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EN
The article focuses on the interpretative argument which appeals to the intentions of the participants of the legislative process in order to explain the meaning of legal texts. The author describes differences between the argument based on the intentions of the real lawgiver and the approach to legal interpretation based on the idea of the rationality of lawgiver. The main difference concerns ideal character of the presuppositons about the rationality of lawgiver contrasted with the approach concentrated on the attempt to discover actual intentions of the participants of the legislative process. The author also describes normative and conceptual arguments concerning interpretation of law based on the intentions of the real, historical lawgiver. It is argued that this approach to the legal interpretation is justified but should not be treated as one of many valid interpretative arguments which should be weighed against each other. The article contains also an example of the use of the above interpretative argument dicussed above.
EN
The subject of this text is the distinction between the context of discovery and context of justification in legal reasoning, exemplified by the discursive concept of law which is represented by legal topics, however, the deliberations contained herein are of the philosophical and legal nature instead of dogmatic and legal one, thus, they do not directly refer to any field of law. The starting point and also justification for the deliberations is to assume a hypothesis for the possible adaptation of the appointed distinction in the theory of law Its meaning has been limited to two separate questions referred to various aspects of legal interpretation and argumentation, the former being: “How do we arrive at formulating an interpretative hypothesis?”, and the latter: “How can it be justified?”. The main thesis of the text comes down to a statement that it is the nature of legal reasoning as presented by legal topics which defines both the way of arriving at an interpretative hypothesis understood as a proposal to settle a dispute as well as the way of justification for such hypothesis. As a result of that, a topical point of view is associated with both views being in favour of the genetic and validative value of heuristics in the process of legal cognition and the kind of preferred justification criteria, which, in case of topics, constitutes a consensus of opinions on what, in a specific here and now case, is or might be regarded as just. That means that the final decision on the value of legal reasoning and adjudicationis coming down to connect a specific legal effect with the actual state of affairs will be made on the basis of both the context of legal discovery and the context of justification.
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EN
The article discusses metalogical issues taking up in jurisprudence and putting a question connected to logical value of legal norms and logical value of the other statements in normative discourse. Its content is an attempt to make these issues from ontological analysis point of view, deals with the legal norm and from speech act theory point of view, showing the necessity of modification existing in literature of the subject linguistic and non-linguistic conceptions of legal norm. The content of the article focuses on analysis truth carries and ontological status of legal norm, simultaneously emphasizing the necessity of distinction between predicative and attributive notion of truth.
EN
Antas J., O kłamstwie i kłamaniu, Kraków 2008. Austin J. L., Mówienie i poznawanie, tł. B. Chwedeńczuk, Warszawa, 1993. Bekrycht T., Aprioryczność prawa. Ontologia prawa w fenomenologii Adolfa Reinacha, Warszawa 2009. Burkhardt A., Soziale Akte, Sprechakte und Textillokutionen, Niemeyer Max Verlag 1986. Geier M., Gra językowa filozofów, tł. J. Sidorek, Warszawa 2000. Gizbert-Studnicki T., Stwierdzenie jako akt mowy, Studia Filozoficzne 1973. Ingarden R., Czego nie wiemy o wartościach [w:] R. Ingarden, Przeżycie, dzieło, wartość, Kraków 1966. Ingarden R., O dziele literackim, tł. M. Turowicz, Warszawa 1988. Jędrzejewska A., Koncepcja oświadczenia woli w prawie cywilnym, Warszawa 1992. Kulesza W., Zniesławienie i zniewaga, Warszawa 1984. Lang W., Wróblewski J., Zawadzki S., Teoria państwa i prawa, Warszawa 1980. Opałek K., Wróblewski J., Prawo – metodologia, filozofia, teoria prawa, Warszawa 1991. Radwański Z., Wykładnia oświadczeń woli składnych indywidualnym adresatom, Wrocław 1992. Reinach A., Aprioryczne podstawy prawa cywilnego, tł. T. Bekrycht, Kraków 2009. Searle J. R., Czynności mowy, tł. B. Chwedeńczuk, Warszawa 1987. Wittgenstein L., Dociekania filozoficzne, tł. B. Wolniewicz, Warszawa 2000. Woleński J., Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa, Warszawa-Kraków 1980. Ziembiński, Z. Logika praktyczna, Warszawa 1994. Zirk-Sadowski M., Rozumienie ocen w języku prawnym, Łódź 1984.
EN
Actuellement la théorie du droit s’occupe du problème de l’interprétation du droit convenable. A partir du changement de l’objet de la philosophie, la langue et le sens sont les objets des recherches. Jerzy Wróblewski crée la théorie de l’interprétation du droit qui concerne le problème en question. Donc, il utilise dans sa théorie la conception du sens de Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, celle-ci ayant le caractère philosophique. Ajdukiewicz est d’avis qu’ on peut connaître la réalité seulement avec la langue. D’après la conception d’Ajdukiewicz il faut utiliser des directives du sens pour constater le sens au niveau logique. A la base de cette conception, Wróblewski crée des directives normatives pour constater le sens de la réglementation.
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