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1

INTENČNÉ ASPEKTY PRÍLEŽITOSTNÝCH DIEL STARŠEJ LITERATÚRY

100%
Braxatoris M.
Slovenská literatúra (Slovak Literature)
|
2023
|
vol. 70
|
issue 5
471 - 487
EN
The article discusses the connections between classical rhetoric and speech act theory of John Austin and John Searle, with regard to genre and interpretive research on occasional works of early Slovak literature. It builds on the traditional aims of rhetoric and the role of the rhetorician (in the spirit of Aristotle, Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, and Marcus Tullius Cicero), as well as on insights into the connections between Aristotelian kinds of rhetoric and the typology of illocutionary acts highlighted by Walter H. Beale, Emmanuelle Danblon, and Cristina Pepe. The author applies selected tools proposed by Teun A. van Dijk for research into the pragmatics of literary communication: the notion of the indirect speech act in relation to the functional syncretism of early literature and the notion of the macro-speech-act in relation to the communicative function of the literary text as a whole. The article aims at defining occasional literary works on the basis of their pragmatic function and to characterise selected genres of occasional literature (supported by older theory of poetic and rhetorical theory). Following the work of the intellectual historian Quentin Skinner, the author outlines the ways in which speech act theory can be used in the interpretation of occasional literary works of Slovak literature of earlier periods.
2

BOOTSTRAPPING OBJECTION

100%
Piller C.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 4
612 – 631
EN
If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.
3

PROBLEMATIKA ÚMYSLU (INTENTIO) U PETRA ABELARDA A TOMÁŠA AKVINSKÉHO

100%
Blaščíková A., Vašek M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2018
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vol. 73
|
issue 10
831 – 843
EN
The aim of this article is to examine the core of Abelard s intentionalist ethics, his understanding of intention, and some of the problems present in his conception. It also aims to demonstrate a more comprehensive understanding of the issue of intentions developed by Thomas Aquinas and compare it to Abelard's teaching. The study explores these topics from the perspective of history of philosophy and points out similarities and differences in the approaches of both of the philosophers. Abelard’s conception was further elaborated by Thomas Aquinas, however, the problem of intention and its place in the evaluation of human actions has not been completely solved.
4

PROBLEM OF INTENTION AND THE EVALUATIVE PROPERTIES OF EFFECTS IN THE KNOBE EFFECT

100%
Waleszczyński A., Obidziński M., Rejewska J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2022
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vol. 29
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issue 2
219 – 245
EN
In the article, we present analyses and findings which add precision to the role of intentions and the relation between effects in attributing the intentionality of causing a side effect. Our research supplements and modifies numerous findings regarding the appearance of the so-called Knobe effect. The experiments and analyses show that the very originality of the story used by Knobe and the relationship between the evaluative properties of the main effect and the side effect results in an asymmetry of responses and contributes to the occurrence of the side-effect effect. Because of this, we reject the thesis that the mode of attitude of the agent to the caused side effect or that the social expectation of this attitude determine the attribution of the intentionality of the caused effect. On the contrary, we defend the thesis that it is the relationship between the evaluative properties of the main effect and those of the side effect, as well as the impact of a side effect on the main effect, that significantly influence the attribution of intentionality in causing a side effect.
5

THE REALIZATION OF INTENTIONS IN THE PROCESS OF SPEAKING

100%
Frydrychowicz S., Matejczuk J.
Kolokwia Psychologiczne (Psychological Colloquia)
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2006
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vol. 15
139-152
EN
The article discusses some theoretical aspects of the realization of intentions in the process of speaking. It also presents results of research on the stages of realization of intentions in the speaking process. The main focus was on the following aspects of the process of speaking: 1. its integrational character; 2. the role of intentions; 3. the stages of realization of intentions; 4. the correlation between process and model of realization of intentions during speaking and the model of realization of intentions according to Gollwitzer. The basic aim of the article was to show the integrational function of intentions in relation to the process of speaking.
6

KOMUNIKAČNÝ ASPEKT NOMINÁLNYCH TAUTOLÓGIÍ TYPU OBCHOD JE OBCHOD

88%
Sokolová J.
Slovenská reč (Slovak Language)
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2015
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vol. 80
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issue 3-4
157 - 176
EN
The aim of the paper is to explain the use of nominal tautologies by the speakers of the Slovak language. It focuses on a) the verification of propositional and pragmatic functions of nominal tautologies; b) the significance of lexical collocations for the contextual dependence of their interpretation. In the paper it is assumed that the semantic-pragmatic and illocutionary use of nominal tautologies forms the background of a conclusive character of practical (non-analytical) argumentation, and the acceptance of the corpus of operators, deictors and descriptive verbs has a crucial significance to the interpretation of the specific content. The article primarily studies the nominal tautologies from the pragmatic perspective; yet, it also considers the attitude and intention of the speaker, contextual significance of nominal tautologies in the case of individual use and the proportion of content between tautologies in the case of coordinative tautologies.
7

THE ESSENCE OF ARTIFACTS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DESIGN STANCE

88%
Kelemen D., Carey S.
Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle (Hungarian Psychological Review)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 1
31-59
EN
Some have argued that because artifacts are not natural kinds, they fall outside of the domain of the theory-theory of concepts. To the contrary, artifact concepts function very much like natural kind concepts. A causal-explanatory structure known as 'the design stance' underlies adult concepts of artifacts. According to the design stance, each artifact's existence, kind, and properties can be explained by the function intended by its designer. The notion of intended function constrains reasoning about artifacts just as representations of causal essences constrain reasoning about natural kinds. Furthermore, just as some framework theories that constrain representations of natural kinds, such as a vitalist biology, must be constructed in childhood, so too the design stance is not constructed until the late preschool years (being consolidated between four and six years of age.) Unlike vitalist biology, though, the construction of the design stance builds upon developmental primitives that are part of the early developing systems of infant core knowledge, especially those within core knowledge of intentional agency.
8

On the Demonstrative Use of Expressions

88%
Ciecierski T.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2005
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vol. 14
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issue 1(53)
153-173
EN
Clear understanding of the demonstrative use of expressions, the author argues, is a complicated philosophical task. We have to decide whether relevant contextual factors that determine semantic values of demonstratively used expressions are: (i) speaker's intentions; (ii) speaker's pointings; (ii) teller-hearer attention. Arguments supporting (ii) are given - e.g. the author thinks that there are mistakes in arguments favouring intentions over pointings and that the careful analysis of the notion of intending shows that typical causes of pointings are treated as having property of influencing semantic values of expressions. However, since this last feature can be properly predicated of pointings themselves, proponent of (i) confuses intentions with effects of expressing them.
9

SÉMANTICKÁ INFORMÁCIA, MISINFORMÁCIA A DEZINFORMÁCIA

88%
Sadloň D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 7
510 – 530
EN
The presented paper advocates the unified account of semantic information, misinformation, and disinformation (3I) which uses “semantic correspondence” and “intention” understood as their main distinctive features. It is argued that the proposed approach is neutral about the misleadingness of messages and their meaning and about the evaluation of truthfulness of factual sentences. The suggested model also comprises a wider variety of language expressions than existing conceptions while securing a simple, intuitive but subtle explanation of its individual components and related issues. Primarily, it leaves enough space for the distinction between 1) “relativistic” approach to 3I, which mainly focuses on pragmatic aspects of communication in dynamic multi-agent systems, and 2) special epistemological procedures, which often do not presuppose such a multi-agent environment and work with 3I in “absolute” terms.
10

PRACTICAL AUTHORITY OF NORMATIVE BELIEFS: TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

88%
Audi R.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
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vol. 20
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issue 4
527 – 545
EN
People who do not act on their judgments regarding what they ought to do—their practical judgments—are often considered weak-willed, especially when the judgment is made at a time when the act it favours is plainly possible. Is this a kind of practical irrationality, perhaps due to incoherence between practical reason, which should guide intention and action, and behaviour that fails to conform to a guiding directive? More generally, do normative beliefs with the same kind of self-directive content as practical judgments possess the same sort of rational authority, if indeed they must have any such authority? At least since Aristotle, weak-willed action has often been considered irrational. This paper indicates why that view is plausible, but also why it is too strong. The paper shows how the practical authority of normative judgments can be overridden and why, on the theory of rational action suggested by analysis of such cases, certain initially plausible action-guiding principles are too strong. The concluding part of the paper briefly indicates how that theory can do justice to the analogy between practical and theoretical reason and to the essential connection between the two.
11
Content available remote

THE MEANING OF INTENTION FOR MORAL EVALUATION OF AN ACTION - DANIEL WEGNER VIEW (Znaczenie intencji dla moralnej oceny czynu - stanowisko Daniela Wegnera)

88%
Cichosz M.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 8
49-63
EN
In the article, the author attempts to compare and confront Daniel Wegner's idea of a conscious will with the selected ethic doctrines in the context of relationship between intention and the moral evaluation of an action. According to the utilitarian doctrine, when one evaluates an action intention should not be considered because only the results of an action are relevant. On the other hand, Kant and the ethics of love for fellowmen claim that intention is a direct cause of action, therefore, it is intention that should really be evaluated. On the basis of Wegner's model of a conscious will, one may state that an utilitarian attitude is more justified in many causes. In the act of volition, intention serves only as a commentary, rather than as a cause (as it is commonly believed). In Wegner's opinion the main role of intention is to explain action in the context of the plans, desires and beliefs of an agent. It is all due to the fact that in social interactions, one should always have the ability to explain one's own behavior: ignorance of the causes of one's behavior is inadmissible in this context (odium of insane action). Moreover, when intention and action match, a specific kind of feeling - phenomenal will - is added to the act of volition. This particular feeling not only strengthens the relationship between intention and action. but it also helps the agent to distinguish his own actions from other actions of other agents. It means that the ultimate form of intention may be completely different from the actual causes of a particular type of behavior.To conclude, due to Wegner's work, the utilitarian doctrine gained strong support for the thesis that intention should not be considered during the moral evaluation of action.
12

INTENTIONS AND AGENCY

88%
Wágner Z.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
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vol. 64
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issue 8
739-747
EN
In this paper the author investigates Harry G. Frankfurt's philosophy of action from the point of view of the concept of intentionality in action. Many influential philosophers of action assume that agents have a separate faculty to form intentions. Most notably, Michael E. Bratman, David J. Velleman and Gary Watson claim that this ability is centrally important to our ability to act. To be agents, it seems to be necessary to actively influence our behaviour, and intentions play a significant role in this process. However, very controversially, Frankfurt's philosophy seems to imply that we do not have a separate ability to form intentions. Rather, our intentions are reducible to a certain type of complex desires. So it seems that in the same way as he reduces reason to desires (most notably in his book 'The Reasons of Love'), he reduces our ability to form intentions to a special way of desiring as well. The author discusses some difficulties of this view, and he tries to point out some advantages of the contrary view according to which they have a separate faculty to actively form intentions.
13

Health oriented goals, self-regulatory processes, health behaviors, and well-being

88%
Pasikowski T., Sek H., Ziarko M.
Polish Psychological Bulletin
|
2005
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vol. 36
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issue 1
25-33
EN
The quality and strength of intention as well as planning are the key self-regulatory processes in health behavior change. The aim of the present study was to test whether the processes resulting in implementation of intention depend not only on planning but also on the sense of agency, an involvement and social influence variables. The study involved 143 voluntary participants, 83 women, 56 men, aged 18-35 with high school or higher education. A set of rating scales and questionnaires was used to measure the self-regulatory processes, health behaviors, well-being and their predictors. The results support the notion that health behaviors and well-being were found to be affected by similar predictors such as the intention strength, completeness and action orientation in planning. High evaluation of developmental goals in health decision making was among crucial predictors of health behaviors. Participants with high levels of self-regulatory indicators used credible social influence sources.
14

ENKRASIA

88%
Broome J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
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vol. 20
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issue 4
425 – 436
EN
Rationality requires you to intend to do what you believe you ought to do. This is a rough formulation of the requirement the author calls ‘Enkrasia’. This article presents a precise formulation. It turns out to be complicated, and the article also explains the need for each complication.
15

From trait-behavior relations to perceived motives: An evolving view of positivity and negativity effects in person perception

88%
Reeder G. D.
Polish Psychological Bulletin
|
2006
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vol. 37
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issue 4
191-202
EN
This article reviews a program of research on positivity and negativity effects in person perception. The focus is on studies in which perceivers receive information about the positive and negative behaviors of a target person (or group) and then make trait inferences. The research program was initially grounded in a theoretical approach based on trait-behavior relations (Reeder & Brewer, 1979) and then evolved toward a multiple inference model (MIM). According to MIM, perceivers make multiple inferences about the motives and traits of a target person (Reeder et.al., 2004). The rationale underlying this theoretical development is discussed in some detail.
16

POINTS OF VIEW FROM THE LOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (II)

75%
Duzi M., Jespersen B., Materna P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2007
|
vol. 14
|
issue 1
5-31
EN
In this abstract also the 1st part of the paper (publ. ibid. nr 3(2006) pp. 277-305) is covered. The authors offer a 'logical explication' of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of 'point of view'. They show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of a 'partial' characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a 'P' and at the same time a non-'P (simpliciter)', because it is a 'P' only relative to some point of view and a non-'P' from another point of view. But there is a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: 'point of view' is a homonymous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet the authors propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term 'point of view'. It is an empirical 'function': when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a (set of) evaluating 'proposition(s)' about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent's 'attitude' to the respective object. In Part I the authors first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II they then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of the agents' attitudes. The authors explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a 'P' and at the same time a non-'P': the agent applies the different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes 'de re', and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes 'de dicto', is also analyzed. The authors show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes unless some additional assumptions are added, and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, the authors explicate the notion of 'conceptual' point of view and analyze the cases of viewpoints given by a conceptual distinction. Finally the authors show, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version.
17

Social Comparison as a Moderator Between Perceived Social Risk and Purchase Intention

75%
MICHNIUK A., GANSSER O., SCHMITZ S. O.
Communication Today
|
2019
|
vol. 10
|
issue 1
124-141
EN
The study aims to analyse the moderator effect of social comparison, which influences the strength of the relationship between perceived social risk (independent variable) and purchase intention (dependent variable). Next to that, it aims to answer the question whether there are any differences in the effects of trust and perceived social risk on the intention to join a fitness centre when participants are exposed to advertising which depicts a slim model (desired end state) or to advertising portraying a heavy one (undesired end state). The results show that, on the one hand, social comparison influences the strength of the effect of perceived social risk on the intention to join a fitness centre. On the other hand, there is a significant difference and a higher influence of perceived social risk on the intention to join a fitness centre when participants are exposed to a desired end state via advertising.
18

ROBUSTNÍ POSKYTOVÁNÍ DŮVODŮ VS. POUHÉ SPOUŠTĚNÍ DŮVODŮ: PŘÍPAD ŽÁDOSTI

75%
Kokešová J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2023
|
vol. 78
|
issue 3
165 – 179
EN
David Enoch attempts to develop a general theory of authority, not by defining the concept of authority or identifying a normative reason for obeying its commands but by describing the mechanism of commanding. According to Enoch, commands are part of a broader phenomenon, the so-called robust reason-giving, which includes promises and requests in addition to commands. Crucial to the theory of robust reason giving is the intention of the person providing the reason. In other words, commanding, promising, or requesting can only be done by someone who can form a complex intention, that is, to have a will of his own. In Enoch’s view, adult human beings, not small children and animals, form sufficiently complex intentions. Yet it seems young children and perhaps even animals can request, that is, of providing reasons robustly. This incoherence needs to be resolved if a theory of robust reason-giving, and hence a general theory of authority, is to be plausible. In this text, I have suggested how to understand the requests of small children and animals. Their speech acts resembling requests can be relatively unproblematic considered as communicating needs or wishes or merely triggering motivational reasons-giving. If we do not classify their speech acts as robust reason-giving, the theory of robust reason-giving (at least on this issue) remains coherent and can form the basis of a general theory of authority.
19
Content available remote

Defending ‘the Artist’s Theory’: Wollheim’s Lost Idea Regained?

63%
McFee G.
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics
|
2010
|
vol. 47
|
issue 1
3-26
EN
The paper considers an argument of Richard Wollheim's, originally presented in a 1976 symposium with Goodman and Wiggins, which disappeared when the symposium contribution was 'reprinted' in the supplementary essays to the expanded edition of Art and Its Objects (Wollheim, 1980). It lays out the argument's original context, locating its objectives by means of a comparison with Goodman's autographic/allographic distinction, with its attendant discussion of the 'history of production', and presents Wollheim's defence of 'the artist's theory'. This defence coheres in interesting ways with Wollheim's aesthetics emphasis on the importance of the artist's intention (suitably understood) as part of a specification of what the work itself is. This conception reinforces the importance Wollheim grants both to the fulfilled intentions of the artist and to a suitably positioned, suitably informed, and suitably sensitive spectator. Both should be modelled as operating under the aegis of the artist's theory, a notion this 'missing' argument serves to emphasize.
20

FENOMENOLOGICKÁ INTERPRETÁCIA ARCHITEKTÚRY CHRISTIANA NORBERGA-SCHULZA

63%
Zervan M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 8
653 – 665
EN
The paper´s focus is on a proposed reconstruction of Norberg-Schulz’s phenomenological method of interpretation. This reconstruction derives from two of his relevant writings: the book Intentions of Architecture (1963) and the paper Kahn, Heidegger and the Language of Architecture (1979), while taking into the consideration the whole corpus of his completed theoretical, historiographical-architectural work. The reconstruction proceeds in two steps: first, we reconstruct Norberg-Schulz’s models of architectural work and following is the reconstruction of interpreting models. The proposed reconstruction also aims at introducing terminological instruments for both of the above-mentioned steps and aspects of interpretation. While preserving the continuity, we redefine basic Norberg-Schulz’s categories. This enables us to enter the discussion about two stages of Norberg-Schulz’s thinking and about two Norberg-Schulzs, respectively: structural-semiotic and phenomenological-existentialist ones.
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