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1

DISTRIBUTION AND INFERENCE: WHAT PHILOSOPHICAL AND COMPUTATIONAL SEMANTICS CAN LEARN FROM EACH OTHER

100%
Ocelák R.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2016
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vol. 23
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issue 3
299 – 323
EN
Distribution of a word across contexts has proved to be a very useful approximation of the word’s meaning. This paper reflects on the recent attempts to enhance distributional (or vector space) semantics of words with meaning composition, in particular with Fregean compositionality. The author discusses the nature and performance of distributional semantic representations and argues against the thesis that semantics is in some sense identical with distribution. Instead he proposes that distribution is merely a reflection of semantics, and a substantially imperfect one. That raises some doubts regarding the very idea of obtaining semantic representations for larger wholes (phrases, sentences) by combining the distributional representations of particular items. In any case, the author rejects the generally unquestioned assumption that formal semantics provides a good theory of semantic composition, which it would be desirable to combine with distributional semantics (as a theory that is highly successful on the lexical field). He suggests that a positive alternative to the strong reading of the distributional hypothesis can be seen in the philosophy of inferentialism with respect to language meaning. The author argues that the spirit of inferentialism is reasonably compatible with the current practice of distributional semantics, and he discusses the motivations for as well as the obstacles in the way of implementing the philosophical position in a computational framework.
2

PERSPEKTÍVY INFERENCIALIZMU V SÉMANTIKE MORÁLNEHO DISKURZU

100%
Spodniak S., Kováčová D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 3
205 – 221
EN
The aim of the paper is to point out that semantic inferentialism is a suitable semantic theory of moral discourse. This aim is pursued by comparison of semantic inferentialism with another two popular semantic approaches to moral discourse, namely representational and expressivist approaches. While the representionalism claims that statements gain their meanings by representing certain states of affairs, the expressivist semantics claims that the meanings of moral statements consist in the emotions or desires we express by them. Thesis of this paper is that semantic inferentialism is a promising semantic theory of moral discourse because it allows us to take the position that moral statements are meaningful without assuming the existence of controversial entities in the form of objective ethical facts, and at the same time, it does not require us to interpret moral discourse merely as a means for expressing our emotions and desires.
3

INFERENTIALISM WITHOUT NORMATIVITY

100%
Posłajko K., Grabarczyk P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2018
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vol. 25
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issue 2
174 - 195
EN
In this paper we argue that inferentialist approach to meaning does not, by itself, show that meaning is normative in a prescriptive sense, and that the constitutive rules argument is especially troubling for this position. To show that, we present the proto-inferentialist theory developed by Ajdukiewicz and claim that despite the differences between his theory and contemporary inferentialism rules of language in both theories function more like classificatory devices than prescriptions. Inferentialists can respond by claiming that in their theory meaning is essentially social and hence normative, but we claim that then semantic normativity becomes derivative of social normativity.
4

Říká logicismus něco, co se říkat nemá?

88%
Kolman V.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2010
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vol. 32
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issue 1
37-57
EN
The objective of this paper is to analyze the broader significance of Frege's logicist project against the background of Wittgenstein's philosophy from both Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. The article draws on two basic observations, namely (1) that Frege's project aims at saying something that was only implicit in everyday arithmetical practice, as the so-called recursion theorem demonstrates, and (2) that the explicitness involved in logicism does not concern the arithmetical operations themselves, but rather the way they are defined. It thus represents the attempt to make explicit not the (arithmetical) rules alone, but rather the rules governing their following, i.e. rules of second-order type. I elaborate on these remarks with short references to Brandom's refinement of Frege's expressivist and Wittgenstein's pragmatist project.
5

THE BASIC MODEL OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE IN ROBERT B. BRANDOM'S INFERENTIALISM

88%
Zarebski T.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2008
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vol. 36
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issue 2
83-109
EN
The paper discusses the basic categories of discursive practice following the model presented by Robert B. Brandom in 'Making it Explicit': deontic status and the deontic attitude, the notions of assertion and inference, inferential relations, and the scorekeeping metaphor. The author analyses these notions, trying to outline Brandom's conception of language and practice. He also discusses the conception of normative facts, the role of sanctions in normative practice, as well as Brandom's specific way of understanding normativity. The author claims that normativity in Brandom's sense is constitutive rather than evaluative.
6

MEANING-CONSTITUTIVE INFERENCES

88%
Drobňák M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2017
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vol. 24
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issue 1
85 – 104
EN
A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as “widely shared”. In the paper, the author argues for an empirical plausibility of Peregrin’s proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning-constitutive linguistic action, which sustain Peregrin’s response. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation. If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. The author believes that binding modulations – a specific type of meaning modulations – satisfy this condition.
7

DETERMINANTS OF MEANING: INVISIBLE, THOUGH UBIQUITOUS CONTEXT

75%
Tasseva E.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 10
877 – 889
EN
In the course of research on the essence of meaning, different concepts appear as theoretical derivatives of the intuitive notion of meaning, depending on which of the key determinants of meaning (reference, inference, or context) dominate the respective line of study. On the basis of underlying specific philosophical aspects of alternative conceptual apparatuses gravitating to the relevant determinants, various competing and arguing philosophical schools (“-isms”) emerge, e. g. referentialism, inferentialism, contextualism. While the development of the first two starts from a certain determinant and ends with corresponding “-ism”, the third, contextualism, has followed another model ‒ the context itself as a general determining category is left in the background. The question is still waiting to be seriously dealt with, as to what sort of needs the non-linguistic use of the notion of context meets, and what characteristics of context, as a linguistic category, justifiably spread into other areas. Here an attempt is made to draw attention to several basic properties of context and to its potential and prospective of functioning as a general logical and philosophical category.
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