Karl Marx is forgotten as a philosopher today not because he failed, but because the praxis-philosophical core of his Critique of Political Economy has not been rightly perceived. Marx’s Critique of Political Economy is a negative theory which takes it upon itself to uncover the negative aspects of capitalist values theory. It is not self-grounded, and substantiated solely by Marx’s earlier writings. It cannot serve as the basis for any kind of common, ecological economy, its importance lies only in its prac-tical-philosophical conclusion that we must overcome the human- and nature-destructive value logic of capitalism.
The main aim of the text is to prove, how the Marxian effort to define the idea of a historical progress within the frames of Marx’ concept of materialism leads to the necessity of putting on the agenda the question of universal liberation of the human subject. The general standpoint is, that Marx’ historiosophical apparatus, generally defined as “historical materialism” leads with immanent necessity from one side – to the equation of the question about the essence of history with the question about its subject, from the other – as Marx leaves Hegelian “Kingdom of Spirit” and engages himself in the issues of material reproduction of human life, to the situation, when the problem of a real content of human emancipation situates itself in the centre of the scope. Presenting historical materialism as a theory of a real social revolution, the text stresses also the problems connected with the idea of “realization” of philosophy and its historical determinants, which make it the same time a theoretical achievement and a problematic program of real social movement; the history and the present day of this movement has for sure its foundations deeply rooted in the space of the debate, which was the first effort of summing up the experience of the Enlightment.
At the turn of the century. Socialist ideas were very popular, especially among youth. It was no different among Poles living under occupation. Young Józef Pilsudski socialist concepts associated with the possibility of fighting for independence of the Republic. He read socialist literature, the Capital of Karl Marx, whose content is not treated as the only interpretation of the understanding of socialism. We can assume that he doesn’t fully understand Marx’s proposed economic solutions. Certainly he wasn’t one of the theorists of Marxism. Socialism for Pilsudski was not a goal but a means to implement the most important of target – Independent Republic.
In this article I tried to analyze the early texts of Karl Marx to abstract from them his views on the state. The question, that interested me, was: is there a theory of the state in early Marx's writings and – if there is – what is it's relationship to the standpoint articulated in his subsequent texts? In the mature thought of Karl Marx the state was understood as a tool of class violence – an institution in the superstructure which primary function is reproduction of a social class structure and its economical infrastructure. But in some early works of this author we won't find such a definitions. I tried to show then, how Marx's understanding of the state have changed during his early period.
The text refers to category of property of labor power. Based on qualitative analyses of job advertisements author singles out four components of labor power: basic components of labor power, mental components of labor power, physical components of labor power and cultural elements of labor power. This division is preliminary effort to operationalize and adopt category of labor force or ergodynamis, which is synonymous, to new contemporary socio-economical phenomenon. In the second part of the text author underlines selected processes of creation of surplus value in order to show explanatory usefulness of category of ergodynamis.
The article offers a comparison of two near-contemporary views of Karl Marx in the history of thought those of Louis Althusser in the book Reading Capital and of Michel Foucault in the book The Order of Things. The tertium comparationis is provided by Marx’s conception of man and work. Despite their common starting points (a critique of dialectics and humanism), the two authors bring diametrically opposed interpretations to Marx. The article argues that the most significant difference is one of methodology. While Althusser takes as his starting point a conception of the history of science due to G. Bachelard, Foucault constructs his own history of knowledge which, thanks to the thesis of the discontinuity between particular periods, constitutes a radicalisation of the Bachelard-Althusser approach. On the other hand a critical eye is, however, cast on Foucault’s overly selective reading of Marx. The article also indicates the prospects for a synthesis of Althusser’s symptomatic history and Foucault’s archeology.
The society of knowledge is made an object of investigation by many contemporary authors. Its basic characteristics, however, were captured by Radovan Richta as long ago as the 1960’s. Richta was one of the first theoreticians to point out that know¬ledge, and the all-round development of man, is becoming an economic factor. In his pioneering conception, Richta was inspired by Marx, who analysed the basic principles of the society of knowledge as far back as the second half of the nineteenth century. The author interprets Marx’s conception with a special emphasis on the contradictions which appear between the demands of the all-round developed person and that of the capitalist economy. In conclusion, the author formulates the thesis that the contemporary society of knowledge is a society of fluid alienation in which knowledge acquires an alienated character.
The study is devoted to the philosophical bequest of the Czech philo¬sopher Robert Kalivoda (1923–1089). Author fist evaluates his contribu¬tion to understanding a key period of Czech history, the Hussite move¬ment. By analysing economic and ideological conditions in the 14th and 15th centuries Kalivoda shows, that the Hussite movement was the first European early bourgeois revolution, bringing about fundamental changes in the structure of feudal society by paralysing the economic and philosophic potential of the Church as a fundamental component of the social order. Philosophically the movement created, out of elements of mediaeval philosophic realism and of the views of various heretical groups, an ideology of emancipation, anticipating ideas of later revolu¬tionary movements. The second part of the study develops Kalivoda’s conception of the aesthetic function, starting from the conceptions of Jan Mukařovský, and thinks through its consequences for the humanisation of humans and society. Subsequently, the study analyses Kalivoda’s view of the so-called anthropological constant as the deepest layer of human existence and of its makeup. Kalivoda starts from Marx’s conception of a dialectical relation between hunger and sex and from their influence on the functioning of society. The author takes issue with Sigmund Freud’s conception according to which the sublimation of sexual instinct into the sphere of the “Higher I” (“Über-ich”) has solely an aggressive and repressive character and shows, that it involves non-aggressive sublimation as well, which – especially in the form of revolutionary activities – has a positive influence on social development.
The aim of this paper is an analysis of Karl Marx’s account of social criticism. The paper opens with a distinction between two models of social criticism, Platonic and Socratic, present in the contemporary political philosophy. The main argument is that despite the contradictory char-acter of the two models of criticism, they are both present in Marx’s account of criticism. Through the concept of emancipation the idea of criticism in Marx is oriented to practice, which leads to the Socratic model of critique. However, through the concept of ideology, especially in the Althusserian account, the Marxian idea of critique shows a strong relation to the Platonic model. The paper concludes that the presence of both contradictory elements, those of internal and exter-nal critique, in the Marxian idea of criticism is not a contingent effect of the development of his thought, but a necessary condition of every kind of criticism.
In order to provide the necessary background for the discussion on Marx’s and Dostoevsky’s conception of socialism we delineate a brief history of the French Revolution. Then, we analyze the social conditions of the proletariat and how socialism is defined for both thinkers as a mainly economic doctrine. Later, socialism’s theological question is discussed. We point out how Marx and Dostoevsky defend the thesis that religion is socialism’s first target. To that end, we refer to the Marxist concepts of “alienation” and “emancipation” and Dostoevsky’s predicted union of Catholicism with socialist ideals as it is exemplified in The Great Inquisitor. Finally, Marx’s and Dostoevsky’s conception of man is explained, showing how the materialistic interpretation of the human being realized by Marx is radically rejected by Dostoevsky. Likewise, it is exposed the scientific and violent nature of socialism. As a conclusion, we summarize the main similarities and differences between Marx and Dostoevsky and we treat the question about their prophetic character in relation to the socialist movement in Russia, and particularly to the Russian Revolution of 1917.
The paper discusses the problem of categorizing the concept of ideology, which in contemporary political theory is returning as a concept with a heavily descriptive meaning. This perspective is the retreat from the more common, but pejorative sense of the ideology as false consciousness. The paper attempts to distinguish the descriptiveness or normativity of meanings of historical concepts of ideology. This critical review is to sensitize researchers in the field of social sciences that the applicability of the concept of ideology relates to the conceptual burden. Analyzing these approaches, the author tries to verify the cognitive meaning of the concept.
This article investigates the ethical foundations for both personal and commercial conduct, placing these a) for natural individuals with Kant’s categorical imperative as the standard for verification and b) for entities defined to conduct business with markets that freely determine prices among the participating actors at the moment of exchange. Pervasive digitization of transactions is noted. The concepts of currency and money are defined and examined in practice, drawing on the statements of international and US government agencies, economists as well as investigative reporters.
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest ukazanie klasycznej krytyki religii jako pożytku dla współczesnych wierzących. Autor przedstawił kilka krytycznych wobec religii uwag wywodzących się z myśli L. Feuerbacha, K. Marxa i F. Nietzschego i odniósł je do pewnych zjawisk współczesnej religijności. Pomimo braku sympatii do wspomnianej ogólnej dezaprobaty wobec religii przez przywołanych myślicieli, autor zakłada, że zasięg ich spojrzenia może być użyteczny dla zidentyfikowania kontrowersyjnych problemów czy patologicznych zjawisk współczesnej religijności. Niniejszy tekst może być pożyteczny w kwestii odnoszenia klasycznej krytyki religii do pewnych elementów religijnej współczesności.
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The article aims to point out the fact that classical criticism of religion can be of benefit to current believers. We have picked some thoughts critical to religion made by L. Feuerbach, K. Marx and F. Nietzsche and related them to certain phenomena of religious presence. Although we do not sympathize with the mentioned authors’ general condemnation of religion, we assume that a range of their views may be useful for identifying problematic, controversial or pathological phenomena in today’s religious scene. Relating classical criticism of religion to certain segments of religious contemporaneousness may be the benefit of this text.
The paper consists of two parts. In the first one the author analyses the situation of mankind in the last decades of the 20th century, regarding it as tragic; in his reflections he refers mainly to the conceptions of Georg W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx and some Christian thinkers. The second part is a critique of Karl Popper’s conception of history, especially his main claim that history has no meaning.
The formation of the human conscience is a controverted question in both philosophical ethics and moral philosophy. Conscience refers to one’s conception and understanding of the moral good. An especially significant manifestation of the problem of conscience in the 20th and 21st centuries is the impact of ideology on the individual person’s moral sense. This article considers the impact of two 19th century philosophies―Mill’s utilitarianism and Marxism―on contemporary moral thought insofar as the interaction of these two produce a powerful materialist ideology to determine the modern European and American conscience. We then turn to the thought of Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyła), who in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor and in his earlier philosophical writings developed an account of moral truth by which the dangers of materialistic ideology can be overcome. It is argued, with John Paul II, that only in the context of truth can a coherent account of freedom of conscience under the moral law be developed.
This article is a selective introduction to the description and characterization of the changes that have occurred in the sociology of knowledge since the publication of Max Scheler’s book in 1924 to contemporary times, most often conceptualized by the term knowledge society. A brief review of the main threads in the field of sociology of knowledge was intended to draw attention to the theoretical and practical advantages of particular approaches, as well as their disadvantages, resulting in a trivial study of the phenomenon of knowledge in question. The descriptive character of this article also allowed for a number of systematizations within specific approaches (e.g. Michel Foucault) and within a broad perspective of the knowledge phenomenon.
Who is a clerk and what his betrayal consists in. A few remarks on the relation of metaphysics to politics: In this article I discuss the concept of Julien Bendy’s “the betrayal of the soulful intellectuals”, and then slightly modify the concept of a soulful intellectual to make this “betrayal” - as I understand it - more explicit. Soulful intellectual - in my understanding - is a philosopher endowed with a “metaphysical temperament” and a cognitive passion associated with contemplation and an attempt to understand the universe. The betrayal of the soulful intellectual consists in giving up this supreme goal and sacrificing it - broadly understood - “political”. I distinguish between emotional (incidental) and structural (comprehensive) betrayal, which leads to the fact that metaphysics is subordinated to the philosophy of politics and is adjusted to it. I then give examples of such betrayals in the history of philosophy. I am also trying to understand the mechanism of their formation, focusing on the structural betrayal associated with the feeling of the horror of existence as a source of creating metaphysics. Such metaphysics usually has soothing functions, so it presents being as a cosmos, and thus order. Which usually leads to reduction and geometrization, omitting irregularities and randomness. When applied to the social world, it usually has a similar “reductive” character. This creates a metaphysically justified utopism. This often leads to an attempt - the more tragic and the more consistent - to straighten this crooked piece of wood that is man. Finally, I wonder if the idea of making philosophy of politics “first philosophy” (that is, “politicize philosophical reason”) is right.
Karl Marx is forgotten today as a philosopher, not because he had failed, but because of his critique of political economy, which is not understood based on its practical philosophical core. Critique of political economy is negative theory, which is committed to the task of unveiling the negativity of capitalist normative theory. It is not find justification in itself, but its justification lies exclusively in the preceding her early writings of Marx. At its foundation is not the way to build a solidaristic and ecological economy; the only its importance lies in the practical and philosophical awareness that the normative logic of capital, killing man and nature, we must overcome.
This article discusses the methodological aspects of Marx’s theoretical approach. It draws on the epistemology of Gaston Bachelard, and especially on the interpretation of Louis Althusser. It examines in detail Bachelard’s concepts of connaissance commune and epistemological rupture, and also Althusser’s distinction between “Generalities I” and “Generalities III”, while putting these concepts into the context of Marx’s critique of political economy. A significant focus here is also the distinction between “real object” and “the object of knowledge”, as well as the concepts of Darstellung, structural causality and overdetermination (surdétermination). The article demonstrates that Marx’s method of the historicising and denaturalising theoretical categories can be an effective instrument in de-ideologising the areas which Althusser characterises as “theoretical ideology”.
Contemporary debates in political ecology tend more and more to be held on the on-tological level, where they are recomposed around the following alternative: should one conceive of nature as the order of reality that transcends society and that should be pro-tected from the excesses of the latter? Or should one renounce the very partitioning of nature and society itself in order to imagine new, more sustainable, ecological arrange-ments? Examining both Bruno Latour’s and Jason Moore’s takes on this alternative we argue that it should be overcome in favor of a naturalist and historical ontology of socie-ty inspired by the young Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. In this historico-naturalist perspective, social relations indeed appear as both determined by their environmental conditions as well as determining the uses of a collective make of its environment. The interest in this approach is to allow one to conceive of social alienation and environmental destruction as two sides of a same process which should therefore be conjointly addressed.
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