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EN
Dealing with Levinas’s idea of the “transcendence of words”, the article follows his treatment of the difference between the meaning of the words in relation to the Other and the role of the words in the aesthetic event of the image. The focus is on the way that Levinas emphasises the contrast between the silence of an image and the sound of a dialogue.
CS
Článek se zabývá Levinasovou ideou „transcendence slov“. Sleduje úvahy tohoto autora o rozdílu mezi významem slov ve vztahu k Jinému a rolí slov v estetické události obrazu. Soustřeďuje se na Levinasovo zdůraznění kontrastu mezi tichem obrazu a zvukem dialogu.
PL
Cyprian Norwid’s Stygmat from the perspective of Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy of dialogue This study is an attempt to read Cyprian Norwids Stygmat anew, employing a deepened perspective that comes from Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy of dialogue. First, the author points to the convergence of the poet’s and the philosopher’s views, especially when it comes to the special place occu- pied by the man, interpersonal relations, and effort. While reconstructing the plot of the novella, the author analyzes relationship between principal characters - Oskar and Róża, and Oskar and the Narrator; he pays atten- tion to the issue of effort and openness towards the other person in forging a relationship. Using Levinas’s terminology, the author describes Oskar’s condition - separation and disintegration of his identity - which made it impossible for him to carry the burden of responsibility for the encounter with the other person. This applies to the Narrator as well; he does not fulfill the role of the confidant - as selected for the role by Oskar - nor does he find fulfilment as a writer. The Narrator remains a passive observer of the events, which his conversation with Redaktor testifies to. As far as the ending of the novella is concerned the author turns to irony (very characteristic of Norwid) and the difficulty in distinguishing between moments in which the poet expresses serious and true statements and those with ironic flair.
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EN
The author attempts to explore the status of truth in the works of Levinas. This analy-sis first requires a preparatory study of the status of truth in the works of Husserl and Heidegger. On the basis of these deliberations, the text then elaborates the Levinasian concept of truth with a reference to Totality and Infinity, as well as Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence.
EN
The “corporeal turn” which has taken place in 20th century thought, is closely related with the discovery of corporeality as a key motive of philosophical ethics. The aim of the present paper is to present and compare two phenomenological contributions to „bodily ethics“ – the first one consists in an ethical interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, while the second one is explicitly contained in the thought of E. Levinas. The starting point of our analysis is the conception of intersubjectivity which differs radically in the thought of the two philosophers. While Merleau-Ponty stresses especially the primordial inter-corporeal resonance and empathy between myself and the other, Levinas’ view is based on the idea of an irreducible alterity of the other, which makes him to consider the relation between myself and the other as essentially asymmetrical. We attempt to show that the relation between Levinas’ and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of intersubjectivity is far more complex than it seems and that in order to develop the moral phenomenology of corporeality in a productive way, it is necessary to overcome certain one-sidedness both in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. This overcoming is unthinkable without taking over the most productive motives of both philosophers’ views of intersubjectivity and corporeality.
PL
This article presents reflections on the category of asymmetry, which has its origins in the philosophy of Emanuel Levinas. Asymmetry, however, turns out to be not only a theoretical philosophical issue, but is radically manifest in education and politics. In the public sphere, it is related to the category of the enemy – politically useful – against which anger and hatred are measured. In education, and more specifically in the education system, asymmetry occurs in the form of discrimination that students and teachers experience. Both of its forms lead to the depreciation of an enemy / Other. This depreciation can lead directly to the disintegration of life into worthy and unworthy of surviving, which is a challenge for politics, education and ethics.
EN
I stand for a philosophical writing engaged in an ethical relation with discussed authors. The relation despite its obvious immeasurable value is based on a concrete context of the encounter, performed by a signifier. Gratitude is the phenomenon, which describes properly the ethical relation, for it at once opens the absolute dimension of an unique other and expresses some onthical content of gestures, gifts and signs, which Myself receives from the others. The article criticises Buber’s theory, due to its ignorance of difference, corporeality, linguistic sign, passivity, etc. For that reason I use Derridian concepts, that enhance (but consequently deconstruct) Levinasian principles.
EN
The aim of the present paper is to exemplify the diachronic structure of Speech through the interpretation of Levinas’ claim according to which the Speech precedes the Spoken. On the basis of comparison between the primordiality of the Speech and Merleau-Ponty’s gestual meaning which precedes the conceptual meaning, we will point out the correspondence – within the frame of the ethical signifiance – between the diachrony of Speech and the origin of language in corporeality. We shall conclude by reflexion of the problem of articulation between Speech as a modality of ethical signifiance and between Levinas’ philosophical discourse itself, which remains a modality of the Spoken despite its reflexion on the Speech.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2011
|
vol. 39
|
issue 1
117-134
EN
The Anti-Odyssey of the subject is an attempt to reconstruct and interpret Emmanuel Lévinas’s anthropology. In this work subjectivity is characterized by three fundamental figures: hypostasis, desire and substitution, which are not three separate and autonomous figures but three stages in the formation of Lévinas’s concept of subjectivity. Hypostasis is a condition for desire and desire precedes substitution. The subject must first take possession of being in order to overcome being towards what is “other than being”. The Anti-Odyssey does not take place in Ithaca. Its plot is situated between the homeland and the promised land, between ontology and ethics. The egological subject is first enclosed in the realm of self-identification. The subject’s exposure to the influence of the Other is crucial for the identity of the self. In the end the deepest core of subjectivity turns out to be responsibility defined as substitution. From hypostasis to substitution, from ontology to ethics, from logos to ethos – this is the briefest summary of The Anti-Odyssey of the subject.
EN
The article reconstructs a certain element of the evolution in Józef Tischner’s thinking. Initially representing orthodox phenomenology, Tischner situated his philosophy in exiological paradigm seeing in values the most fundamental reality and the main object of philosophical research. Later, thanks to agathological dimensions he put aside the language of values and sometimes doubted adequacy of values as philosophical category. Tischner revealed courage when he was able to radically revise his former views according to the principle: amicus Plato, magis tamen amica veritas.
EN
The starting point for consideration is to put the Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy into question whether the status of “absolute Otherness” may also belong to the Other other than man. On the basis of the thought of Levinas it receives a negative responseand it is because of his involvement in the so-called anthropological machine (which he shares with Martin Heidegger and some other critics of metaphysics). But it is, however, possible to open the (broadly defined) phenomenological ethical thought drew on the achievements of Levinas to the question of the animal. This attempt might be centered around the proposals of Jacques Derrida, the author of the essay The Animal That Therefore I Am (More To Follow), where he spoke about the singularity of each animal, the problematic status of border between man and animal,and the being-with animals as a full-fledged modality of being. This is a provocative thought which asks us about our attitude to such issues as “responsibility” and “responsiveness”, “carno-phallogocentrism”, or the status of non-human animals. Derrida’s thought is here very close to some kind of phenomenological language, but it is rather the phenomenology of the otherness than the phenomenology of intentional subject. The same phenomenology that we find in Bernhard Waldenfels’s or John D. Caputo’s writing.
DE
Im Artikel wird eine phänomenologische Methode angewandt, um die Emotion des Schocks zu erklären, die im Mittelpunkt der politischen Polarisierung steht. Er beantwortet die folgende Frage: Was ist dieses oft paradoxe Gefühl des Unglaubens, das wir empfinden, wenn uns etwas schockiert, und warum macht es die Menschen einander fremd? Im Gegensatz zu anderen Konzepten des Schocks (Stockdale, Osler) versuchen wir, den phänomenologischen Rahmen der "traumatischen Erfahrung" von Lorelle zu nutzen, um den positiven Aspekt des Schocks zu betonen: Wir zeigen, dass der Schock eine Erfahrung an sich ist und nicht nur ein Versagen bei der Verarbeitung von Erfahrungen. Die Schlussfolgerung ist, dass die Überraschung nicht immer als passive Anerkennung der Diskrepanz zwischen unseren Erwartungen und der Realität gesehen werden sollte, sondern dass sie als aktive Kraft anerkannt werden sollte. Auf diese Weise kann der Unglaube eine moralische Norm sein, die sich selbst bestätigt und eine Atmosphäre der Fremdheit für Menschen schafft, mit denen wir nicht einverstanden sind.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł wykorzystuje metodę fenomenologiczną do wyjaśnienia emocji szoku, która stanowi sedno polaryzacji politycznej. Odpowiada na następujące pytanie: czym jest to często paradoksalne uczucie niedowierzania, które odczuwamy, gdy coś nas szokuje, i dlaczego ono sprawia, że ludzie stają się sobie obcy? W przeciwieństwie do innych koncepcji szoku (Stockdale, Osler), staramy się wykorzystać ramy fenomenologiczne "traumatycznego doświadczenia" Lorelle'a, by podkreślić pozytywny aspekt szoku: pokazując, że szok jest doświadczeniem samym w sobie, a nie tylko niepowodzeniem w asymilacji doświadczenia. Wniosek jest taki, że zaskoczenie nie powinno być zawsze postrzegane jako bierne uznanie luki między naszymi oczekiwaniami a rzeczywistością; zamiast tego powinno być w pełni uznane za aktywną siłę. W ten sposób niedowierzanie może być standardem moralnym, który sam się potwierdza i nadaje atmosferę obcości ludziom, z którymi się nie zgadzamy.
EN
This article uses the phenomenological method to explain the emotion of shock, which is at the heart of political polarization. It answers the following question: what is this often paradoxical feeling of disbelief that we feel when we find something shocking, and why does it make people strangers to one another? Unlike other existing conceptions of shock (Stockdale, Osler), we employ the phenomenological framework of Lorelle’s “traumatic experience” to make explicit the positive aspect of shock: showing how shock is an experience in itself and not merely a failure to assimilate experience. The conclusion reached is that surprise should not be seen as always a passive acknowledgment of the gap between our expectations and reality; instead it should be fully recognized as an active force. Thus, disbelief can be a moral standard that asserts itself and imposes an aura of strangeness on the people we disagree with.
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