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EN
The last century has seen many disciplines place a greater prior- ity on understanding how people reason in a particular domain, and several illuminating theories of informal logic and argumentation have been devel- oped. Perhaps owing to their diverse backgrounds, there are several con- nections and overlapping ideas between the theories, which appear to have been overlooked. We focus on Peirce’s development of abductive reasoning [39], Toulmin’s argumentation layout [52], Lakatos’s theory of reasoning in mathematics [23], Pollock’s notions of counterexample [44], and argumen- tation schemes constructed by Walton et al. [54], and explore some connec- tions between, as well as within, the theories. For instance, we investigate Peirce’s abduction to deal with surprising situations in mathematics, rep- resent Pollock’s examples in terms of Toulmin’s layout, discuss connections between Toulmin’s layout and Walton’s argumentation schemes, and sug- gest new argumentation schemes to cover the sort of reasoning that Lakatos describes, in which arguments may be accepted as faulty, but revised, rather than being accepted or rejected. We also consider how such theories may apply to reasoning in mathematics: in particular, we aim to build on ideas such as Dove’s [13], which help to show ways in which the work of Lakatos fits into the informal reasoning community.
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Popper : dogmatyzm : dialektyka

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PL
W artykule udowadniam tezę, że Popper - mimo programowych haseł swego krytyczne­ go racjonalizmu - jest dogmatykiem, że ma np. dogmatyczno-negatywne podejście do dialekty- ki. Choć krytykuje dialektykę sam jest dialekty- kiem. Widać to w Popperowskiej filozofii ma­ tematyki. Również jego falsyfikacjonizm jest stanowiskiem dogmatycznym. Powołuję się przy tym na Feyerabenda, Kuhana i Lakatosa.
EN
In this article I justify the thesis that K. R.Popper - in spite of the policy statement of his critical rationalism - is a dogmatist, e.g. his approach to the dialectics is dogmatically negative. Although he criticises the dialectic, he is a dialectician himself. It is evident in his phi­ losophy of mathematics. His falsificationism is a dogmatic attitude, too. In the argumentation, I refer to Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Lakatos.
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