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Teoria estetyczna w nauce Hume’a o naturze ludzkiej

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Filo-Sofija
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2006
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vol. 6
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issue 6
207-222
EN
The article deals with the problems of aesthetics found in two works of David Hume: Treatise of Human Nature and Of the Standard of Taste. Both works, being complementary to each other, give the epistemological grounds for the theory aesthetics. On the basis of Hume’s Treatise I show the epistemological frame of the theory, compare two principal kinds of reasoning (demonstrative and metaphysical), and sketch the possibility of judgments concerning beauty. The conception of beauty developed in the work equals it with utility and place the phenomenon in the sphere of social relations. The conception is further compared with another one, fully explained in the later work Standard of Taste. The procedure allows of the critical analysis of the whole conception of aesthetics with special reference to the category of beauty and to aesthetic judgments.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 8
687 – 696
EN
Many commentators think that Hobbes was committed to an instrumental view of rationality which foreshadows that of David Hume. The Humean conception of instrumental rationality is a conjunction of the following two claims: (a) no preferences or desires can properly be said to be irrational in themselves, and (b) the role of reason or rationality can be only confined to informing the agent with true beliefs about the world, and revealing the most effective means that could satisfy the agent’s current ends whatever they happen to be. In this paper, the author argues that, unlike what many people think, a careful reading of Hobbes shows that he was committed to neither of these claims.
Filo-Sofija
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2007
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vol. 7
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issue 7
EN
Firstly, the contents of Hume’s Dialogues of Natural Religion had no principal influence on Kant’s critique of physico-theology in Critique of Pure Reason. Secondly, Kant recognizes the falshood of Hume’s conviction that critique of natural theology annihilates “the religious hypothesis”. Thirdly, according to Kant, the same arguments which discredit the critique of natural theology expressed by Hume make “Epicurus thesis” more probable.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 4
281-294
EN
The paper deals with the impact of Hume's philosophy on Kant's philosophy of history. By comparing the views of the two philosophers the author comes to the conclusion that on some places Kant in his works on his own philosophy of history makes use of Hume's argumentation concerning the connections between the cultivation of humans, production and trade, and the origins of political freedom, as well as the rise of the society controlled by justice and law. The author sees the two thinkers as very close one to another not only in the understanding of the epistemological question, but also in contemplating the history.
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100%
Filo-Sofija
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2004
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vol. 4
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issue 4
191-208
EN
The way in which Hegel understood the eighteenth-century British philosophy determined to an extend the later interpretations of thought of the most outstanding philosophers of the British tradition. From the point of view which Hegel adopted describing the logic of the history of philosophy, Locke and Berkeley belong to metaphysical philosophy common for Descartes and Leibniz. On the other hand purely skeptical philosophy of David Hume is seen merely as the link of chain between the metaphysics and German idealistic philosophy. There is much truth in what we can find in Hegel’s writings, especially in his way of reading Locke, although the positive, systematic character of Hume’s philosophy is completely neglected.
EN
Freedom or control of how we act is often and very naturally under-stood as a kind of power—a power to determine for ourselves how we act. Is freedom conceived as such a power possible, and what kind of power must it be? The paper argues that power takes many forms, of which ordinary causation is only one; and that if freedom is indeed a kind of power, it cannot be ordinary causation. Scepticism about the reality of freedom as a power can take two forms. One, found in Hume, now often referred to as the Mind argument, assumes incompatibilism, and concludes from incompatibilism that freedom cannot exist, as indistinguishable from chance. But another scepticism, founds in Hobbes, does not assume incompatibilism, but assumes rather that the only possible form of power in nature is ordinary causation, concluding that freedom cannot for this reason exist as a form of power. This scepticism is more profound—it is in fact presupposed by Hume’s scepticism—and far more interesting, just because freedom cannot plausibly be modelled as ordinary causation.
EN
This essay examines critically the impact of Hume's conception of reason on ethics. In Hume's empirical ethics, the role traditionally attributed to reason is played by sentiment. Hume's conception of reason and its ethical implications are presented and possible objections to the limits he imposed on the role of reason in ethics are indicated. This analysis relies on Aristotelian arguments, and suggests that reason seems to play a more significant role in human action than Hume claimed. The paper concludes that showing Hume's restrictions on reason in human action as incorrect remains a genuine possibility.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 7
550 – 561
EN
The article offers an interpretation of several issues of Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature. It shows how the constitution of the Self in the indirect passion of pride and in the context of affection is according to Hume the necessary condition of philosophy in general. Following is a brief description of how the author’s interpretation derives from the shifts in the interpretations of Hume’s Treatise in Smith, Árdal, Livingstone, Baier, and Harris. Contrary to earlier interpretations the influence on these philosophers of the theories of the Treatise’s Second Book (namely the questions of personal Self and passions) as well as Hume’s conception of curiosity from the Treatise ´s First Book Conclusion is depicted. It enables us to better understand the meaning of the latter, as well as personal motivation of a person’s commitment to philosophy.
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