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EN
The opinion is based on the analysis of a number of detailed problems related to the procedure for submitting candidatures for members of the National Council of the Judiciary, from among judges, in relation to the provisions of the Act of 8 December 2017 amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and some related acts. The author is of the opinion that the time limits specified in the abovementioned act and the amending act of 8 December 2017, related to the procedure for nominating judges — members of the Council, worded as follows: “in the period of […] days beginning with the day […]”, begin to run on the day following the day of an event effecting the running of a time limit. The author also points to inconsistencies of particular, newly introduced, provisions of the act on the National Council of the Judiciary
EN
According to the author, in the Polish legal system there is no regulation concerning the flag protocol. Therefore, the rules of diplomatic protocol as well as heraldry and vexillology customs are applied which allow for flying, apart from the national flag, also other symbols of states or international organizations. The author claims that, due to lack of provisions governing competence to determine which authority is an appropriate body for adopting flag protocols for particular public administration buildings, this should be the power of the Marshal (Speaker) of the Sejm, who – according to the Standing Orders of the Sejm – ensures order and decorum within the precincts of the Chamber.
EN
The author analyzes the normative model derived from the Standing Orders of the Sejm and confronts the theoretical assumptions with parliamentary practice accompanying the procedure for election of the Marshal of the Sejm, based on its similarity to the procedure for recall of the Marshal of the Sejm. He argues that the general principles set out in Chapter 2, “Debates of the Sejm” in Section III of the Standing Orders of the Sejm, should apply to this matter in question. The said provisions do not provide for specific powers that would give the Deputies subject to the motion for the recall of the Marshal of the Sejm the right to speak in the debate in accordance with the rules different from those defining the procedure for taking floor by other speakers. It should be assumed that in the debate on a motion to recall the Marshal of the Sejm the questions in the debate can be responded by their intended addressees, i.e. a person subject to the motion or the designated candidate. There is no specific basis in the Standing Orders that would allow giving a speech by the Deputy subject to the motion when no question has been addressed to him/her during the debate.
EN
The specificity of the proceedings in relation to petitions precludes the admissibility of discontinuance of the proceedings regarding consideration of a petition on the basis of appropriate application of Article 105 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure. In case of withdrawal of a petition submitted to the Sejm, the body responsible for its consideration, i.e. the Petitions Committee, should make a decision about the way of proceeding with the petition. Withdrawal of the petition does not prevent its consideration. Given the open catalogue of the ways in which petitions can be proceeded, the Committee should be allowed to adopt a resolution to refuse consideration of the petition because of the applicant’s willingness to withdraw the petition
EN
In the light of the binding provisions of law, the General Prosecutor is included in the subject matter of the oversight function of the Sejm. The statutory request for information and explanations may been perceived as the main instrument of parliamentary oversight serving to obtain information on specific proceedings conducted by the state prosecution.. The Marshal of the Sejm may refer a matter to the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, since the subject matter of activity of this committee includes matters related to the activities of the state prosecution, in order to obtain relevant information and express an opinion.
EN
The Marshal of the Sejm is not allowed to verify, whether an explanatory statement to a bill submitted by a group of citizens meets requirements specified in Articles 34 paras. 2 and 3 of the Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. Besides, demanding enclosure – to the notification of the establishment of the Committee – of statements on accession to the legislative initiative committee and of a statement on selection of committee’s agent, is not based on rules of the Act of 24th June 1999 on Exercise of the Legislative Initiative by Citizens. Therefore the current practice of demanding the enclosure of the above documents cannot be continued in future.
EN
The Vice-Marshal of the Sejm, who has been authorized by the Marshal of the Sejm to take action in matters related to petitions, does not exercise the competence to assess petitions on his own, but does so on behalf of the Marshal. This action should therefore be assessed, as if it were performed personally by the Marshal of the Sejm. The provisions of the Standing Orders of the Sejm do not provide for the possibility of re-assessment of petitions. Consequently, the petitioner’s request to re-examine the petition in order to possibly amend the decision to leave it unexamined cannot be satisfied.
EN
The author argues that laconic regulation of the dismissal of members of the Labour Protection Council, in conjunction with the provisions specifying its composition and with the principle of personal discontinuation of parliament’s work, allows us to assume that the end of the term of the Sejm and the Senate may constitute a precondition for dismissal from membership of the Board of Deputies and Senators sitting in the chambers of previous term of office and for the appointment of their successors from among the members of parliament of a new term. The principle of rotation in the terms of office of the Labour Protection Council means that the Marshal of the Sejm may not dismiss its members at his/her own “discretion”. Because of such a flawed and unclear provisions of the Act on the National Labour Inspectorate, the existing law should, according to the author, be changed and supplemented.
EN
The report, submitted by the Council for the Polish Language, entitled “Language of political information”, contains an analysis of the problem that is narrow in scope. In the light of the current parliamentary practice, the narrow scope of the Council’s reports is typical and this has not been questioned in the course of parliamentary work. The decision of the Culture and Media Committee, resulting in a refusal to consider the document in question, is an expression of negation of the decision of the Marshal of the Sejm to recognize this document as a report. Formally, the committee proceedings on the report had not been completed. The Committee should return to examining this document and complete its work, formulating an appropriate opinion.
EN
The position of the Sejm refers to application of the Marshal of the Sejm initiating proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal. The position of the Sejm it was stated that the questioned provision of the Act – Electoral Code, in so far as it limits the competence of the Marshal of the Sejm to change the date of presidential elections after an occurrence of unpredictable, extraordinary circumstances hindering or preventing the holding of elections on the originally scheduled date, is unconstitutional. According to the applicant, the challenged provision violates the Constitution because it introduces additional, non-constitutional deadlines binding the Marshal of the Sejm in ordering elections to the office of the President of the Republic of Poland. It also excludes the constitutional competence of the Marshal of the Sejm to change the date of these elections and limits the possibility of ordering presidential elections by indicating a statutory holiday.
EN
The author provides an analysis of the provisions of Article 10a, para. 4 of the Standing Orders of the Sejm in the context of the time period within which it should consider a motion to recall the Marshal of the Sejm. She points out that the opportunity to recall the Marshal of the Sejm is complicated as compared to the election procedure,. The character of the time limit for consideration of the motion to recall the Marshal of the Sejm is not indicative, but mandatory. From an analysis of the concept of ‘the next sitting of the Sejm, it follows that the consideration of the motion and the putting thereof to a vote at the sitting that is “the first one after 7 days of its submission”.
EN
The opinion refers to a number of problems related to the statutory obligation to provide Deputies with information by representatives of state organs. The most important of the analyzed issues is the matter of legal measures at the disposal of a Deputy who decides that organs of the state do not realize or improperly realize their obligations in the scope of providing information on their activity.
EN
This article attempts to reconstruct legal regulations concerning the legal status of the prosecutor in proceedings before the State Tribunal. The reconstruction enables the legal nature of this function to be defined, as well as the procedural competences and rules for the appointment and circumstance resulting in the termination of tenure thereof. The analyses carried out concerning the legal nature of the prosecutor’s function lead to the conclusion that in the proceedings before the State Tribunal the prosecutor acts in their own name and thus is not a legal representative of Parliament. However, simultaneously the prosecutor’s function is not independent, as it is supervised by the appointing body. The author states that all the norms included in the Criminal Procedures Code pertaining to the public prosecutor apply thereto. However, the prosecutor must not drop the charges as this remains under the control of Parliament. Analyses on the appointment of the prosecutor allowed for the conclusion that the decision is to be made independently from the charges, whereas the Constitution does not require adopting resolutions with the absolute or qualified majority of votes. In relation to the termination of the prosecutor’s tenure, the author puts forward the thesis that it is possible for the prosecutor to be dismissed by Parliament at any time. The article is rounded off with considerations regarding the evaluation of statutory regulations on the investigated issue.
PL
Celem artykułu jest zrekonstruowanie norm prawnych regulujących status prawny oskarżyciela w postępowaniu przed Trybunałem Stanu, co ma pozwolić na określenie charakteru prawnego tej funkcji, a także jego kompetencji procesowych oraz zasad jego wyboru i okoliczności skutkujących wygaśnięciem jego mandatu. Przeprowadzone analizy dotyczące charakteru prawnego funkcji oskarżyciela prowadzą do sformułowania wniosku, że w postępowaniu przed Trybunałem Stanu działa on we własnym imieniu, a zatem nie jest przedstawicielem procesowym parlamentu. Jednocześnie jednak jego funkcja nie jest samoistna, a organ, który go powołał, sprawuje nad nim ogólną kontrolę. Autor stwierdza, że do oskarżyciela stosuje się co do zasady wszystkie normy Kodeksu postępowania karnego dotyczące oskarżyciela publicznego. Wykluczone jest jednak cofnięcie przez niego oskarżenia, co pozostaje w gestii parlamentu. Analizy dotyczące wyboru oskarżyciela pozwoliły na sformułowanie wniosku, że decyzja w tej sprawie podejmowana jest niezależnie od samego oskarżenia, a Konstytucja nie wymaga podjęcia uchwały w tym zakresie bezwzględną lub kwalifikowaną większością głosów. W odniesieniu do wygaśnięcia funkcji oskarżyciela autor stawia między innymi tezę o możliwości odwołania go w każdym czasie przez parlament. Artykuł wieńczą rozważania dotyczące oceny regulacji ustawowych odnoszących się do badanego zagadnienia.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł poświęcony jest problematyce śmierci będącej przesłanką opróżnienia urzędu Prezydenta RP. Konstytucja RP reguluje w sposób kompleksowy instytucję zastępstwa Prezydenta RP, określając prawne formy jej wykonywania oraz wskazując Marszałków (Sejmu oraz Senatu) jako podmioty uprawnione do realizacji obowiązków głowy państwa. W przypadku wystąpienia śmierci Prezydenta pojawia się wątpliwość co do możliwości wdrożenia regulacji cywilistycznych w momencie uruchamiania procedury zastępstwa Prezydenta przewidzianej w art. 131 Konstytucji. Przeprowadzona w artykule analiza ma na celu udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytanie czy funkcjonujący w obszarze prawa konstytucyjnego marszałek Sejmu (na którym ciąży obowiązek objęcia obowiązków głowy państwa) jest związany regulacjami obowiązującymi co do zasady na gruncie cywilnoprawnym.
EN
This article is devoted to the issue of death as a premise for vacating the office of President of the Republic of Poland. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland comprehensively regulates the institution of substitution of the President of the Republic of Poland, specifying the legal forms of its execution and indicating the Marshals (of the Sejm and the Senate) as entities authorized to carry out the duties of the head of state. In the event of the occurrence of the death of the President, doubts arise as to the possibility of implementing civilian regulations at the time of triggering the procedure of substitution of the President provided for in Art. 131 of the Constitution. The analysis carried out in the article is aimed at answering the question of whether the Marshal of the Sejm (on whom the duty to assume the duties of head of state is incumbent), functioning in the field of constitutional law, is bound by the regulations applicable in principle on civil law grounds.
EN
The subject of this article is to present the evolution of the constitutional and legal position of the Marshal of the Sejm, which covers the time from regaining independence by Poland to 1997 when the current constitution came into force. Assuming that both the scope of the competences connected with the operating of the Sejm and the powers beyond that area decide on the political position of the Marshal, the constitutional and regulatory solutions concerning that office were analysed. The result of those analyses proves that the position of the chairman of the Polish Sejm changed significantly over the analysed time. The changing political trends were the most important factor determining the constitutional and legal position of the Marshal of the Sejm. In the normative perspective they were reflected in the constitutional acts which were binding successively in Poland. The Marshal has always had the status of the constitutional body; however, this fact has not always determined his strong position in the Sejm.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest ukazanie ewolucji prawnoustrojowej pozycji Marszałka Sejmu, obejmującej okres od odzyskania przez Polskę niepodległości do czasu wejścia w życie obowiązującej obecnie konstytucji z 1997 r. Przyjmując założenie, że o pozycji ustrojowej Marszałka decyduje zarówno zakres jego kompetencji związanych z funkcjonowaniem Sejmu, jak również jego uprawnienia wychodzące poza ten obszar, analizie poddane zostały rozwiązania konstytucyjne i regulaminowe odnoszące się do tego urzędu. Wynik tych analiz wskazuje, że prawnoustrojowa pozycja przewodniczącego polskiego Sejmu, na przestrzeni analizowanego okresu, ulegała istotnym zmianom. Najważniejszym czynnikiem determinującym prawnoustrojowy status Marszałka Sejmu były zmieniające się trendy ustrojowe, które w płaszczyźnie normatywnej, znajdowały odzwierciedlenie w kolejno obowiązujących w Polsce aktach konstytucyjnych. Marszałek zawsze posiadał status organu konstytucyjnego, jednak ten fakt nie zawsze determinował jego silną pozycję w Sejmie.
EN
The purpose of the article is to present the public activity of Prince Antoni Paweł Sułkowski (1785-1836) in the 20s and 30s of the 19th century. During this period, Sułkowski defended Polish nationality, serving as the marshal at three provincial parliaments in 1827, 1830 and 1834. Furthermore the article describes the involvement of Prince Sułkowski in „organic work” and his attitude towards the November Uprising.
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie aktywności publicznej księcia Antoniego Pawła Sułkowskiego (1785-1836) w latach 20 i 30 XIX w. W tym okresie Sułkowski występował w obronie polskiej narodowości, pełniąc funkcję marszałka na trzech sejmach prowincjonalnych 1827, 1830 i 1834 r. Nakreślono także zaangażowanie Sułkowskiego w pracę „organiczną”.  Należało przy tym wytłumaczyć zmianę, jaka zaszła w pojmowaniu przez Sułkowskiego walki o sprawę polską. Ponadto analizie została poddana postawa Sułkowskiego wobec powstania listopadowego.  
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