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1

PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM AND HOBBES

100%
Chung H.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
vol. 71
|
issue 3
197 – 208
EN
Many commentators think that Hobbes was committed to psychological egoism. Psychological egoism is a theory of human psychology claiming that all human actions are ultimately motivated solely by one’s own self-interest. In this paper, the author argues that there are reasons to think that Hobbes was not committed to psychological egoism in any of its plausible formulations.
2

UNDERSTANDING RATIONALITY IN HOBBES AND HUME

80%
Chung H.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 8
687 – 696
EN
Many commentators think that Hobbes was committed to an instrumental view of rationality which foreshadows that of David Hume. The Humean conception of instrumental rationality is a conjunction of the following two claims: (a) no preferences or desires can properly be said to be irrational in themselves, and (b) the role of reason or rationality can be only confined to informing the agent with true beliefs about the world, and revealing the most effective means that could satisfy the agent’s current ends whatever they happen to be. In this paper, the author argues that, unlike what many people think, a careful reading of Hobbes shows that he was committed to neither of these claims.
3
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Thomasa Hobbesa koncepcja wyobraźni

80%
Wawrzonkowski K.
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
|
2012
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vol. 24
9-36
EN
The article deals with Thomas Hobbes’ conception of imagination. Hob-bes was aware of Greek and Latin origins of the term. According to him, imagination is nothing but a decaying sense. While reconstructing the draft of Hobbes’ theory of imagination, the author of the article describes the activity of mind as motion caused by bodies, and states that imagination can overcome the bounds of senses and memory. On the one hand, imagination is limited toexperience (in its reproductive function), but on the other, it can create newideas, conceptions or trains of thoughts (in its productive function).
4

Émile Durkheim a tzv. Hobbesův problém řádu: co se skrývá na dně „prvního" ze sociologických mýtů?

61%
Marsalek J.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
|
2008
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vol. 17/30
|
issue 3-4
161-184
EN
This paper deals with the relationship between Emile Durkheim's sociology and the contractualist tradition of political philosophy, represented here principally by Thomas Hobbes. Its aim is to show that Giddens' strict rejection of Parsons' claim according to which Durkheim has reopened in his work the 'Hobbes' problem of order', should not be accepted as such, because it's radicality hides that what is the value in Parsons' thesis. As we argue, Parsons has the merit of noticing that Hobbes and Spencer, who - in respect of their social philosophies - are usually seen as opposed, appear to be close to each other when they are considered by Durkheim as to the conception of the society their philosophies yield. Yet Durkheim's criticism of their individualistic conception of society results in a critique of their theories of the state. It is then proposed that Durkheim's sociology is an endeavour to conceive the society independently of the state, and thus, inversely, to emancipate the state from the society, so that it can be entrusted with a different function other than the guarantor of the social order.
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