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Philosophy of Nature Today: (De)mystificatory Function

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EN
The subject of the paper is the social function of the philosophy of nature. The author presents briefly his own position in this topic and gives an evaluation of the literature on the philosophy of nature in the last three decades or so. According to him, the opposition against the abusing of science for the tasks of social mystification stems mostly from the circles of the (philosophying) scientists themselves and the sociologists of knowledge. What concerns the academic philosophers - in spite of the variety of their ontological orientations - they are prone rather to cultivate the metaphilosophical mythology (of positivistic origins).
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2007
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vol. 35
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issue 1
103-117
EN
While polemically presenting the meta-philosophical views of the well-known Kraków philosopher, the article takes up, among other things, such issue as the connection between philosophy and meta-philosophy, the understanding of philosophy as a 'philosophical heuristic', the goal of philosophizing, a philosophical system as a whole organized around one highlighted notion, and the postulated unity of philosophy. These considerations are subordinated to one main issue: how can autotelic and totalizing charakter of philosophizing be reconciled with its unlimited self-transcending.
EN
Friedrich Waismann was a rather tragic thinker of the past century, who spent the first part of his life in Austria as a member of the Vienna Circle, and then emigrated to England, where he finally settled in Oxford and became associated with its postwar ordinary language philosophy. The paper provides a brief account of Waismann’s life and scholarly achievements, presents an outline of his conception of philosophy, and discusses various criticisms and interpretations of his metaphilosophy. It is emphasized that his significance for the development of analytical philosophy should not be reduced to a more or less faithful exposition of the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 5
449-460
EN
The paper offers a discussion of the concept of common sense in T. Reid's philosophy. Reid criticizes Hume's scepticism, which is in conflict with common sense, as a 'deadlock of philosophy'. Reid's criticism thus might be seen as naive and 'un-philosophical', and therefore missing the point. The author argues, however, that common sense, as used by Reid, is a metaphysical concept. In his view common sense and its principles delimit all plausible philosophizing. He also sees a remarkable affinity between Reid's philosophy and later Wittgenstein's considerations of 'the image of the world'. Reid's philosophy of common sense is an original philosophical resolution of the problem, which the philosophy 'in a deadlock' is facing, as well as an effective criticism of scepticism.
EN
This paper discusses Kolakowski's metaphilosophical views. Although Kolłakowski was always deeply interested in the nature of philosophy, he expressed his views on this topic rather occasionally, usually in his historical works; in fact, he published only one metaphilosophical essay, 'Zakresowe i funkcjonalne rozumienie filozofii' (The Extensional and Functional Understanding of Philosophy), 1962. Kołakowski defined philosophy by its functions in culture. He opposed any reduction of philosophy to science or another field of culture (art, religion, etc.). At the beginning, he defended a radical rationalism. Since he was afraid that this kind of rationalism implies relativism, his later view became more absolutistic. On the other hand, it is unclear whether this absolutism was genuine. Kołakowski considered uncertainty as a fundamental feature of human fate. He looked for ideas which could help people in overcome uncertainty. Thus, we should speak about images of something absolute rather than the Absolute in the traditional philosophical sense. This seems the most appropriate interpretation of Kolakowski's view about philosophy.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 5
356 – 365
EN
In the course of their discussion of historical explanation, historical narrative etc. philosophers of history repeatedly touched upon the metaphilosophical questions concerning the nature and the role of the philosophy of history. Especially during the last decades, some of the critics of the prescriptive approach advocated the need to focus on describing the actual historical works and the genuine historical practice. According to the advocates of the descriptive or bottom-up approach, philosophers of history should prescribe historians neither what they ought to do nor how their works ought to look like. Philosophers should rather follow the views of historians and describe their outcomes. Although this return to historical works and historical practice looks appealing, the author argues that one should not naively reduce philosophy of history to a mere description. It is important that philosophers of history follow the work of historians but they must anyway interpret what they find in historical discipline. Making use of examples from the writings of Paul Roth, he concludes that philosophy of history should try to fruitfully combine descriptive and prescriptive approaches.
EN
Philip Kitcher emphasises the social context of philosophy and science. He proposes the concept of well-ordered inquiry, which holds that there are research agendas and applications subject to public control guided by ideal deliberation among well-informed and mutually engaged representatives of diverse points of view and all possible human desires. To put it another way, he gives a description of the social guidance of inquiry by means of democratic deliberation. In his view, there is no single good toward which the sciences aim. Kitcher’s assertion that inquiry pursues not merely truths, but significant truths – ones that respond to people’s needs in using them – is crucial to understanding the ideal of well-ordered inquiry. This paper outlines Kitcher’s main ideas for renewing philosophy juxtaposed with particular philosophical traditions.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 4
312 – 324
EN
The article deals primarily with the Wittgensteinian contributions to metaphilosophy as rendered in the book Metaphilosophical investigations (T. Čana – D. Kamhal – R. Maco 2015). It focuses on the language and methods of the metaphilosophical elucidations and, in some cases, puts these elucidations under criticism for an incorrect usage of the key concepts. Critical remarks are also made with regard to the methodological maxims that require simplicity and transparency of philosophizing. In addition, the article offers some alternative solutions to the problems at issue. These solutions are above all metalinguistic recommendations and intended as contributions to therapeutic philosophy.
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