The paper examines various instances of 'inductionism-deductionism' controversion (e.g. Popper vs Vienna Circle or the formulation of Laudan's argument against realism as pessimistic meta-induction vs. kind of deduction). The thesis is that the form of logical reconstruction of our reasoning (in every-day life as well as in science or meta-science) as induction or deduction is irrelevant as to the rational evaluation of this reasoning. Thus the inductionism-deductionism controversion is claimed vacuous. Instead of formal logic a sort of evolutionary epistemology is called for adequate account, since - as it is argued for - the degree of sensitivity to counterexamples contradicting our theories and hypotheses is a kind of adaptation to environment.
The paper presents a brief outline of Michał Heller’s programme of theology of science, with specific attention to its collocation and critical role with respect to both theology and science. The former consideration is based on a third domain of truths (Hans Urs von Balthasar), while the latter is inspired by Józef Tischner’s presentation of religious thinking. Theology of science as such will be described with reference to Larry Laudan’s approach, considered here as a very useful and pragmatic tool for the description of basic concepts of this theology.
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