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Knowledge - infological interpretation

100%
Stefanowicz B.
Ekonomia. Rynek, Gospodarka, Społeczeństwo
|
2004
|
issue 13
39-46
EN
The article presents an 'infological' approach to explain the sense of the term knowledge. Originally, the idea of such an approach was developed by Bo Sundgren (1973) and Börje Langefors (1980) to define the term 'information'. The concept was based on the assumption that 'information' can be viewed as a name of the context delivered by the message 'K' defined by an equation discussed by the author. By analogy, the term 'knowledge' (omega) can be interpreted as the contents of the set consisting of three elements of another equation, i.e. information 'I', context (C) of the problems 'Q' under solving, and the experience (D) of the user 'U'. The approach seems to be perspective for manifold analysis of 'knowledge'. Among others, 'omega' can be considered as a name of the relation combining the elements in the above-mentioned equation, which makes a good background for developing a 'relational theory of knowledge'.
2

EXISTENCE, APPEARANCE, AND ACQUAINTANCE

51%
Riska A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2006
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vol. 13
|
issue 1
5-15
EN
When A. J. Ayer commented on Russell's theory of acquaintance, he claimed that the person who is acquainted with an object knows that the object exists and also that the object in question has the properties which it appears to have. This essay employs Russell's theory of knowledge by acquaintance from the period between 1910 and 1918 and critically analyzes both the existential and the descriptive statements as they are related to the object of acquaintance. In particular, Ayer's views on the relationship between appearance and reality are treated as unacceptable from any sound epistemological point of view. I believe that the logical analysis of these epistemological problems reveals intricate issues involved in such discussions, which transcend their limited historical context.
3
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PRESENTATIONISM IN THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND REALISM

51%
Debowski J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2005
|
issue 2
73-111
EN
The difficulties with justification of the thesis of realism in the theory of knowledge (scilicet belief that we gain or we are capable of gaining knowledge about objects transcendent to the mind) are well known since long. Those difficulties caused many kinds of realism to exist nowadays - kinds discordant among themselves or even excluding each other. As is well known, since Descartes the main problem of every kind of realism and perhaps even of the whole theory of knowledge became so called 'transcendency problem' or 'the bridge problem'. How to come from perceptions to the things themselves? Or: how to come from 'the knowledge of knowledge' to 'the knowledge of things'? These are some examples of questions being in close relation with the transcendency issue and 'the bridge problem'. Since Descartes, in order to solve the above-mentioned problem, there have been created several standpoints, which tried to justify the thesis of realism in the theory of knowledge in an indirect manner, basing on other theses (for instance the principle of causality or referring to the term of cognitive intermediators). The author claims that defending the realism from the standpoint of representational theory of knowledge is inefficient. Representationism rather assumes the thesis of realism than proves it. It means that representationism can be defended efficiently only from the standpoint of presentational theory of knowledge. In other words, to prove transcendency and ontological objectivity of conceived objects, we need to refer to various kinds of immediate cognition, and to take into consideration the selfpresentation of objects. Whoever neglects that, deprives himself of a good opportunity to justify thesis of realism. The standpoint of Putnam (his internal realism) and the discussion about the realistic character of the semantic theory of knowledge (especially the distinction between weak and strong correspondence) make a good illustration of the difficulties, to which lead the standpoints ignoring the above-mentioned 'principle of all principles'.
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