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EN
The article presents the background of the arguments within the German People’s Party (DVP) concerning the idea of great coalition in the years 1920–1929. At the time, the concept of great coalition referred to the idea of a broad alliance of political forces ranging from social democrats on the left to national liberals from DVP. The chairman of DVP, Gustav Stresemann, was a proponent of such an alliance. Twice, i.e., in 1923 and 1928, he pushed towards the formation of a great coalition comprising SPD, DDP, Centre Party (and BVP in the period 1928–1930), while facing opposition from the right wing of his party. The crux of the discontent on the part of the right-wing faction was the cooperation with social democrats. In 1923, the right wing of DVP caused a downfall of the great coalition and resulted in the fracturing of the party. In March 1930, only a few months after Stresemann’s death (2 October 1929), the coalition of his making disintegrated. This proved to be the last parliamentary government of the Weimar Republic.
EN
On the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty this study deals with the historical development of Franco-German relations in the 20th century. The focus is on the historical models of rapprochement between the two nations. The author presents in detail the possibilities for cooperation in the interwar years (with a special focus on civil integration). This period may be considered one of the most intensive periods of the French-German reconciliation. Bases that the parties could build on after 1945 were founded as the ideas were similar. Following the successes of the large-scale policy, numerous other very important steps were needed to minimise mutual mistrust in the peoples of the two states. This led to a large number of various organisations and cooperations. The patterns presented here greatly influenced communication after 1945. In the second part of the study the author presents the origin and effect of the Élysée Treaty with some new aspects of the history of diplomacy. Of the numerous new initiatives, the author focuses primarily on civil ones. The great innovation brought about by the treaty, however, was the strong involvement of the civil societies of both countries, particularly in education, research, culture and youth exchanges. As a result of historical cooperation “Erbfeinde” (hereditary enemies) have become “Erbfreunde” (hereditary friends) within the European integration.
PL
Jednym z zasadniczych problemów w stosunkach niemiecko – sowieckich w latach 1925-1932 była kwestia traktatowego porozumienia pomiędzy Warszawą a Moskwą. Niestety poza jednym wyjątkiem nie znalazła ona szczególnego zainteresowania wśród badaczy. A szkoda, bo bardzo dobrze ukazuje ona prawdziwą naturę relacji Berlina i Moskwy w latach 1922-1933, które należałoby nazwać okresem rapallskim. Trudno się zatem dziwić, że nie zbadano również wpływu, jakie negocjacje tego porozumienia wywarły na stan stosunków sowiecko-niemieckich. Artykuł niniejszy ma na celu przynajmniej częściowe zmniejszenie tego rodzaju deficytów. Dotyczy on przełomu roku 1931 i 1932, kiedy to miała miejsce ostatnia, decydująca faza negocjacji polsko-sowieckiego paktu o nieagresji. Autor skupił się w nim na przedstawieniu równolegle trwających negocjacji pomiędzy Berlinem a Moskwą dotyczących zasadniczych zapisów polsko-sowieckiego traktatu.
EN
One of the key problems of German-Soviet relations in 1925-1932 was the treaty agreement between Warsaw and Moscow. For Germany, the conclusion of a political treaty between Poland and the USSR posed a threat to the realisation of its main foreign policy priority, namely the revision of the eastern border. Berlin was therefore very suspicious of any attempt at Polish-Soviet rapprochement. When the Soviets and Poles began final negotiations for a Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact in November 1931, this issue became a problem in Soviet-German relations. The problem was so significant that the Soviets consulted the Germans about the content of this agreement. German diplomacy tried to torpedo it, but as this article shows, it did not have very strong arguments. As a result, Berlin had to accept that Moscow and Warsaw concluded a political compromise in 1932.
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