jacko J. F.
Homo Ludens
|
2013
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issue 1(5)
93-108
EN
The study determines common meanings of the term ‘game’ in management and in management sciences. It has practical and theoretical goals. Its practical aim is to sensitize researchers to the current ambiguity of the term and to the need of controlling its ambiguity. The theoretical aim is to determine the theoretical methods of controlling this ambiguity by using the proposed typology of prototypes of games. The typology is based on the distinction among three main analogues (prototypes): parlour games, stage acting and play.
19

Praising punishment

51%
Marosan G.
Szociologiai Szemle (Sociological Review)
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2008
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vol. 18
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issue 3
109-123
EN
The article surveys the role of the institutions of punishment in the society. In the past years - besides of analyzing the other-regarding behavior - more and more experiments were carried out to purposefully examine the effect of punishment. These experiments were carried out partly on human subjects, and partly on agents of computer simulations. The results of the experiments show a much more appropriate picture about role of the punishment institutions in societies. The article presents the characteristics of different types - direct, indirect, and altruistic - punishments. It argues that the punishment behavior of different people depends on their personality, life-history, as well as their social circumstances. The article analyses the different types of distortion of punishments. It also claims that the different institutions of punishments are essential for the integration of the society.
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