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Edukacja moralna z perspektywy etyki cnót

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EN
Compared to other approaches, it is virtue ethics that puts greatest emphasis on moral education. This results from its focus on moral agent and his or her moral condition as the main object of ethical enquiry. The aim of this paper is to outline the moral education within the framework of virtue ethics. I intend to explain how such education embraces the cognitive (acquiring moral beliefs), affective (proper harmonization of emotions), and behavioral elements. In the first part of the article, I present the concept of ethical virtue to contrast it with certain misunderstandings which might lead to unnecessary fear of introducing the category of virtue into moral education. In the second part, I respond to various objections raised against virtue ethics, the most important being the objection of indoctrination and undermining autonomy of the educated. Another objection to which I pay special attention is the objection that there is no one catalogue of virtues but many different catalogues praised by different cultures, which especially poses a problem in multicultural societies. I am also trying to show the advantages of virtue education over other, nondirective approaches to moral education.
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Wśród teoretyków moralności największe znaczenie edukacji moralnej przypisują etycy cnót. Wynika to z ich koncentracji na sprawcy działania, jego moralnej kondycji jako głównego przedmiotu dociekań etycznych. Celem mojego artykułu jest odpowiedź na pytanie, na czym polega edukacja moralna w duchu etyki cnót. Wyjaśniam, w jaki sposób obejmuje ona elementy kognitywne (kształtowanie moralnych przekonań), afektywne (odpowiednie uporządkowanie uczuć i emocji) i behawioralne. W pierwszej części mojego artykułu kreślę właściwe ujęcie cnoty etycznej, dzięki czemu zwracam uwagę na jeden z głównych błędów w jej rozumieniu, którego efektem może być niepotrzebna obawa przed jej aplikacją do różnych koncepcji edukacyjnych. W drugiej części podejmuję próbę odparcia głównych zarzutów kierowanych pod adresem etyki cnót, przede wszystkim indoktrynacji i pogwałcenia autonomii wychowanków oraz wielości katalogów cnót. Staram się także wykazać przewagę edukacji moralnej poprzez cnoty nad tzw. niedyrektywnymi metodami moralnej edukacji, stanowiącymi jej konkurencję.
Ethics in Progress
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2019
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vol. 10
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issue 1
23-40
EN
Democracy is bound to fail if its citizens lack opportunities to develop their moral-democratic competence, that is, their ability to solve conflicts through thinking and discussion, instead of through violence, deceit or bowing down to others. The concept of Discussion Theatre has been designed to provide such an learning opportunity. In contrast to traditional theatre, there is no above and below, no division between actors and listeners – all are participants. The Discussion Theatre is the “public” version of the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD), which is been successfully used in institutions of education in many countries for over two decades.
Ethics in Progress
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2018
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vol. 9
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issue 2
131-161
EN
The paper discusses Wittgenstein’s approaches to ethics within two contrastive contexts, e.g., pragmatism and cooperative-discursive normative practice. The first section revisits the fiasco of his early “negative” ethics. The second section subsequently shows how Wittgenstein’s mature concept of blind rule-following displaces normativity but simultaneously becomes the key predictor for discourse ethics (or, rather, a specific kind of it). The final section discusses the pros and cons of finitism in the light of contemporary philosophy of mind. As a conclusion, the author provides evidence for her hypothesis that there is no normative (embodied) mind without a manifest normative competence, which includes moral judgment and discursive competence.
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