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EN
Deindustrialisation means a decrease in the share of industry in the gross domestic product of a country or region. A similar phenomenon has been observed for decades in the agricultural sphere. Both these sectors are gradually losing importance in favour of the broadly understood services sector. This is undoubtedly happening in many developed countries, and yet the stereotypical conviction that the role of industry is certain to decline ever further is a false one. In particular, the claim that the Polish economy has been undergoing the process of deindustrialisation seems to be contestable: many opinions are at odds with statistical data. Industrial production is changing, but it is unlikely to completely disappear because we all need food provided by farmers, as well as various services and material products.
EN
Since Antiquity, logic has always enjoyed a status of something crucially important, because it shows us how to reason, if we are to reason correctly. Yet the twentieth century fostered an unprecedented boost in logical studies and delivered a wealth of results, most of which are not only understandable by non-specialists, but their very connection with the original agenda of logic is far from clear. In this paper, the author surveys how the achievements of modern logic are construed by non-specialists and subject their construal to critical scrutiny. He argues that logic cannot be taken as a theory of the limits of our world and that its prima facie most plausible construal as a theory of reasoning is too unclear to be taken at face value. He argues that the viable construal of logic takes it to be explicative of the constitutive (rather than strategic) rules of reasoning, not of the rules that tell us how to reason, but rather of rules that make up the tools with which (or in terms of which) we reason.
EN
The nominalist attitude in medieval logic supported a fully extensional conception of the sense of the expressions. Many arguments against this approach were raised at that time. The authoress would like to show in this article (1) that there is a (hidden) extensional conception of notions in current logic, namely in the interpretation of formal theories and the creation models of them and (2) that, and how, the traditional arguments against the extensional conception are relevant also for logic today.
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Filozofie a náboženská zvěst

80%
Studia theologica
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2005
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vol. 7
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issue 1
78-83
EN
The article deals with the relationship between philosophy and religious belief, in particular Christianity. It is a polemic against P. Dvorak and his view according to which there are logical relations between philosophy and the Christian message. The function of philosophy (and theology) is not to draw conclusions from factual statements inherent in the Christian message, since the key propositions of the latter are of a different kind (profession, parable, etc.) The nature of philosophical treatment of Christianity is hermeneutic as it searches for better understanding of the message. That in turn influences the content of the message without abolishing its specific character.
EN
Systems of axioms for elementary logic we can find in textbooks are usually not very transparent; and the reader might well wonder how did precisely such a set of axioms come into being. In this paper we present a way of constituting one such non-transparent set of axioms, namely the one presented by E. Mendelson in his Introduction to Mathematical Logic, in a transparent way, with the aim of helping the reader to get an insight into the workings of the axioms.
EN
The author proposes bridging disparate explications of sentential connectives (operators). Logicians take sentential operators to denote truth functions and distinguish 16 such binary operators. On the other hand, linguists recognize much more sentential operators and even for the same truth function, distinguish several connectives with different properties. For example, the conjunction “and” can in some uses have an adversative or conditional or restrictive feature, and sometimes has a temporal or causal meaning. The author favours logic-semantic tools over pragmatic ones and proposes distinguishing operators as truth-functions from complex constructions of truth-functions. The same truth function can be constructed in different ways, which enables one to explain the different properties of a single connective discussed by linguists. The author proposes two conditional connectives – namely one for the necessary conditional relations and another for the sufficient conditional relation – the negation and the logical conjunction as the basic operators. Using these simple connectives, he defines constructions of other sentential operators and demonstrates their various properties.
EN
The paper offers an outlook on St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument (stated famously in the Proslogion) which is a result of reconsidering the possibility that being a subject of the laws of logic (especially the laws that are relevant for the argument itself), constitutes itself a perfection (assuming, understandably, with many modern defenders of the ontological argument, that there is a sense of the term ‘perfection’ applicable within the line of thought in question). The more or less obvious parts of the historical context of such a hypothesis are noted, and some of its variants or alternatives, including negation, are assessed as well. It is argued that one of them, which states that God is “logically transcendent” (in a sense specified in the paper) may be perhaps of some use in defense of St. Anselm’s Argument, or indeed any argument of that sort.
EN
According to traditional grammar adjectives are either attributive or predicative. This distinction is also referred to by P. T. Geach. In Polish analytic philosophy attributive adjectives have been divided into two categories: determining and modifying (K. Twardowski, I. Dąmbska). The difficulties connected with the formal expression of the role of attributive adjectives in the framework of the classical predicate calculus are known (H. Reichenbach, D. Davidson). The paper proposes two logical constructions built upon elementary ontology which characterise attributive adjectives. Since they are nominal calculi, they are more natural than the predicate calculus and they avoid the above difficulties. The first construction makes it possible, for example, to see Johannes Scotus Eriugena’s logical schema in De Divisione Naturae in a new perspective. The second additionally includes relations, relative names, adverbs, and adjectives derived from adverbs.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 4
383-388
EN
The paper outlines a brief history of the role of logic as it has been conceived in the system of European science, scholarship and culture. It also tries to answer the question, in which of those roles logic approved itself and in which it did not. Further, it examines the role that logic plays in our times, as well as its relation to the contemporary philosophy.
EN
A critical analysis of Perzanowski’s attempt to develop an ontological argument based on the degree of reality shows that the comprehension axiom needs to be reinforced and that the family of all perfections is logically closed. This means that the P6 axiom is unnecessary. Moreover, the replacement of the reduction axiom by a strengthened instantiation axiom increases the number of degrees of reality and the class of consistent sets of qualities.
EN
Our thesis, briefly stated, is that, by utilizing the concept of spaciousness, which may later be simulated by the computer, one will be able to imitate, replace, and extend the process of thinking. This concept of thought builds upon ideas previously discovered and described by Henri Bergson: 'We express ourselves by words because of necessity but we think most often in space'. Through language, the results of thinking are presented in a linear fashion, while the entire process occurs spaciously within the mind utilizing information as a medium. The premise underlying our thesis is that the construction of a spacious model of the mind on the proper level will enable a transfer of the thought process to a computer, which, in turn, would provide meaningful results.
EN
In this paper, the author discusses the relation between logic and rationality. He develops (formally and conceptually) a rational requirement which can respond to the classic objections by Harman (1986). On the one hand, the requirement pays attention to the relevance of the premises and the conclusion, which is formally expressed by the notion of weak relative closure. The requirement also takes care of the complexity of the inferences. This notion of complexity is formally represented by a partially ordered scale of the difficulty of inferences, which is weaker than the notion of complexity as a number of steps.
EN
In his proof of the first incompleteness theorem, Kurt Goedel provided a method of showing the truth of specific arithmetical statements on the condition that all the axioms of a certain formal theory of arithmetic are true. Furthermore, the statement whose truth is shown in this way cannot be proved in the theory in question. Thus it may seem that the relation of logical consequence is wider than the relation of derivability by a pre-defined set of rules. The aim of this paper is to explore under which assumptions the Goedelian statement can rightly be considered a logical consequence of the axioms of the theory in question. It is argued that this is the case only when the all the theorems of the theory in question are understood as statements of the same kind (and true in the same sense) as statements of arithmetic and statements about provability in the theory, and only if the language of the theory contains logical expressions allowing to include certain predicates of meta-language in the language of the theory.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 7
473 – 490
EN
This paper compares several definitions of argument in the field of logic and argumentation theory in order to identify those defining features that are reflected in the notion of argument in the field of philosophy of science. An argument in philosophy of science has a standard structure that includes a non-empty set of premises and a conclusion, between which there is a relation of deductive or non-deductive (typically probabilistic)support, whereby disregarding the user of the argument does not affect the methodological function of the argument. The core of the study shows that argument in philosophy of science can be used to model explanation, prediction, and also as a tool for problem identification, a means of both justifying and criticizing a particular thesis, a model for testing and evaluating hypotheses, and as a tool for distinguishing between different methodological approaches.
15
70%
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 1(16)
127-148
EN
This paper presents the beginnings (1912–1916) of Heidegger’s philosophy from the perspective of his early interest in the issue of question as such. The result of this focus was Heidegger’s little-known lecture delivered in 1915 at Heinrich Rickert’s seminar, entitled Frage und Urteil (Question and judgment). Without going into the details of Heidegger’s presentation, the present paper gives a broad introduction to the issues discussed there. It does this in several steps. First, it considers the spiritual motives of Heidegger’s interest in logic. Second, it attempts to systematize Heidegger’s early views on logic and its subject. Third, it draws attention to the importance and development of Heidegger’s phenomenologica of questions. Fourth, it points out that Heidegger’s interest in the question as such is closely linked with numerous (in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century) attempts to consider the problem of question in the framework of the philosophical study of the essence of cognition and being. These four issues create a starting point for understanding the specifics of Heidegger’s question of being.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2013
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vol. 41
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issue 4
179-195
EN
Jerzy Perzanowski often illustrated the central point of his ontological conception by means of a special diagram. However, there are several versions of this diagram. The article points out, on the one hand, places which illustrate the evolution of this conception. On the other hand, it calls attention to places which need further interpretation and continuation.
EN
This paper focuses on the theory of deduction, developed by the Czech logician Pavel Tichý. Research on deduction in Tichý’s logic is still not very advanced. Tichý’s own deduction system is a generalization of Gentzen’s natural deduction and although it is an interesting topic in itself, I’d rather focus on the theory or philosophy of deduction that motivates Tichý’s choice of deduction system. Some of Tichý’s expressions suggest that in the question of the status of the theory of deduction in logic he held the prevailing modern approach, but this contradicts the fact that most of his writings concern selected problems of logical semantics. Having introduced Tichý’s original conception of deduction, I pay attention to the so called object-conception of logic, which explains the special position of the theory of deduction in his conception.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 6
469 – 480
EN
This paper deals with the distinction between two roles of a deductive argument in the communication: explanatory and suasive. The distinction was hinted out by Michael Dummett, in his Justification of deduction. The paper attempts to show various controversial consequences of the distinction. For example, there is a belief that, regarding the arguments used in the explanatory mode, obvious threat of circularity is not in fact “interesting”. Quite the opposite, it seems to be something natural. The aim of the paper is to critically reconsider the distinction between the roles of a deductive argument as well as its consequences.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 4
285 – 295
EN
The essay offers an explanation of the most important Peirce’s steps on his way to scientific metaphysics. His philosophy might be described as a conceptual reconstruction of the universe using the methods of science. Logic and methodology and their place in the construction of the new philosophy, i.e. Peirce’s scientific metaphysics, are outlined as well. Fallibilism and abduction are among the means needed to achieve this objective. Peirce suggests that the key to the explanation of active human condition is the philosophy of pragmaticism.
EN
The author of the paper asks the question why Slovak speakers use grammatical forms such as “budeme sa sústrediť” or “vidíme sa (zajtra)” in spite of their standard command of the grammatical rules. The linguists refer to this by saying that the speakers are under the influence of negative factors and the author draws attention to three reasons: the power of tradition, logic and ideology. A grammatical behaviour like this can be regarded as a cue that we have to do with two modalities of the grammar. However, the linguists and people under the influence of the school start from the assumption that the grammar exists only in the rational modality and they are reacting to the grammatical behaviour in the linguistic practice according to their assumption. This text is meant to encourage readers to overcome this convention and to pay attention to the grammar in the practical modality too. The author suggests that we could begin our exploration of the grammar in this modality by thinking about the grammatical disposition of fluent speakers and this can be done by starting with the theory of background of J. R. Searle.
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