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1

Nowożytny spór o abstrakcje

100%
Gryzenia K.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2010
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vol. 46
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issue 2
219-238
EN
The issue of modern dispute over abstraction undertaken in this article takes into consideration, above all, three authors: Cajetan (Thomas de Vio), Pedro da Fonseca and Francisco Suarez. Cajetan, as a member of the Dominican order, represented Thomistic thought and in the early phase of the modern period was the most influential. Fonseca was at the beginning of the forming of the Jesuit philosophical school, not burdened by the tradition of his order, that is either Thomistic or Scottish tradition. Suarez, Fonseca's successor, was widely recognized in the 17th century. One should also remember that nominalism, even though quite fundamentally criticized at that time, had quite a significant impact. We deal here with merging of diverse orientations and the intention of this study is to show how the issue of abstraction was presented, with the special focus of Fonseca's approach. Fonseca is not very well known, but his solutions decided not only the philosophical face of so-called 'suarezianism' but - as it is believed - were the link in shaping philosophical culture of next generations. There is no denying that all discussed authors show perceptiveness and inquisitiveness, hence multiple differentiations, divisions and subtle distinctions. This is what happens for example with the division of abstraction into formal and objective, typical and untypical, habitual and actual or with displaying different and separate functions of active intellect etc. Among various philosophical currents, quite a big influence of neo-Platonic spiritualism and nominalism can be noticed. An example of this tendency is Fonseca's and Suarez' theorem that idea is the model and material cause of abstract cognition. According to this conviction everything that is contained in idea must reflect in intellect. This way the difference between sensory and intellectual cognition, between subject and object is abolished. These findings confirm one of the interpretations that this is a step towards Cartesianism with its philosophy of the subject.
2

Pożądanie a intelekt według św. Tomasza z Akwinu

80%
Swiecki P. M.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2010
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vol. 46
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issue 2
182-207
EN
The subject of the paper is appetite and its role in human intellectual cognition. The analysis is based on St. Thomas Aquinas' works, especially on his 'Summa Theologiae' and 'Quaestiones disputatae de veritate'. Only intellect and will, powers of the rational part of soul, are considered. According to Aquinas, the presence of appetite on this level is not limited to free acts of will. Appetite can be found in the very structure of these powers - in both intellect and will there is a natural appetite, which inclines them to acting. These powers naturally desire: to cognize the truth, and the object of cognition as such. Consequently, there are three types of appetite that influence the acts of intellect: free acts of will, natural appetite of will, and natural appetite of intellect. Their essence, mutual relations, and their influence on intellect are discussed. It is shown that according to Aquinas the natural appetite of intellect and will enables any cognitive activity.
3
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Jistota a víra podle sv. Tomáše Akvinského

70%
Štěpinová M.
Studia theologica
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2009
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vol. 11
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issue 2
1-10
EN
According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the certitude of faith is caused by the First Truth which is an object of faith. The question of the certitude was overlooked and the signification of the First Truth was underestimated in the thomist treatises on faith. In his paper, the authoress concentrates on the First Truth as the last perfection of the intellect and the last end of the will. The relationship of the First Truth to the intellect and to the will is fundamental for understanding of the significance of faith's certitude.
4

THE SPINOZA INSPIRATION IN THE LATE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT (SPATAUFKLARUNG)

61%
Jakuszko H.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2009
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issue 15(28)
173-188
EN
The 1780s in German culture witnessed the phenomenon of Spinoza's revival, which was an important generational experience of the fourth philosophical generation of the German Enlightenment, called by Werner Schneiders the generation of I. Kant. Initiated by F. H. Jacobi Spinoza-Streit (Pantheismusstreit) introduced a new quality to the knowledge on the life and work of Spinoza because the question about the 'spirit of Spinozism' was posed for the first time. In the debate over Spinoza the following models of interpretation can be distinguished: (1) weak anti-Spinozism - the Berlin Enlightenment (M. Mendelssohn); (2) strong anti-Spinozism (F. H. Jacobi); Weimar neo-Spinozism (J. G. Herder, J. W. Goethe). The crucial controversy was that between strong anti-Spinozism and neo-Spinozism. In the view of Jacobi, Spinozism is an atheism which eliminates the God of religion (ens extramundanum) depriving him of personal character and free decision. Jacobi argued that the definitions of Spinoza's philosophy as pantheism or cosmotheism are of euphemist character which obscure the essence of Spinozism. He criticized Weimar neo-Spinozism as an inconsistent endeavour of mediation between theism and Spinozism.
5

ĽUDSKÁ DUŠA A MIMOĽUDSKÝ INTELEKT

61%
Karul R.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 7
613 – 622
EN
In the contribution two Plotinus´ treatises are scrutinized in order to unveil the possible self-givens of soul on one side and intellect on the other. Plotinus´ concept of soul borders on the definition of a human being (whose constitution depends on the soul descending into him), while the intellect is divine, non-human. In Plotinus self-givens means self-knowledge, self-reflection or self-awareness. The question is, whether self-knowledge as the highest knowledge is related to the soul, or to the intellect alone. Even though the author outlines what could be regarded as the self-knowledge of soul, he questions the independent existence of this self of soul. Soul is not self-given in knowledge, it is rather self-given by intellect. This, strangely enough, corresponds with M. Henry’s conception of the relationship between the Self (i.e. soul in Plotinus) and Life (i.e. Intellect in Plotinus).
6
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Stany trzecie w ujęciu Władysława Tatarkiewicza

51%
Szutta A.
Filo-Sofija
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2011
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vol. 11
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issue 2-3(13-14)
617-627
EN
The article treats on the concept of “third states” (as opposed to the other two kinds of states: those of work and entertainment) introduced by Władysław Tatarkiewicz in his treatise On Happiness. A thorough analysis of the passage on “third states” as well as of the very concept allows to see its relevance to the considerations on such important philosophical questions as those of the nature of doing philosophy, the meaning of life, intellectual intuition, theoria or contemplation. The paper consists of five parts. The first part is focused on Tatarkiewicz’s understanding of “third states” as well as on a phenomenological analysis of the concept itself. The second part is a kind of extension of the analysis enriched by Josef Pieper’s interpretation of the idea of leisure which I find very close to what Tatarkiewicz means by “third states”. In the light of the analysis the concept of the ‘third states’ turns out to be very inspiring and useful in dealing with a number of philosophical questions, which is shown in the fourth part of the paper. The final step consists of questioning the above conclusion by short outlining a possible naturalistic interpretation of the ‘third states’ in the light of which the picture of philosophy, human life or human cognition, based on the concept of the ‘third states’ might turn out to be a mere illusion. I do not give a final answer to this question but treat the conclusion of the paper as an invitation to a deeper consideration of the matter.
7

TOMÁŠOVA METAFYZIKA ČLOVĚKA - ČLOVĚK JAKO PROSTŘEDNÍ ČLÁNEK HIERARCHIE STVOŘENÍ

51%
Slováček P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
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vol. 71
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issue 6
462 – 473
EN
The article sheds light on how Thomas Aquinas philosophically explained and founded the unity of human being as the centre of the created universe, establishing the continuity between the spheres of nature and intellect. Thomas’ conception is explored with respect to older doctrines drawing on Aristotle’s hylemorfic approach, especially to human soul, showing at the same time the development of Thomas’ conception itself. In Thomas the traditional problem of a possible uniting the soul as a form with the soul as a founding principle of thinking is successfully eliminated by transposing the psychological problematic as a whole to metaphysical level (especially in his later writing De substantiis separatis). This shift enabled him to explain the continuity of universe as well as the unity of human being thanks to the distinction between essence and being taken from Avicenna.
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