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1

O OBJAVOVANÍ A KONŠTRUOVANÍ MOŽNOSTÍ

100%
Schmidt M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
|
vol. 75
|
issue 9
793 – 803
EN
The aim of the paper is to argue that it is not possible to approach modalities solely on empiric grounds as the followers of Kripke and Putnam maintain. This holds even in the case of nomological possibilities that are rooted in the laws of nature. There are no laws of nature that prevent scenarios opposing reality, for instance, no law precludes the possibility of the evening star not being identical with the morning star. As the paper argues, in order to prevent these scenarios, the concept of nomological possibility must contain some pieces of a priori metaphysics. Put differently, nomic possibilities are not just discovered, nomic possibilities are also construed.
2

AGAINST LAWS OF NATURE AS TRUTHMAKERS FOR PRESENTISTS

100%
Rychter P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2016
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vol. 23
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issue 4
428 – 442
EN
This paper addresses the so-called ‘truthmaker problem’ or ‘grounding problem’ for presentism. In section 1, the author sets the stage by introducing presentism and the truthmaker problem. In section 2, he considers a proposed solution to it, which he calls the ‘laws of nature proposal’ (LNP), recently defended by Markosian (2013). The author argues that LNP fails as a solution to the truthmaker problem because it does not meet a constraint that is generally taken as constitutive of it: that the entities doing truthmaker work should be categorical. Then, in section 3, the author discusses the prospects of abandoning this ‘categoricity constraint’. The conclusion of this discussion is that the presentist should be allowed to such a move. This, however, is not completely good news for the friends of LNP, since the abandonment of the ‘categoricity constraint’ opens the door to simpler solutions, like what is often called ‘Lucretianism’.
3

PHYSICAL MONADOLOGY AS KANT'S POSITION IN THE DISPUTE WITH LEIBNIZ AND NEWTON

88%
Sytnik-Czetwertynski J.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2008
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vol. 36
|
issue 1
106-119
EN
Immanuel Kant covered problems which had not been developed by his predecessors because it was necessary for him to prepare an alternative system (e.g. he strived to point out what the ether was in Meditations of fire, which had not been mentioned by Newton, while in his study 'Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces' he attempted to establish the law of the living forces, which had not been indicated by Leibniz). The defining of the notion of ether would make it possible to determine the problem of the punctual (or not) character of matter and the nature of the mutual influence of the material elements. This was crucial for organizing the system (otherwise, the elements of matter could not interact with each other, which would result in the impossibility of the explanation of the laws of nature, and even the interpretation of the existence of the real world). Furthermore, the attempt to detect the law of the living forces was in turn intended to put in order the domain of global activity. This law was fundamental for the principles of the mechanics, dynamics, kinematics, etc. The final attempt to overcome the conceptions of his predecessors was the creation of his own project of a new physics, the first part of which was Physical monadology.
4

DOES DIVINE INTERVENTION VIOLATE LAWS OF NATURE?

88%
Bergmann R. B.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2019
|
vol. 26
|
issue 1
86 - 103
EN
The present paper discusses processes in our world embedded in a dense net of causes and effects. The role of laws of nature is discussed using classical mechanics as an example to demonstrate that the behaviour of objects is not determined by laws of nature on their own. Natural processes rather depend on the environment that implies forces and conditions under which these processes occur. These conditions are usually described in mathematical terms using suitable initial or boundary conditions or further constrains. This analysis may seem trivial but has an important consequence. Divine intervention appears not to violate natural laws, rather, new causes are introduced that lead to results that otherwise would not have occurred. A further consequence arises from the complexity of causal nets and the presence of probabilistic processes in our world as one may not be able to determine the causes that led to a certain effect.
5

Cud jako proste działanie ze strony Boga. Filozoficzna propozycja Davida Cornera

88%
Swiezynski A.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
|
2010
|
vol. 46
|
issue 1
93-124
EN
It has been common for some time to think of a miracle as a natural event possessing a supernatural cause. Such a supernaturalistic account of miracles might be constructed with an eye to apologetic concerns, with the hope that the occurrence of a miracle might provide a defense for theism. The general strategy of such an apologetic appeal is to suggest that a miracle is an event that nature could not produce on its own. It is thought of as an event that is incapable of receiving a natural explanation. Thus the supernaturalist hopes that the occurrence of a miracle will point to the operation of a causal force from outside of nature, i.e. one that is supernatural. David Corner's concern is to show the liabilities of such an account of miracles, and to show how our concept of the miraculous may do without it. He offers a non-causal account of miracles as a basic action on the part of God. His motivation, expressed in the broadest possible terms, is to rescue the concept of 'miracle' from the quasi-scientific language of supernaturalists, and to show that the best understanding of a miracle is not one that tries to place it in relation to scientific notions such as that of a law of nature; it is one that understands a miracle to be an extraordinary expression of divine agency - where this needs not be understood in terms of divine causality - and as an event that has a role to play within theistic religious practice.
6

THE DEMARCATION PROBLEM OF LAWS OF NATURE

88%
Bielik L.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2010
|
vol. 17
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issue 4
522-549
EN
The paper focuses on the problem of identification of laws of nature and their demarcation from other kinds of regularities. The problem is approached from the viewpoint of several metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological criteria. Firstly, several dominant approaches to the problem are introduced. Secondly, the logical and semantic explicatory framework - Transparent Intensional Logic - is presented for the sake of clarification of logical forms of sentences that are supposed to express the laws of nature. Finally, a complementary strategy to the demarcation problem is proposed, including reconsideration of relevant metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological requirements and principles behind the former conceptions.
7

Is Chance An 'Element' Of Miracle? In Search For Common Aspect Of Miraculous And Chance Events

75%
Swiezynski A.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
|
2010
|
vol. 46
|
issue 2
25-47
EN
Philosophical attempts to answer the question as to what chance is and the question as to the possibility of the existence of the miracle, are ineluctably bound up with the problem of the concept and structure of the laws of nature. It thus appears that the most competent area of philosophical deliberation, within the framework of which one might seek the answer to the foregoing questions, is the philosophy of nature, rooted within contemporary natural sciences. An extraordinary event, one which we are unable to incorporate into the regularities of nature as we know them, may be such either on account of its ontic structure, or on account of the observer's limited cognitive capabilities. What emerges here is a convergence between the empirical element of a miraculous event and an event which we describe as a chance event, in the sense of there being an absence of cause/a lack of knowledge regarding the cause.
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