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EN
This essay focuses on three conceptions of man formulated within the German school of philosophical anthropology. I discuss, one by one, theories by Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen. First, I emphasize the common to these theoreticians methodological assumptions consisting primarily in an opposition against the Cartesian dualism and in founding a ground for philosophical analysis in the results of scientific research. Second, I present their conceptions of man stressing at the same time dissimilarities that differ them from each other. These differences concern first and foremost their general orientation: while Scheler’s understanding of man is clearly determined by a metaphysical idea of a permanent essence of man, Plessner’s conception focuses rather on a dynamic, historical way of manifesting of their existence. Philosophy by Gehlen in turn presents a picture of man as a biological being who by their own effort, by emerging institutional reality, stabilizes their existence.
EN
Modern times are in many ways not a beginning, but an end. So also as to community and family. Modern times are not original, but secondary, derivative. Therefore, in order to understand them, we have to see their derivativeness first. This is developed with the help of a number of texts by Alasdair MacIntyre and Hans Sedlmayr. Then: In order to regain within the strange surrounding ´20th century` the old strength of community- and family-thinking we have to concentrate on a robust understanding of institutions. Here Arnold Gehlen, especially with his radically underestimated book Urmensch und Spätkultur, is proposed as enormously helpful for an understanding of the binding force of institutions. Finally, there are starting-points for thinking the family, perhaps even more than this, in several lines of philosophy of the 20th century; some forms are distinguished in an effort at a typology, using books and thoughts of authors like among others C.S. Lewis, Robert Spaemann, and Martin Heidegger
Ethics in Progress
|
2018
|
vol. 9
|
issue 2
131-161
EN
The paper discusses Wittgenstein’s approaches to ethics within two contrastive contexts, e.g., pragmatism and cooperative-discursive normative practice. The first section revisits the fiasco of his early “negative” ethics. The second section subsequently shows how Wittgenstein’s mature concept of blind rule-following displaces normativity but simultaneously becomes the key predictor for discourse ethics (or, rather, a specific kind of it). The final section discusses the pros and cons of finitism in the light of contemporary philosophy of mind. As a conclusion, the author provides evidence for her hypothesis that there is no normative (embodied) mind without a manifest normative competence, which includes moral judgment and discursive competence.
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