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EN
The paper concerns itself with the beginnings of the development of Heidegger’s thought between the years 1909 and 1912, as witnessed in his articles and reviews for the university magazine Der Akademiker and in his first purely philosophical articles – The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy and Recent Investigations in Logic – which were published in 1912 in the Catholic Literarische Rundschau. These sources reveal how Heidegger’s growth from Catholic attitudes to a critique of the Aristotelian-Scholastic system was significantly influenced by his interest in the problematic of pure logic which led him to deal with not only the conception of Frege, but also the philosophical system of Heinrich Rickert.
PL
Autor próbuje pokazać że ujęcie chrześcijańskiego Boga rozwijane w późnym średniowieczu przez Mistrza Eckharta, wychodzi poza przedstawioną przez Nietzschego krytykę chrześcijaństwa jako religii zaświatów. W artykule autor prezentuje wyżej wymienioną krytykę, podążając za wizją Boga rozwijaną przez Eckharta. Pokazuje, że chrześcijaństwo, które Nietzsche krytykuje, posługuje się zdroworozsądkową wizją transcendencji Boga, opartą na obrazach przestrzennych. Autor ukazuje zatem, że Eckhart przeformułowuje tę transcendencję w taki sposób, iż nie podlega ona krytyce Nietzschego, w szczególności nie może prowadzić do deprecjacji świata faworyzującej zaświaty będące światem odwróconym, jak to ujmował Nietzsche. Myśl Eckharta jest sposobnością dla chrześcijaństwa „po Nietzschem”.
Pamiętnik Literacki
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2016
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vol. 107
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issue 2
261-269
PL
Tekst stanowi próbę krytycznego oglądu przedstawionego w książce Bjørnara Olsena „W obronie rzeczy. Archeologia i ontologia przedmiotów” projektu dowartościowania materialnych aspektów kultury i wskazania ich konstytutywnej roli w kształtowaniu społecznej „codziennej powszedniości”. Badacz, występując przeciw binarnym podziałom, stanowiącym kontynuację Kartezjańskiej marginalizacji materii jako „rzeczy rozciągłej”, nie unika jednak potknięć i niekonsekwencji. Ujawniają się one głównie w łączeniu – na zasadzie bricolage’u – często bardzo odległych sposobów myślenia o rzeczach (kontrowersyjne wydaje się np. zestawienie Heidegger–Latour, w którym zanika swoistość myślowej drogi autora „Bycia i czasu”). Proponowane przez Olsena odczytanie koncepcji Heideggerowskich skłania jednak do namysłu nad możliwością pogodzenia dyskursu „emancypacyjnego” (w którego kierunku zmierza „obrona rzeczy”) z nielinearnym (opozycyjnym wobec idei postępu) spojrzeniem na historię. Olsen wskazuje także aporie, w jakie wikła się dyskurs naukowy, próbując opisać to, co w sposób niezauważalny, „powściągliwy” funduje społeczną rzeczywistość.
EN
The text is an attempt at a critical assessment of the view on the project of appreciation of material aspects of culture and of pointing at their constitutive role in shaping the social “everyday commonness” as presented in Bjørnar Olsen’s book “In Defense of Things. Archaeology and the Ontology of Objects.” The researcher, taking a stand against binary oppositions which follow Cartesian marginalisation of matter as “extended thing,” does not avoid stumbles and inconsistencies. They are revealed mainly in combining, as in bricolage, often remote modes of thinking about things (juxtaposing Heidegger to Latour, in which the former’s peculiarity of thinking, seems controversial). Heidegger’s conceptions of understanding proposed by Olsen induces the reader to ponder on a possibility of reconciling “emancipation” discourse (going in the direction in which “the defense of things” follows) with non-linear one (opposing the idea of progress) view on history. Olsen also points at aporias that scientific discourse is entangled in when he is trying to describe what in an imperceptible and “reserved” way is founded by social reality.
PL
Is Heidegger’s philosophy of Being (Seyn) a mystique? In this article I examine whether late Heidegger’s philosophy (Gesamtausgabe volumes 65–74) can be called a mysticism. For serious reasons the answer should be negative. Heidegger’s early statements relating to the mystique are very unflattering. I try to grasp what the Heidegger’s exact attitude to the mystique is. Reflections on the mystique do not appear in late Heidegger’s philosophy (with one exception). Heidegger treats the term “mysticism” as an objection to thinking, which consists in masking a lack of understanding of thinking. According to the immanent criteria, the philosophy of Being cannot be called the mystique. But it is possible to transpose the concept of the mystique, which means to carry the word from the first in another beginning. The second part of my work is an attempt at such a transposition. As a result I obtain the word “mysticism” conceived from the side of Being, that is as a source for mysticism conceived in the traditional way. So I can say that the philosophy of Being is a mystique in this particular sense of this word.
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Thinking without Heidegger?

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Forum Pedagogiczne
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2019
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vol. 9
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issue 1
245-256
PL
There has been a resurgence of Martin Heidegger’s ideas in recent years, especially within English-language philosophy of education. Yet, there have also been other developments that deserve to be taken seriously, first and foremost the indication that his anti-Semitism informs not only his personal beliefs and political stance but is already rooted in his philosophy, notably his ontology. It is these developments and the context of Heidegger’s philosophy that are examined first, before I return to the purported significance of his ideas for education towards the end of this essay.
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Existence a intersubjektivita u Karla Jasperse

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EN
The article focuses on the role of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers, concentrating above all on the third chapter of Philosophy, Vol. II in which Jaspers gives his most detailed exposition of the various forms of communication. At the same time, a detailed analysis of the basic modes of communication – which correspond to the different levels of the human self – facilitates our understanding the origin of the inadequacies and failures that occur in communication when it has not risen to the level of existential communication. Special attention is given to existential communication and its importance in the process of becoming oneself. The author argues that, especially in those passages that highlight the serious metaphysical consequences that follow from failures in communication, Jaspers is developing an implicit polemic with Martin Heidegger (in whose analyzes of authentic Dasein intersubjectivity played no role). In the conclusion, the author points out the connection between existential communication and the boundary situation of struggle.
CS
Článek je věnován roli intersubjektivity ve filosofii Karla Jasperse. Autor se zaměřuje především na 3. kapitolu z Philosophie II, kde Jaspers podává nejpodrobnější výklad různých podob komunikace. Detailní rozbor základních způsobů komunikace, jež odpovídají různým úrovním lidského Já, zároveň umožňuje objasnit původ nedostatečnosti a selhávání, k nimž dochází v komunikaci, pokud se nepozvedla na úroveň existenciální komunikace. Zvláštní pozornost je věnována právě existenciální komunikaci a jejímu významu v procesu stávání se sebou. Autor zastává tezi, že zejména v pasážích osvětlujících závažné metafyzické důsledky, jež plynou ze selhávání v komunikaci, Jaspers rozvíjí implicitní polemiku s Martinem Heideggerem, v jehož analýzách autentického pobytu intersubjektivita nehraje žádnou roli. V závěru pak autor poukazuje na souvislosti mezi existenciální komunikací a mezní situací boje.
PL
Artykuł przedstawia biografie i filozoficzne poglądy dwojga niemieckich myślicieli XX wieku — Hannah Arendt i Martina Heideggera. Dwie wojny światowe za życia jednego pokolenia, nieuwieńczone ani ostatecznym trumfem pokoju, ani wytchnieniem, uformowały, ale w sposób bardzo odmienny, tych dwoje ludzi. Stąd i filozofia, i polityka rozpisała im życiowe ścieżki, wybory, decyzje i bóle. Jak to się jednak stało, że Hannah Arendt przebyła drogę od filozofii teoretycznej do filozofii polityki, stając się jednym z najważniejszych głosów filozofii politycznej w XX wieku, a Martin Heidegger, choć podjął dramatyczną próbę stworzenia w swojej filozofii fundamentów dla polityki, utknął w swym hermetycznym języku, nie mogąc (a po wojnie nie mając ku temu życiowego uprawomocnienia) analizować na gruncie filozofii zagadnień politycznych? Podjęta refleksja jest próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego żydowska myślicielka stała się filozofem polityki, a niemiecki filozof, mimo że pragnął metafizyki jako dziejowej metapolityki narodu, nigdy nie miał do tego prawa. Co było źródłem odmienności tych dwojga myślicieli? Czy tylko względy charakterologiczne? A może gdzieś u podstaw ich życiowych wyborów leżały przede wszystkim idee, którymi żyli i które głosili? Może dlatego Heidegger po wojnie wybrał ucieczkę, nie chcąc czy nie potrafiąc zmierzyć się z tym, kim okazał się Adolf Hitler, czym było ostateczne rozwiązanie, Auschwitz, ludobójstwo, Arendt zaś pozostała wierna myśleniu i miłości, ukazując ludziom XX wieku prawdziwe korzenie totalitaryzmu.
EN
The article presents the biographies and philosophical views of two German thinkers of the twentieth century—Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger. Two world wars during the lifetime of one generation, not crowned neither with the final triumph of peace nor respite, formed, but in a very different way, these two philosophers. Hence the philosophy and politics influenced their life path, choices, decisions and pains. How did it happen, however, that Hannah Arendt came the way from theoretical to political philosophy, becoming one of the most important voices of poli­tical philosophy in the twentieth century, while Martin Heidegger, although made a dramatic attempt to create in his philosophy the foundations for a policy stuck in his hermetic language, unable (and after the war, not having had validation of life) to analyze on the basis of philosophy the political issues? Taken reflection is an attempt to answer the question of why the Jewish thinker became a philosopher of politics, and the German philosopher, although he wanted the metaphysics as a historical metapolitics of the nation has never had the right to do it. What was the source of the variability of these two thinkers? Was it only a difference of characters? Or maybe somewhere at the roots of their life choices lied the ideas they have lived and preached? Maybe that's why Heidegger after the war, chose the escape, unwilling or unable to deal with who Adolf Hitler turned out to be, what was the final solution, Auschwitz, genocide, while Arendt remained faithful to thinking and love showing people of twentieth century the origins of totalitarianism.
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Cézanne ve filosofii Martina Heideggera

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EN
Philosophical reflexion on art and artistic activity played a very important role in Heidegger’s intellectual development. His famous paper The Birth of an Artistic Work (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks) marked, after all, the emergence of a fundamental shift in his philosophy. Art, in its specific approach to the world, might aid the working out of a “new beginning” in philosophy since, in Heidegger’s view, the involvement of art in classical metaphysics had been the cause of error. Heidegger found a common voice, at different times, with poetry, fine arts (in one period he was very occupied with Paul Klee) and architecture. Only at the end of his life did he discover for himself the genius of the French painter Paul Cézanne, and he found in him an expression that almost coincided with the expression of his own thoughts. This comparison of Cézanne and Heidegger attempts to uncover other possible connections between the work of these two figures.
DE
Die philosophische Reflexion der Kunst und der künstlerischen Tätigkeit spielte in Heideggers geistiger Entwicklung eine sehr wichtige Rolle. Seine berühmte Abhandlung Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks war sogar Ausgangspunkt eines wesentlichen gedanklichen Schubs in Heideggers Philosophie. Die Kunst mit ihrem spezifischen Ansatz konnte dabei dem gedanklichen Erschließen des sog. neuen Anfangs der Philosophie verhelfen, da deren Verschmelzung mit der klassischen Metaphysik laut Heidegger ein Irrweg war. Heidegger fand Geistesverwandtschaften wechselweise in der Poesie, in der bildenden Kunst (in einer bestimmten Phase beschäftigte er sich intensiv mit dem Werk Paul Klees) oder in der Architektur. Erst gegen Ende seines Lebens entdeckte er für sich das Genie des französischen Malers Paul Cézanne und fand in ihm einen nahezu identischen Ausdruck seiner eigenen Gedanken. Durch einen Vergleich von Cézanne und Heidegger wird versucht, mögliche weitere Zusammenhänge in den Werken dieser beiden Persönlichkeiten aufzudecken.
Pamiętnik Teatralny
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2016
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vol. 65
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issue 4
33-54
EN
This article is informed by an insight that has been present in Witkiewicz studies for a long time and makes it viable to read Witkacy’s dramaturgy and philosophical investigations through the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Thus, the structure of the essay rests, on the one hand, on a reading of Witkacy’s dramas-The Pragmatists (1919), The Anonymous Work (1921), The Madman and the Nun, or There Is Nothing Bad Which Could Not Turn into Something Worse (1923), and The Mother (1924)-as well as on an analysis of his philosophical writings of 1933–1939. On the other hand, it is based on a presentation of Heidegger’s conceptions of the authentic and inauthentic modes of Dasein, his understanding of primordial temporality and truth, his notions about the end of philosophy brought along by the domination of operative thinking, and the role he ascribed to metaphysics. The conclusions flowing from setting the dramatic and philosophical writings of Witkacy in the context of Heidegger’s thought enable us to look at the lot of protagonists of Witkiewicz’s plays in a new way. It is not only determined by the super-cabaret improvisations arranged by the characters for their metaphysical thrills; it is also an arena of struggle between the Heideggerian authentic self-being and the inauthentic they-being. The struggle in which, according to catastrophic premonitions of Witkiewicz’s and beliefs of Heidegger, the they-being wins.
PL
Artykuł opiera się na obecnym w badaniach nad Witkacym od dłuższego czasu spostrzeżeniu, które pozwala czytać jego dramaturgię i filozoficzne poszukiwania przez pryzmat filozofii Martina Heideggera. Struktura eseju opiera się więc z jednej strony na lekturze dramatów Witkacego – Pragmatystów (1919), Bezimiennego dzieła (1921), Wariata i zakonnicy, czyli Nie ma złego, co by na jeszcze gorsze nie wyszło (1923) i Matki (1924) – oraz na analizie jego pism filozoficznych z lat 1933–1939. Z drugiej strony opiera się na prezentacji Heideggerowskich koncepcji bycia właściwego i niewłaściwego, czasu pierwotnego pojęcia prawdy, jego przekonania o końcu filozofii w związku z dominacją myślenia naukowo-technicznego oraz roli, jaką przypisywał metafizyce. Wnioski płynące z osadzenia dramaturgii i filozofii Witkacego w kontekście myśli Heideggera pozwalają w nowy sposób spojrzeć na los bohaterów sztuk Witkiewicza. Wyznaczają go nie tylko kabaretowe improwizacje aranżowane przez bohaterów dla metafizycznych uniesień; jest on także areną zmagań między Heideggerowskim autentycznym byciem Sobą a nieautentycznym światopoglądem Się. Walki, w której – zgodnie z katastroficznymi przeczuciami Witkiewicza i przekonaniami Heideggera – zwycięża światopogląd Się.
EN
The theme of gratitude is topical and important owing to the fact that it goes against the tide of the widespread consumer, capitalist, legal, and subjective stand – it appears at the antipodes of the conviction that: “you make your own destiny”, “everyone is free and independent”, “everyone has an equal chance”, “nothing is for free”, and “quid pro quo”, and goes beyond “I must”, “I should”, “I want”, beyond will and conquest, but also beyond sacrifice and potlach. Generally speaking, this is a question asking whether there exists the possibility of selflessness, some sort of surplus in Nature and daily marketability, mercy in the world of politics and law – can gratitude be expressed and practised, what are its relations with memory, love, and “ordinary” recognition, what sort of placement in the face of ordinary dependences of being.
PL
Celem artykułu jest zarysowanie możliwości myślenia jako wdzięczności – a zadanie to sytuuje w kontekście aktualnej rewolucji związanej z upowszechnieniem sztucznej inteligencji (chatGPT). Esej wyprowadza tę kwestię z pism Martina Heideggera, który może pierwszy skojarzył myśl z podzięką – a następnie rozwija ją w kontekście prac filozofa Jeana-Luca Nancy’ego, pedagoga Jana Masscheleina oraz antropologa Tima Ingolda. Tezą jest przekonanie, że myślenie wdzięczne jest w opozycji do myśli metafizycznej, tradycyjnie rozumianej wiedzy i nauki – wynika z uważnego, nie-intencjonalnego otwarcia na dany świat. Nie zatroskane poznanie i pewność są odtąd celami myślenia, ale jego źródłem jest przyjmowanie nieobliczalnych zdarzeń w ich chwale oraz dziękczynienie im poprzez adorację. Myślenie jako wdzięczność jest afirmacją niezbywalnej istoty człowieczeństwa, a jego kształtowanie nadzieją na zdolność życia w obliczu niepewności czasów.
EN
In order to better understand the notion of history proper to phenomenology, I un-dertake a brief case study. Namely, I investigate Martin Heidegger’s relation to Edmund Husserl in the years preceding Husserl’s appointment to Freiburg, with a special focus on an occasional writing by Heidegger from 1912. The application of historical method not only dismantles the teleological constructions which mark Heidegger’s own account of his early discovery of Husserl’s phenomenology, but also present a young thinker eager to absorb cutting edge, though not necessarily consistent, developments from contemporaneous philosophy. Heidegger’s early approach could also be conceived as a window onto an elusive brief period of phenomenology before its transformation into a Movement, thereby illustrating the positive contributions of the historical approach to the history phenomenology.
14
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Self(ie)

70%
EN
In this paper, the mode in which the self reveals itself in the contemporary world-historical situation will be analysed. Hence, the focus will be on a particular form of technological mediation of the self by examining a recent phenomenon commonly referred to as the s e l f i e. Unlike most psychological studies suggest, it will be argued that selfies enable a human epistemological need to realize self-knowledge. Thus, they are not a mere result of narcissistic disorder. Furthermore, I will claim that the self-knowledge achieved via the selfie does not necessarily offer a lower level of aesthetic perfection as a means of self-knowledge gained via other “classical” art forms, and that the prejudice that this is the case is a result of a surpassed dualistic view of human nature. In the conclusion of the paper the investigation will be extended to the question of what the selfie can teach us about the essence of (modern) technology and, inversely, what from (modern) technology we can tell about the (modern) self. In doing so, Gehlen’s and Heidegger’s views on the essence of technology will be employed. Finally, to answer the question of whether the self can be revealed in the selfie, Heidegger’s criticism of modern technology will be emphasized and the difference between technology as a way of revealing and technology as a purpose will be underlined.
EN
The article is informed by an insight that has been present in Witkiewicz studies for a long time and makes it viable to read Witkacy’s dramaturgy and philosophical investigations through the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Thus, the structure of the essay rests, on the one hand, on a reading of Witkacy’s dramas—The Pragmatists (1919), The Anonymous Work (1921), The Madman and the Nun, or There Is Nothing Bad Which Could Not Turn into Something Worse (1923), and The Mother (1924)—as well as on an analysis of his philosophical writings of 1933–1939. On the other hand, it is based on a presentation of Heidegger’s conceptions of the authentic and inauthentic modes of Dasein, his understanding of primordial temporality and truth, his notions about the end of philosophy brought along by the domination of operative thinking, and the role he ascribed to metaphysics. The conclusions flowing from setting the dramatic and philosophical writings of Witkacy in the context of Heidegger’s thought enable us to look at the lot of protagonists of Witkiewicz’s plays in a new way. It is not only determined by the super-cabaret improvisations arranged by the characters for their metaphysical thrills; it is also an arena of struggle between the Heideggerian authentic self-being and the inauthentic they-being. The struggle in which, according to catastrophic premonitions of Witkiewicz’s and beliefs of Heidegger, the they-being wins.
EN
One of the most famous parts of Heidegger's The Origin of the Work of Art is the passage in which he refers to the painting by van Gogh, which represents a pair of worn-out shoes. Considering the artist's oeuvre, the aforementioned painting did not seem to have a crucial significance, yet it elicited the most attention. The non-canonical and poetic interpretation by Heidegger has led to fierce criticism by art historian Meyer Schapiro. The discussion between the philosopher and art historian was understood as a collision of different methodologies. Schapiro accused Heidegger of a misinterpretation as he attributed the painted shoes to a peasant woman. In Schapiro's view, Heidegger's interpretation was a type of false projection that was not grounded in facts. Schapiro proposes the reading in which the painted object is intertwined (or interlaced) with the artist to the extent that it becomes a metonymic self-portrait. Schapiro's reattribution changes the painting's interpretation in the context of the origins of the represented object but also the class and gender of its owner. Also, by referring to a "relic," Schapiro seemed to open up the possibility of a theological interpretation; however, he did not elaborate on this matter. In his "polylogue" Derrida reflected on both interpretations, tracing their inconsistencies and accusing both authors of violence. The present article takes into account each of these texts to reflect on the ethics and limitations of interpretation, the origins of truth in painting, and the origin of the shoes depicted in van Gogh's artwork – as in this particular matter, all of those issues seem interlaced.
Human Affairs
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2011
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vol. 21
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issue 4
393-402
EN
In this paper, I discuss Richard Rorty’s views on intercultural hermeneutics as presented in his essay “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens” and in his correspondence with the Indian philosopher Anindita Niyogi Balslev. In doing so, I focus primarily on Rorty’s presumption that instead of providing an “authentic” picture of another culture, the goal of intercultural studies or hermeneutics should be to look if there is anything “of use” that a given culture offers and that is not offered by ours.
EN
Jacques Derrida’s critique of Edmund Husserl in Voice and Phenomenon targets several ways in which Husserl’s theory of signs is said to remain dependent on a model of presence, and therefore to be a form of onto-theology. In a sense this simply extends Martin Heidegger’s own critique of Husserl as failing to account for what remains obscure behind any presentation to the mind. Yet Derrida’s critique is ultimately more radical than Heidegger’s, though the radicality is in this case unjustified. Namely, Derrida goes beyond Heidegger’s critique of presence to mount an additional critique of “self-presence,” which is more often known as “identity.” Derrida’s insufficiently motivated critique of identity leads to additional problems for his philosophy.
PL
This article deals with radical hermeneutics in Vladimir Makanin’s micro-novel The Loss. The article presents the position that John D. Caputo’s flow is fundamental to Makanin’s hermeneutics. The author refers to Vladimir Ivancov’s research and debates with Anna Skotnicka and Anna Stankevich.
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EN
This article focuses on the idea of theory of literature as non-dogmatic and anti-essentialist form of reflection on literature. On the one hand, Jean-Michele Rabat´e, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida and Martin Heidegger, referred to in sequence, are shown as thinkers breaking the clear division into literary text and, external thereto, theoretical text. On the other hand, the conclusion of the article, using examples of a few James Joyce’s texts, emphasizes the metaliterary element, which meets the proposals discussed in reference to the aforementioned figures.
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