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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 7
529 – 539
EN
The article deals with Kant´s concept of logic on the background of the historical developments of logic taking into account particularly Leibniz´s influence. A special attention is paid to its formality emphasized by Kant and inspired by Leibniz. It is the form that is determining the possibility of logic´s development. Although Kant broke later with neo-Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, some of Leibniz´s traces are still identifiable in his logic (formality quantification, the subject of logic).
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 5
359-368
EN
The paper deals with the rise of modern thought in connection with the origins of modern mathematical science. Leibniz, one of the founding fathers of modern science and the language of science (characteristica universalis), scientific questions and modern knowledge as such, is an extraordinary thinker among others because of his comprehensiveness. He aimed at a new synthesis of science, which should first of all maintain the unity of science, philosophy and morals (or ethics). By the help of the notions such as 'cleverness', 'brightness', 'calculating and considering reason' Leibniz wanted to stress his conviction, that the topical questions of his time could be resolved only in dependence on creative thinking and mainly moral action.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2017
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vol. 45
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issue 1
141-156
EN
The paper investigates the impact of Leibniz’ thought on contemporary philosophy. It focuses on two philological issues: (1) the debate on the misunderstandings connected to the formula “lingua characterica”, used by Gottlob Frege to describe of Leibniz’ philosophy; (2) an interesting interpretation of “ars inveniendi ” as formulated by Hans Hermes.
EN
Leibniz, one of the most prominent scholars of his time, was interested not only in natural sciences, mathematics, philosophy, etc. but in linguistics as well. As is known, he was presumably the first to declare the close linguistic connection between the Finnic languages and Hungarian. In accordance with his precursors and contemporaries, he was deeply immersed in the 'primeval' Scythian and Celtic (or Scytho-Celtic/Celto-Scythic) languages; he considered them as chronologically distant ancestors of the German(ic) language(s). Lots of words were thought by him to have come from Celtic languages (e.g. Kelt > Germ. Held). Leibniz was a determined proponent of the Finnlanders and Lapponians being the original settlers populating the Scandinavian Peninsula. Interestingly enough, there are present-day Finnish linguists claiming that the Finnish people have not come from Asia; that they represent the original population living in the same region from times immemorial. As to the Hungarians, Leibniz was convinced that their original homeland might have been near the vast Volga - Caspian Sea region. Leibniz's Scythian theories have left deep resonances on Hungarian language comparisons. Even today we find paracomparative writings focusing on the almost mythical Scytian origins of the Hungarian language in spite of the fact that the Finno-Ugrian origins of Hungarian have long been proved.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2013
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vol. 41
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issue 1
61 - 75
EN
In this paper I briefly examine the idea that a certain moderate version of pantheism (hence, strictly speaking, of panentheism) can be both formulated and maintained within Leibniz’s mature philosophical system. I argue that this pan(en)theistic programme fails, however, because it violates his non-negotiable principles concerning God, creation, and created substances.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 2(17)
175-182
EN
The article aims to analyze the problem of Leibniz’s optimism in the interpretation of José Ortega y Gasset. His reflections on the philosophy of Leibniz are certainly characterized by originality and innovation. Ortega is trying to set Leibniz in modern times and show the influence of his intellectual ideas on the twentieth-century philosophy. For this purpose, the Spanish thinker evokes the most popular of Leibniz’s doctrines—the doctrine of optimism.
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THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN FREEDOM ACCORDING TO LEIBNIZ

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EN
The article concerns the fundamental metaphysical problem of human freedom as it is discussed in Leibniz's philosophy. The essence of it can be expressed as follows: in what way the determinism developed by Leibniz goes along with his doctrine of human freedom in action? The article is divided into two parts. The first part contains analysis of Leibniz's theses encapsulating his determinism and those concerning his concept of freedom. The second part points to some major difficulties resulting from Leibniz's view. Leibniz starts with the conviction that there is no contradiction between the two following theses: 1) at least some human actions are performed freely (i.e. the agent might have done otherwise than in fact he did) ; and 2) each action has a reason which is known beforehand and this is the reason why the action is undertaken rather than not. This view was justified by Leibniz by means of (1) introducing divisions and distinctions between modalities, (2) by laying the stress on teleological determinism, and (3) by arguments in favour of the thesis that the world exists contingently. The analysis carried out in the second part demonstrates that Leibniz's view leads to some difficulties. Two of them are of great significance: a) the relationship between freedom and Inter-World Identity of the agent, and b) seemingly unavoidable link between freedom and indeterminism. Both these problems result from the fact that Leibniz's idea of freedom was based on his strong concept of individuality, and from universal analyticity of truth.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 7
501 – 508
EN
The aim of the article is to explore the meanings of the concept of system in Leibniz´s philosophy. It shows that practically there is no such meaning as attributed to his philosophy since Kant (i. e. a unified and complete, so called architectonical way of unveiling and explication of doctrines). In Leibniz a system refers either to a hypothesis (pre-established harmony), or the real order of the bodies in this world, or even to the encyclopaedic classification of knowledge, but never to any kind of representation. It is in philosophy or in metaphysics, which we could call systematic. Although Leibniz himself wished to give his philosophy a systematic form, his project does not correspond with the way the concept of system is understood in his writings.
EN
There are two roads of contemporary metaphysics and two answers to the question about thinking: existential and non-existential interpretations of the thinking subject. The difference between these points of view is considered in the paper in the light of main metaphysical question Why is there something rather than nothing? At the same time, the paper constitutes an attempt to find a certain ontological order and - looking from such a perspective - it deals with our forgotten foundations of thinking.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 7
540 – 554
EN
In the present text, we explore the idea of dialogue at the heart and roots of the Leibnizian philosophy and present show its connection with the doctrine of the continuum. We shall argue that a dialogue, political, religious as well as doctrinal, constitutes the starting point of the Leibnizian conciliatory "humanist metaphysical" method of his demonstrations catholicae. We shall see also that the idea of dialogue constitutes the metaphysical foundation as well as the practical goal of the most famous project by Leibniz, the caracteristica universalis, "Methode de la Certitude et de l'Art d'Inventer pour finir les disputes, et pour faire en peu de temps des grands progres". The connecting role of the dialogue within the Leibnizian thought is explained on three levels. First, on the level of metaphysics, we shall analyse from the metaphysical perspective the possibilities and limits of the dialogue in the horizon of human knowledge. Next, on the level of method, we shall discover the function of dialogue in the dynamics of the human invention. Finally, on the level of the drawing on Leibnizian writings, we shall document the virtues of the dialogue, as compared to the geometrical method.
EN
The author of the paper asks basic questions about being and meaning and the relation that occurs between them. Taking as his point of departure the Leibnizian question 'Why there is something rather than nothing', he asks about reasons of being's existence, ways of this existence and justification for certain ways of existence. In particular, he deals with the question of the meaning of human existence. His view is that for none of these questions a satisfactory solution for all can be found. Philosophy remains in the face of such problems relatively helpless. Looking at philosophy's boundaries, one can say 'I don't know' or become absorbed into holy books that promise an answer.
EN
In the article, the author puts a question: «Is it possible to examine Leibniz' philosophy as a phenomenological doctrine?» and tries to prove that Leibniz developed a phenomenological doctrine, which is very differed both from traditional phenomenological theories and from E. Husserl's phenomenology. In the article, the basic object of research becomes a concept 'the well grounded phenomenon'. On the basis of his analysis the author tries at first to show those pre-conditions which brought Leibniz over to forming of his phenomenological doctrine, and to find out those grounds which it was based on, and then to give a comparative analysis of Leibniz' philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl. According to Leibniz, every cognition of reality is limited to the area of the phenomena. The world of the phenomena is acknowledged to exist independent both of subjects which perceive them and from external things. Metaphysical knowledge has status of hypothesis. The specific feature of phenomenology of Leibniz consists in that the concept of substance is not rejected, but radically reconsidered.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2013
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vol. 41
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issue 4
179-195
EN
Jerzy Perzanowski often illustrated the central point of his ontological conception by means of a special diagram. However, there are several versions of this diagram. The article points out, on the one hand, places which illustrate the evolution of this conception. On the other hand, it calls attention to places which need further interpretation and continuation.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 7
509 – 519
EN
Let us refer to sections 70 and 71 of Monadology: In them Leibniz explains his conception of the organic body as a totality made up of many organs, which are the constituent parts of all organic bodies of the other living creatures. 1) This conception, although postulated, is not justified. Can it be justified by the corpus of Leibniz´s works itself? 2) Here we find the dominant entelechy, attributed to a living body, but also to living creatures by which it is constituted. How should this interconnection of dominant entelechies be interpreted, if this interconnection is to offer a sufficient argument for the organic composition of a living creature? Due to some misinterpretations of this interconnection Leibniz wants to alter the latter to some extent. Who were these interpreters and what were their arguments? And what does this correction of his thesis embody?
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 7
520 – 528
EN
Where does the uncertainty of our knowledge of natural world come from? Does our knowledge turn more reliable after our acceptance of the need of the mathematization of nature and formalization of the experiment results? Is there between the above mentioned poles (i.e. uncertainty vs. unquestionable knowledge built after the model of the mathematization of the experiment results) any other epistemic space which made the guaranteed certainty in physics possible? Should this certainty be conceived – on the background of the absolute or metaphysical certainty – as insufficient, or as an application of the mathematical model? Leibniz stands for the idea that the high probability of moral certainty could reach the truth of the latter. The aim of the paper is to analyse this very probability logic with attention paid to making use of it in natural philosophy.
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