On the basis of two surviving documents compiled by Pylyp Orlyk ("Promemoria" and "Diariusz podorożny ..."), as well as insignificant literature, the author made an attempt to analyze the daily life and political activities of members of the Hetman's family in the context of international relations of the first quarter of the 18th century. This was the period of the end of the Great Northern War and the preparation of the Treaty of Nystad. The Orlyk’s family was in exile and had been constantly changing the place of residence. The involvement of members of Orlyk’s family, including his eldest daughter Anastasia Theodora and her husband, in Pylyp Orlyk’s political affairs has long been a little-known fact. Based on the mentioned texts, the author of the article proves that Anastasia Orlyk was an active associate and assistant of her father, helping him to correspond with family members and political companions. In the face of constant political persecution by the Moscow authorities, relocations and family tragedies experienced by the Orlyk, the hetman’s wife could not always be useful to him. As a result, Anastasia’s role as one of her father’s political mediators increased significantly. An active assistant to the hetman was his future son-in-law Johan Stenflycht. He tried to help Orlyk get amnesty from the Tsar Peter I of Moscow on favorable terms, but his efforts were unsuccessful. Using the help of his children and relatives, Orlyk sought to maintain the interest of European states in the Ukrainian cause. Thanks to their joint efforts, the Ukrainian government in exile tried for some time to maintain its position in international relations in the 1720s and 1730s. Orlyk’s second daughter, Barbara, who was too young at the end of the Great Northern War, was not involved in her father’s political affairs. At the same time, after the death of her sister, Barbara became Stenflycht’s wife and mother of Anastasia’s children. Orlykʼs grandchildren on Anastasia Theodora’s side survived the early deceased mother, but did not survive their father. Stenflycht had no children in his marriage to Barbara. Thus, both branches of the Orlyk-Gertsik family tree were interrupted. Today in Sweden, you can still find material evidence of the life of Johan Stenflicht, but they are not connected with his Ukrainian wives and heirs of the exiled hetman Pylyp Orlyk
Diplomatic negotiations aimed at ending the Great Northern War, conducted by Saxony, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden, which in the years 1721–1732 were formally still in conflict despite the Treaty of Nystad concluded by Sweden and Russia in 1721, have not yet been analysed from the perspective of Saxon and Polish diplomacy. The aim of this article is to examine this process, mainly in the light of primary sources of Saxon origin. Contrary to the popular belief that the many years of neglect to solve this issue were due solely to the weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the author proves that there were many other factors involved. Some of the most important ones involved different political interests of the Commonwealth, Saxony and Sweden, and the changing international circumstances, including alliances, in the years 1721–1732. The article also presents how the original form of the peace agreement was developed. Instead of the signing of a peace treaty, it resulted in an exchange of royal letters between Sweden and, respectively, Saxony in 1729 and the Commonwealth in 1732. They included a declaration to ‘restore the old friendship’. Such a form of peace agreement, whose aim was to bypass Russian mediation, became the source of a common misconception that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was not a party in the Great Northern War.
The issue of the gathering of the Lithuanian nobility in Vilnius, organised in August 1715 by Great Hetman of Lithuania Ludwik Konstanty Pociej as a way of sparking a protest against the contributions imposed by King Augustus II for the maintenance of the Saxon army in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, has so far been marginally addressed in historiography. The purpose of the article is to examine the causes and consequences of the gathering and to determine the Russian attitude towards it. Using manuscript sources from Russia, Belarus, Poland and Lithuania, the author argues that the Russians had minimal influence over the organization of the gathering, yet they used it as a means to combat King Augustus II’s attempts to free himself from Russian influence. There is ample evidence to put forward a hypothesis that the request to Tsar Peter I for acting as an intermediary in the conflict between the king and the nobility was conceived by Pociej and other leading officials of the Commonwealth rather than by Russian diplomats. The article also argues that the convention in Vilnius contributed significantly to the formation of the Tarnogród Confederation in the Crown. The Poles believed that the Lithuanians were determined to uphold the declaration of the Vilnius convention to instigate military action against the king’s policies and contributions for the purposes of the Saxon army. When the news of the Vilnius gathering spread throughout Poland, riots began in the southern provinces, and part of the Polish army declared a confederation and took up arms.
The article is devoted to the efforts made by Karol Stanislaw Radziwiłł, the Grand Chancellor of Lithuania, and his clients to protect his estates from the Swedish and Polish armies. There is no doubt that Radziwiłł’s transition from the camp of supporters of Augustus II to the pro-Stanislav party in 1706 was due to his desire to prevent his estates from being destroyed by the Swedish army. He sent his residents to the court of the new monarch to represent his interests. Among their tasks was that of the protection of Radziwiłł’s estates from military quartering, contributions and robberies carried out by both the Swedes and Leszczyński’s Polish supporters. The residents’ interventions, however, were unsuccessful. The Swedish commanders treated the exploitation of wealth as a wartime necessity and did not keep their promise to limit contributions and requisitions. Dependent on the Swedish military power, king Stanislaus was helpless in the face of the destruction wrought by the Swedes. The efforts made by the residents were thus little more than demonstrations of the Radziwiłł’s dedication as Leszczyński’s supporter.
PL
Artykuł poświęcony jest staraniom kanclerza wielkiego litewskiego Karola Stanisława Radziwiłła i jego klientów podjętym w celu ochrony dóbr przed wojskami szwedzkimi i polskimi. Radziwiłł został stronnikiem Leszczyńskiego ze względu na chęć ochrony swoich posiadłości, niszczonych przez Szwedów. Jego rezydenci na dworze króla Stanisława nie odnieśli jednak sukcesów w swoich interwencjach. Polski monarcha był bezsilny wobec działań Szwedów, którzy eksploatację kraju traktowali jako konieczność. Zabiegi klientów mogły jedynie demonstrować poświęcenie Radziwiłła.
The article discusses a practically unknown episode of King Stanisław Leszczyński’s visit to Lviv in 1709. The visit was related to the course of the Great Northern War and an attempt to help King Charles XII of Sweden, who at that time was waging war with Russia. However, the forces of King Stanisław and the supporting Swedish corps were too weak to fulfil the task. In any case, the Swedish commanders were aware of the fact and deliberately delayed the moving of their troops towards Ukraine.
PL
Artykuł omawia szerzej nieznany epizod pobytu króla Stanisława Leszczyńskiego we Lwowie w 1709 r. Wiązał się on z wydarzeniami wielkiej wojny północnej i próbą przyjścia z pomocą szwedzkiemu królowi Karolowi XII, prowadzącemu wówczas wojnę z Rosją. Siły króla Stanisława i wspomagającego go korpusu szwedzkiego okazały się za słabe, by wypełnić to zadanie. Zresztą dowódcy szwedzcy zdawali sobie z tego sprawę i wyraźnie opóźniali marsz swych oddziałów w kierunku Ukrainy.
Access to the Baltic Sea was the main initial goal of Russia’s participation in the Great Northern War (1700–1721). This military involvement was primarily due to the personal motives of Peter the Great, however, numerous different factors also played an important role. The foundation of St Petersburg, making it the capital city, and fortifying it with a defensive system was aimed at securing the Russian control over the mouth of the Neva. The military operations and diplomatic efforts undertaken by Russia in 1702–1709 were aimed exclusively to maintain access to the sea. At this time, Russia was ready to agree to the peace terms which were to grant it only the old Russian provinces of Ingria and Karelia. However, after the victorious Battle of Poltava of 1709, Peter the Great developed imperial ambitions. Under the pretext of ensuring the security of St Petersburg and ensuring Russia’s access to the sea, the Russians captured Swedish lands in the Eastern Baltic and Finland, and then annexed most of these territories. At the same time, Russian diplomacy constantly ensured of its readiness to conclude peace, but these attempts were rejected by the Swedes. Ten years of warfare and destructive raids on the coastal regions of the Kingdom of Sweden forced the Swedes to negotiate. The Treaty of Nystad of 1721 not only ended the war between Russia and Sweden, but it also became the starting point of the extraordinary development of Peter the Great’s imperial ambitions. Russia entered the world of great European and global politics as an empire, as an aggressive state of despotic character.
The Battle of Poznań was fought on 19 August 191704 between the Saxon and the Swedish armies. It was an exceptional battle which took place at night, and its result was inconclusive – at least as indicated by the commanders-in-chief of both armies and the historiography of the last two hundred years. This article is intended to identify the winner.
The article is devoted to the military situation in the northern part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the second half of 1701, with special emphasis on the cooperation between the Sapiehas and King Charles XII of Sweden and its impact on the war plans by the Swedish king.
PL
Artykuł omawia sytuację militarną na północy Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego w drugiej połowie 1701 r., ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem współpracy między Sapiehami a Karolem XII oraz jej znaczenia w wojennych planach szwedzkiego króla.
The article constitutes a prolegomenon to the issue of the service of Silesian Evangelicals in the Swedish army during the Great Northern War (1700–1721), which has so far been absent in scholarly literature. The main objective of this text is to analyse their motives for joining the military service of the Kingdom of Sweden, as well as to trace their career and position in the officer corps. The above issue is part of the research on the officer corps of Charles XII’s army, and thus it may serve as an important point of reference also for the works devoted to the service of Polish and Lithuanian officers in the Swedish army of that period. A group of several dozen representatives of the Silesian nobility and aristocracy, whose members served in the rank of officers in various units of almost all the enlistments of the Swedish army (the largest number in the mercenary värvade regementen), throughout the whole war period (the most numerous in the period of 1703/1704–1709), mainly as the dragoons, and less often in other cavalry formations. The primary source for selection was a twovolume dictionary by Adam L.C. Lewenhaupt entitled Karl XII:s officerare. Biografiska anteckningar (Stockholm 1920–1921). Among the handwritten primary sources, the materials stored in Riksarkivet and Krigsarkivet were used, which primarily constitute records from the Royal Registry and military roles. They have been subjected to critical analysis in order to prepare possibly the most thorough biographies of officers of Evangelical faith from Silesia. A number of research methods have been used, such as the biographical, genealogical or statistical methods. The representatives of the following old and influential Silesian families were mentioned: von Ferentheil, von Franckenberg, von Holly, von Koschembahr and von Lindeiner. Among less significant families of the Silesian nobility, the representatives of the following families were scrutinised: Dumky, Görlitz, Hoffman, Kluge and Schmitt. An in-depth survey in Swedish, German, Austrian, Russian, Danish, Latvian and Estonian archives is necessary for further research. This is due to the fact that the representatives of the described group served in the armies of various states over the years, and were also imprisoned in various countries. The article significantly broadens the knowledge about the ways of recruiting officers by the Swedish army during the Great Northern War, and also brings us closer to the individual profiles of Evangelical officers from Silesia and the ways of their promotion. It also points out the importance of the representatives of this group among the commanders of the mercenary regiments (värvade regementen). As the text takes into account the historical political, military and religious situation, it allows to understand what drove the representatives of the described group to join the ranks of Swedish troops. Further survey in foreign archives, especially among specific documents, such as military roles and lists of prisoners of war, may bring a great deal of new information about the mentioned officers, and allow to identify those who were not included in the Lewenhaupt’s book. Undoubtedly, it will also constitute a starting point for the research on the service of officers from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Swedish army, whose number was significant in the examined period.
The article discusses the state of the Lithuanian Artillery Corps in the early years of the 18th century. Th e fi ndings are mainly based on a report prepared for the Lithuanian Fiscal Tribunal that concerned the corps’ income and expenses 1710–1717. Th e tribunal took place at the end of 1717 in Grodno. Th e Lithuanian Artillery Corps was practically non-existent in 1710 due to the losses incurred during previous wars, and the presence of both a demographic and fi nancial crisis in Lithuania at the time only added to the problem. In the following years funding was insuffi cient. Th is is evidenced by the fact that 1710–1717 funding for the corps amounted to Polish zlotys 96,000, whereas its expenses amounted to no less than Polish zlotys 170,000. Despite the lack of funds, by 1716 the condition of the corps had improved significantly, although no attempts were made to conduct a thorough reform of its fi nancing during the period in question. Between 1716–1717, the artillery was able to supply the infantry and dragoons of the Lithuanian army with only a few fi eld guns and ammunition. Th e Silent Sejm of 1717 did not increase the funding of the corps, which could now field up to 10 cannons, a satisfactory amount considering the size of the Lithuanian army at the time, i.e. approximately 6,100 soldiers. Th e available sources show that the Lithuanian Artillery Corps was quite small – in total about 30 soldiers served in its ranks, most of whom were born in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
DE
Der Aufsatz befasst sich mit der litauischen Artillerie in den Jahren 1700–1717 und stützt sich hauptsächlich auf einen Bericht über ihre Einnahmen und Ausgaben für die Jahre 1710–1717, der für das Finanztribunal des Großherzogtums Litauen erstellt wurde. Dessen Sitzung fand Ende 1717 in Grodno statt. Die litauische Artillerie war im Jahr 1710 aufgrund von Kriegen, demografi schen und fi nanziellen Krisen praktisch nicht existent. Auch in den folgenden Jahren war ihre Finanzierung unzureichend. Die Einnahmen für diesen Zweck beliefen sich 1710–1717 auf 96 000 polnische Zloty, die Ausgaben jedoch auf nicht weniger als 170 000 Zloty. Trotz der unzureichenden Mittel hatte sich der Zustand der Artillerie bis 1716 erheblich verbessert, obwohl im Berichtszeitraum kein Versuch unternommen wurde, ihre Finanzierung grundlegend zu reformieren. In den Jahren 1716–1717 war die Artillerie lediglich in der Lage, die Infanterie und die Dragoner der litauischen Armee mit einigen Feldgeschützen und Munition zu versorgen. Der Stumme Sejm von 1717 sah keine Erhöhung der Mittel für die litauische Artillerie vor, die bis zu 10 Kanonen aufstellen konnte, was angesichts der offi ziellen Größe der litauischen Armee von 6100 Soldaten zufriedenstellend war. Den verfügbaren Quellen zufolge war das litauische Artilleriekorps mit insgesamt etwa 30 Soldaten, von denen die meisten aus der polnisch-litauischen Adelsrepublik stammten, nicht sehr groß.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy artylerii litewskiej w latach 1700–1717 i opiera się głównie na sprawozdaniu z jej dochodów i wydatków za lata 1710–1717 przygotowanym dla Trybunału Skarbowego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego. Jego posiedzenie odbyło się pod koniec 1717 r. w Grodnie. Artyleria litewska w 1710 r. praktycznie nie istniała z powodu wojen, kryzysów demograficznego i finansowego. W następnych latach jej finansowanie było niewystarczające. Dochody na ten cel w latach 1710– 1717 wyniosły 96 tys. złp, lecz wydatki wyniosły nie mniej niż 170 tys. złp. Mimo braku funduszy do 1716 r. stan artylerii znacznie się poprawił, choć w badanym okresie nie podejmowano prób gruntownej reformy jej finansowania. W latach 1716–1717 artyleria była w stanie zaopatrzyć piechotę i dragonów armii litewskiej jedynie w kilka dział i amunicję. Sejm niemy z 1717 r. nie zwiększył środków na artylerię litewską, która była w stanie wystawić do działań wojennych do 10 dział, co przy liczebności armii litewskiej wynoszącej na papierze 6100 żołnierzy było zadowalające. Z dostępnych źródeł wynika, że Korpus Artylerii Litewskiej nie był duży – w jego szeregach służyło łącznie ok. 30 żołnierzy, w większości urodzonych w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów.
Impact of the Northern Wars of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries on Attitudes and Relations Between Various Religious Denominations Among Poznań Burghers Wars often result in changes of peoples’ attitudes and approach towards others and social, economic and religious reality around them. This is especially true among those who have personally experienced atrocities of military conflicts. The aim of this paper is to reveal the impact of the Northern Wars (i.e. the 1655-1660 and 1700-1712 conflicts) on attitudes and relations between burghers of the city of Poznań representing various religious denominations. Examination of evidence shows that citizens of Poznań displayed usually toleration for other religions groups. This circumstance, of course, did not exclude occasional religious upheaval.
The article constitutes a prolegomenon to the issue of the service of Silesian Evangelicals in the Swedish army during the Great Northern War (1700–1721), which has so far been absent in scholarly literature. The main objective of this text is to analyse their motives for joining the military service of the Kingdom of Sweden, as well as to trace their career and position in the officer corps. The above issue is part of the research on the officer corps of Charles XII’s army, and thus it may serve as an important point of reference also for the works devoted to the service of Polish and Lithuanian officers in the Swedish army of that period. A group of several dozen representatives of the Silesian nobility and aristocracy, whose members served in the rank of officers in various units of almost all the enlistments of the Swedish army (the largest number in the mercenary värvade regementen), throughout the whole war period (the most numerous in the period of 1703/1704–1709), mainly as the dragoons, and less often in other cavalry formations. The primary source for selection was a twovolume dictionary by Adam L.C. Lewenhaupt entitled Karl XII:s officerare. Biografiska anteckningar (Stockholm 1920–1921). Among the handwritten primary sources, the materials stored in Riksarkivet and Krigsarkivet were used, which primarily constitute records from the Royal Registry and military roles. They have been subjected to critical analysis in order to prepare possibly the most thorough biographies of officers of Evangelical faith from Silesia. A number of research methods have been used, such as the biographical, genealogical or statistical methods. The representatives of the following old and influential Silesian families were mentioned: von Ferentheil, von Franckenberg, von Holly, von Koschembahr and von Lindeiner. Among less significant families of the Silesian nobility, the representatives of the following families were scrutinised: Dumky, Görlitz, Hoffman, Kluge and Schmitt. An in-depth survey in Swedish, German, Austrian, Russian, Danish, Latvian and Estonian archives is necessary for further research. This is due to the fact that the representatives of the described group served in the armies of various states over the years, and were also imprisoned in various countries. The article significantly broadens the knowledge about the ways of recruiting officers by the Swedish army during the Great Northern War, and also brings us closer to the individual profiles of Evangelical officers from Silesia and the ways of their promotion. It also points out the importance of the representatives of this group among the commanders of the mercenary regiments (värvade regementen). As the text takes into account the historical political, military and religious situation, it allows to understand what drove the representatives of the described group to join the ranks of Swedish troops. Further survey in foreign archives, especially among specific documents, such as military roles and lists of prisoners of war, may bring a great deal of new information about the mentioned officers, and allow to identify those who were not included in the Lewenhaupt’s book. Undoubtedly, it will also constitute a starting point for the research on the service of officers from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Swedish army, whose number was significant in the examined period.
The article presents the course of actions undertaken by the Swedish army in the years 1708 and 1709. Both campaigns were directed against Russia, and the strategic goal outlined by the ruler of Sweden – Charles XII was to seize Moscow. At the end of 1708, however, the Swedish army was not in the foreground of the tsar’s capital, but in Ukraine, on the left bank of Dnepr. The following year the Swedes fought the battle of Poltava, which ended with their defeat. The author tries to answer the question, why did this happen? When discussing the path of Charles XII to the Poltava battlefield, he pays attention primarily to natural and objective factors (weather, surface shape, natural obstacles etc.) on which the King of Sweden had no influence. In the author’s opinion, these was this factors that largely influenced the fact that the Swedish army stood to the battle of Poltava significantly weakened and with a very little chance to win.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono przebieg działań podejmowanych przez armię szwedzką w latach 1708–1709. Obie kampanie skierowane były przeciwko Rosji, a celem strategicznym nakreślonym przez władcę Szwecji – Karola XII było zajęcie Moskwy. W ostatecznym rozrachunku, u schyłku 1708 r. wojska szwedzkie znalazły się jednak nie na przedpolu stolicy carów, a na Ukrainie Zadnieprzańskiej. W roku następnym Szwedzi stoczyli bitwę pod Połtawą, która zakończyła się ich klęską. Autor próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytanie, dlaczego tak się stało? Omawiając drogę Karola XII na połtawskie pole bitwy, zwraca uwagę przede wszystkim na czynniki naturalne i obiektywne (pogoda, ukształtowanie powierzchni, przeszkody naturalne itd.), na które król Szwecji nie miał żadnego wpływu. Zdaniem autora to właśnie te czynniki w dużym stopniu wpłynęły na to, że szwedzka armia stanęła do walki pod Połtawą znacznie osłabiona i z niewielkimi szansami na zwycięstwo.
The capture of the Stronghold of Kokenhausen in October 1700 was the last act of the 8-month-long campaign of August II’s army on the area of Swedish Inflanty Voivodeship. After the disgrace of the premature abandoning of the siege of Riga (the main aim of this campaign), it was a vital military and political success. However, in the literature concerning the Great Northern War the pieces of information on this event are mostly scarce and when confronting them with each other one can see many contradictions and oblique statements. It causes the picture of the siege and surrender of the Kokenhausen Stronghold to be unclear and bring doubts to mind. The only way out of this situation is referring to a first-hand source of information – i.e. to a description given by a witness of the events. Such a source is undoubtedly the letter written on 9th October 1900 in the camp of the Saxon army near Kokenhausen, presented herein. Its author was probably a court treasurer of the Crown, Atanazy Miączyński (1639–1723), experienced commander of John III Sobieski’s times, as well as a faithful supporter of August II.
RU
Захват крепости Кокенгаузена в октябре 1700 года стал последним актом восьмимесячной кампании, проводимой армией Августа II на территории шведской Ливонии. После преждевременного отказа от осады Риги (главной цели этой кампании) это был существенный военный и политический успех. Однако в работах, посвященных Великой Северной войне, сведения об этом событии преимущественно скудны, а при сопоставлении фактов можно обнаружить множество недосказанностей и противоречий. Вследствие этого образ осады и капитуляции крепости в Кокенгаузене неясен и вызывает сомнения. Единственный выход из этой ситуации – обращение к непосредственному источнику информации, т.е. описанию, составленному свидетелем событий. Им, без сомнений, является письмо, датированное 9 октября 1700, написанный в лагере саксонской армии под Кокенаузеном. Вероятнее всего, его автором был подскарбий надворный коронный Афанасий Миончинский (1639–1723), опытный командир времен Яна III Собеского и верный сторонник Августа II.
PL
Zdobycie Twierdzy Kokenhausen w październiku 1700 r. było ostatnim aktem ośmiomiesięcznej kampanii prowadzonej przez wojska Augusta II na terenie szwedzkich Inflant. Po blamażu związanym z przedwczesnym porzuceniem oblężenia Rygi (głównego celu tej kampanii) był to istotny sukces militarny i polityczny. Jednakże w opracowaniach poświęconych wielkiej wojnie północnej informacje na temat tego wydarzenia w większości są skąpe, a konfrontując je ze sobą, zauważyć można liczne sprzeczności i niedomówienia. Powoduje to, że obraz oblężenia i kapitulacji Twierdzy Kokenhauzen jest niejasny i nasuwa wątpliwości. Jedynym wyjściem z tej sytuacji jest sięgnięcie do bezpośredniego źródła informacji – tj. opisu przedstawionego przez świadka wydarzeń. Takim jest bez wątpienia prezentowany powyżej list z 9 października 1700 r., napisany w obozie armii saskiej pod Kokenhausen. Jego autorem był prawdopodobnie podskarbi nadworny koronny Atanazy Miączyński (1639–1723), doświadczony dowódca z czasów Jana III Sobieskiego oraz wierny stronnik Augusta II.
Ważnym elementem w obecnych badaniach historycznych jest analiza relacji dyplomatycznych dotyczących dawnej Rzeczypospolitej w tym Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego. Ukazują one dzieje państwa oraz jego politykę wewnętrzną i zagraniczna z innej perspektywy historycznej. W 1700 r. wybuchła Wielka Wojna Północna, która zmieniła układ sił politycznych w Europie Środkowo Wschodniej na kolejne dziesięciolecia. Dyplomaci obcych dworów byli zainteresowani tą wojną, w tym Philipp Plantamour, sekretarz ambasadora angielskiego w Berlinie. Przesyłał on do Londynu swoje relacje, w których umieszczał nie tylko informacje dotyczące działań militarnych w czasie wojny, ale także te dotyczące najważniejszych rodzin na Litwie i ich rywalizacji politycznej. Analiza tych raportów dyplomatycznych da odpowiedź na pytanie w jaki sposób widziano wielką wojnę północną oraz sytuację wewnętrzną w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim na zachodzie Europy. Interesujące będzie także czy relacje Philippa Plantamoura w sposób rzetelny przedstawiały opisywane w raportach wydarzenia, czy były prawdziwe i zawierały do tej pory nieznane informacje.
EN
An important element in current historical research is the analysis of diplomatic relations regarding the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, including the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. They show the history of the state and its internal and foreign policy from a different historical perspective. In 1700 the Great Northern War broke out, which changed the balance of political forces in Central and Eastern Europe for the next decades. Foreign court diplomats were interested in this war, including Philipp Plantamour, secretary of the British ambassador in Berlin. He sent to London his reports, in which he placed not only information about military operations during the war, but also about the most important families in Lithuania and their political rivalry. An analysis of these diplomatic reports will answer the question of how the Great Northern War and the internal situation in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Western Europe was seen. It will also be interesting if the reports of Philipp Plantamour reliably presented the events described in the reports, were they true and contained unknown information so far.
RU
Важным элементом современных исторических исследований является анализ дипломатических отчетов касающихся Речи Посполитой. Они показывают историю государства, его внутреннюю и внешнюю политику с другой исторической точки зрения. В 1700 году вспыхнула Северная война, и в последующие десятилетия политическая система в Центральной и Восточной Европе изменилась. Дипломаты из иностранных дворов, в том числе Филипп Плантамур, секретарь посла Джорджа Степни в Берлине, заинтересовались войной. Свои отчеты он отправлял на Британию. В них он размещал информации о военных и политических операциях в Литве. Анализ этих дипломатических отчетов дает ответ на вопрос, как этот воспринимался в 1700- 1703 гг. этот конфликт а также Литва и ее социальные элиты. Также будет интересно ответить на вопрос о том, содержали ли отчеты Филиппа Плантамура правдивую и ранее неизвестную информацию.
Wielka wojna północna oznaczała zmierzch starych potęg takich, jak Szwecja czy Rzeczypospolita i narodziny nowej - Rosji cara Piotra I. Przeprowadził on w państwie głębokie reformy oraz zmodernizował i unowocześnił siły zbrojne, tworząc bałtycką flotę wojenną. Zmiany te nie uszły uwadze ambasadorów obcych państw, w tym oczywiście Wielkiej Brytanii, którzy raportowali o nich do centrali. Sporządzali także zestawienia sił zbrojnych Rosji, w tym marynarki oraz umieszczali przy takiej okazji trafne spostrzeżenia dotyczące żołdu czy werbunku marynarzy. Kilka z nich będzie przedmiotem analizy, a dane które można z nich odczytać będą mogły świadczyć o rozwoju carskich sił zbrojnych.
EN
The Great Northern War marked the end of old military powers such as Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the birth of a new one - Russia of Tsar Peter I. He carried out profound reforms in the country and modernized the armed forces, creating the baltic navy. These changes did not escape the attention of foreign ambassadors, including of course this from Great Britain, who reported about them to the headquarters. They also prepared lists of Russian armed forces including the navy and placed on this occasion accurate insights regarding the pay or recruitment of sailors. Several of them will be the subject of analysis, and the information that can be found in them also testify to the development of the tsarist armed forces.
RU
Великая Северная война ознаменовала упадок старых держав, таких как Швеция или Речь Посполита, и рождение новой - России царя Петр I. Он провел глубокие реформы в стране и модернизировал вооруженные силы, создав Балтийский флот. Эти изменения не остались незамеченными послами зарубежных стран, в том числе, конечно же, Великобритании, которые доложили о них в штаб. Они также подготовили списки вооруженных сил России, в том числе военно-морского флота, и разместили точные сведения о заработной плате или найме моряков. Некоторые из них будут проанализированы, и данные, которые можно будет прочитать из них, смогут свидетельствовать о развитии царских вооруженных сил.
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