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1

MONTESQUIEU A RZYMSKA DYSCYPLINA WOJSKOWA: POGLĄDY, INTERPRETACJE I ŹRÓDŁA POZNANIA

100%

Faszcza M. N.

Zeszyty Prawnicze

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2016

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vol. 16

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issue 1

27-52

PL

Montesquieu and Roman Military Discipline: Opinions,Interpretations, and SourcesSummaryMontesquieu’s influence on the development of modern public lawis undisputed, but he also played a very important role in shaping theperception of the Roman art of war. Like Machiavelli, he devoted a considerable amount of attention to Roman disciplina militaris. His comments were quite general, but they exerted a substantial influence onthe opinions of scholars of military discipline. Along with Lipsius andMachiavelli, he was one of the most cited authors, and his perceptionof military discipline was even reflected in some of the arrangementsemployed in the French army under the First Republic. Research on thereception of Roman ideas on the art of war usually stops at the MiddleAges, but Montesquieu’s work as a writer and his impact on later scholarsare the best justification for studying his opinions on this issue.

2

The principle of separation and balance of powers in Polish constitutional law: A historical view

89%

Wiśniewski P.

Roczniki Wydziału Nauk Prawnych i Ekonomicznych KUL

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2014-2015

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vol. 10-11

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issue 1: Prawo

167-178

PL

W XVIII w. doktryna separacji władz została wprowadzona jako środek przeciw tyranii. Recepcja zasady separacji i równowagi władz dokonała się w Polsce bardzo szybko, tak jak jej sformułowanie. Stało się to wraz z uchwaleniem Konstytucji Trzeciego Maja. Druga Republika Polska miała dwie konstytucje, nie licząc tymczasowych aktów o randze konstytucji. Pierwsza, Konstytucja Marcowa, wprost odnosiła się do zasady separacji władz. Druga, Konstytucja Kwietniowa, była zaprzeczeniem poprzedniej. Ustrój polityczny PRL był niewątpliwie ustrojem totalitarnym. Trzecia Republika Polska powróciła do systemu opartego na separacji władz, zwłaszcza w okresie, kiedy odzyskała ona pełną suwerenność i szybko powróciła do budowania swego ustroju politycznego w oparciu o tę zasadę.

EN

In the 18th century, the doctrine of separation of powers was established as a remedy for tyranny. The reception of the principle of separation and balance of powers in Poland was very fast, relative to its formulation. This happened together with the establishment of the Third of May Constitution. The Second Republic of Poland had two constitutions, apart from provisional acts of constitutional rank. The first, March Constitution directly referred to the principle of separation of powers. The other, April Constitution was a contradiction of the former. The political system of the PRL was without any doubt a totalitarian one. The Third Republic of Poland returned to a system based on the separation of powers, especially in the period when it regained full sovereignty and it quickly returned to building its political system based on this very principle.

3

Imagology and Exoticism in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters

75%

Majid Y. B.

Human and Social Studies

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2013

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vol. 2

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issue 3

113-123

EN

This article aims at highlighting the specificities of Gaston Bachelard’s «La poétique de la rêverie» (The Poetics of Reverie), seen as the pivot of Motesquieu’s imaginary creation in Persian Letters. The Same and the Other are two essential terms when trying to find the place imagology plays in an intercultural approach where France and Persia are associated with an enchanted exoticism. Criteria such as space, taste, the marvellous and verisimilitude will be examined in order to analyse the images vehiculated by the perceived society (France) and by the perceiving one (Persia) and to evaluate Montesquieu’s genius for social irony.

4

O metodě v právní vědě u Montesquieua : příklad XXVIII. knihy Ducha zákonů

71%

Fořtová H.

Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)

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2019

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vol. 158

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issue 11

997-1009

EN

The paper discusses book XXVIII of the Spirit of the Laws devoted to the practice of judicial combat, which replaced judicial procedure in the course of the development of Frank monarchy. Our aim is to use this case to explain Montesquieu’s understanding of the “method in jurisprudence”. Throughout his book, the author stresses that his aim is not to “interpret” the laws” but rather to “reflect upon” them and to make the reader understand the laws in all possible relations. The last part of the volume (Books XXVII–XXXI) largely examines the laws from a historical perspective. Montesquieu acknowledges the unreasonableness and injustice of the judicial combat as a way of settling disputes (the stronger and more skilful one was in the right) nevertheless he defends its existence because this practice maintained the society thanks to a set of fixed rules and thus prevented the outburst of violence. This custom itself was not reasonable but the way of handling it was. This, however, does not mean that anything could be justified. Montesquieu demonstrates that the rules concerning the judicial combat respected the free spirit of the Franks and were based on the principal of honour which guaranteed the required realm of freedom in the French monarchy. While in England, liberty was maintained by constitutional arrangement, in France it was safeguarded by manners. Liberty is the leading criterion in judging individual laws; that is why despotism must be rejected. While it may provide social stability, it violates the nature of man as free being.

CS

Text se zabývá XXVIII. knihou Ducha zákonů věnovanou praktice soudního souboje, která v jistém stupni vývoje francké monarchie nahrazovala soudní proceduru. Cílem je na tomto příkladu pochopit autorovo pojetí „metody v právní vědě“. Montesquieu napříč celou knihou zdůrazňuje, že jeho cílem není „výklad“ zákonů, ale jejich „promýšlení“, cílem je naučit čtenáře chápat zákony ve všech možných vztazích, porozumět příčinám jejich vzniku i jejich působnosti. Závěrečná část Ducha zákonů (knihy XXVII–XXXI) je z velké části věnovaná předvedení zákonů v historické perspektivě. Montesquieu uznává nerozumnost a nespravedlnost soudního souboje jako způsobu řešení sporu mezi Germány (o tom, kdo byl v právu, rozhodovala síla a obratnost), jeho existenci však hájí, neboť tato praktika svázala společnost pevnými pravidly, čímž zabránila nekontrolovatelnému šíření násilí. Rozumnost nebyla v podstatě tohoto zvyku, ale v jeho provedení. To ovšem neznamená, že by bylo možné ospravedlnit cokoli. Montesquieu ukazuje, že germánská nařízení o souboji respektovala svobodného ducha Germánů, v jejich jádru stála čest, která ve Francii zajišťuje nezbytný prostor svobody. Na rozdíl od Anglie, kde je svoboda výsledkem ústavního uspořádání, spočívá svoboda ve Francii na mravech. Svoboda je kritériem, kterým je třeba se řídit při posuzování jednotlivých zákonů; odmítnout je tak nutné despocii: ta sice může zajistit stabilitu, potlačuje však přirozenost člověka jako svobodné bytosti.

5

The Code Civil Between Enlightenment and Restoration. The Heritage of Portalis

63%

van Roermund B.

Diametros

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2014

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issue 40

149-175

EN

The French Code civil, including the tradition of legal practice and scholarship it stands for, is the child of two parents: Enlightenment and Restoration. They came together in the person of Jean Etienne Marie Portalis (1746–1807), who was the main drafter of the code under Napoleon. I want to investigate which line of philosophical argument he followed in uniting the two and critically assess the value of this argumentation. In section 1 I briefly sketch the codification of civil law in the (post-)revolutionary setting of the time, as well as Portalis’ philosophical background. Section 2 turns to the principled and wide-ranging discourse he delivered at the occasion of the formal presentation of the draft civil code to the legislature. This discourse, in turn, found its deeper roots in an extensive treatise that he wrote prior to the former, on the use and abuse of reason in times of Enlightenment (Section 3). I will focus, in particular, on the twin concepts of knowledge (section 4) and nature (section 5) in this treatise. From this vantage point, section 6 analyzes the eclectic way in which Portalis uses his philosophical godfathers Montesquieu and Rousseau, while section 7 shows why his preoccupation with the protection of established property rights can explain such eclecticism. Section 8 takes stock and submits that at least one of Portalis’ arguments presents a real challenge to Enlightenment philosophy up until the present day.

6

Cudzoziemskie przypadki pewnej „bagatelki”. O polskich przekładach „Le Temple de Gnide” Monteskiusza w XVIII wieku

63%

Skibińska E.

Pamiętnik Literacki

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2021

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vol. 112

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issue 2

209-223

PL

Przedmiotem artykułu jest funkcjonowanie polskich tłumaczeń „Le Temple de Gnide” jako serii przekładowej ukazanej w perspektywie komparatystycznej. Ten nieco zapomniany poemat prozą Monteskiusza w XVIII stuleciu cieszył się znacznym zainteresowaniem czytelników, wydawców i tłumaczy. W Europie liczba jego wydań i przekładów była większa niż wszystkich innych dzieł autora traktatu „O duchu praw”. Wyniki analizy danych bibliograficznych przekładów „Le Temple de Gnide”, opublikowanych w różnych językach, często tworzących serie przekładowe, wskazują, że jego translacje i retranslacje wpisują się w szersze mechanizmy życia literackiego wieku XVIII i części XIX stulecia. Teksty – zarówno oryginały, jak i przekłady – traktowane były wówczas jako „własność wspólna” tłumaczy, wydawców czy innych pisarzy, którzy poddawali utwory „doskonalącym przeróbkom”, służącym rozmaitym celom estetycznym i merkantylnym. Dotyczyło to również dwóch omawianych XVIII-wiecznych tłumaczeń polskich utworu Monteskiusza. Zestawienie z oryginałem pozwoliło też na wyjaśnienie niektórych wątpliwości dotyczących ich wydawców oraz podstawy przekładu.

EN

This article traces the (mis)fortunes of the Polish translations of Montesquieu’s “Le Temple de Gnide” (“The Temple of Gnidos”), analysed as a translational series in a comparative framework. This prose poem, now somewhat forgotten, in the 18th century was considerably popular with readers, publishers and translators. Its various editions and translations published throughout Europe outnumbered those of any other work by Montesquieu. A bibliographical analysis of this poem’s translations published in various languages and often forming translational series demonstrates how these (re)translations fitted into the broader literary dynamics of the 18th and early 19th centuries. Back then, both original texts and their translations were seen as a “shared property” of the translators, publishers, and writers who made various “improvements” to cater for aesthetic tastes and ensure financial gains. This was also true of the two 18th-century Polish translations of the poem. Comparing them with the source text sheds some light on their publishers and the textual basis.

7

Rewolucja w haremie Usbeka, czyli Monteskiuszowska koncepcja wolności w „Listach perskich”

63%

Porada A.

Historyka Studia Metodologiczne

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2019

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vol. 49

8

Montesquieu’s Attempt to Establish History as Science

63%

Wewiór P.

Kultura i Edukacja

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2013

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issue 6(99)

54-65

EN

The essay deals with Montesquieu’s methodology of history. My crucial assumption is that Montesquieu intends to cultivate history as science. In the 18th century this ambition meant that he wanted to use the analytical method in the field of history. His works include many examples of the successful exploitation of analysis. Since the philosopher does not consider his methods, my aim will be to extract from his works the ideas that stand behind his historical investigations. In other words, I am going to answer how history can be practiced as science (in the Enlightenment sense of this term). First of all, I am going to explain why analysis was – and still is – so efficient in a realm of natural phenomena. My point will be that it indicated to early modern scientist how they should conduct their experiments. On the other hand, experiments give advantage to scientists due to the fact that they are able to construct and control their object. To put it differently: analysis and experiments are efficient because truth and action are convertible. Now, my crucial question is: ‘Are historians capable of gaining advantage over their objects as physicists are?’ Giambattista Vico, for example, agrees. According to him, researchers can comprehend historical events because history is man-made. Some parts of Montesquieu’s works indicate that he shares Vico’s assumptions. Hence, historians are able to scrutinize past factors, and they can perform thought experiments. Such experiments are means for validating and abolishing hypotheses by using counterfactuals.

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Czy wolność człowieka jest absolutna? Punkt widzenia liberalizmu klasycznego

62%

Jasiński K.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

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2011

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vol. 23

53-64

EN

The paper concerns the idea of freedom and her limits in the thought of the some representatives of classical liberalism. The paper has three parts: 1) freedom as a feature of the personality and her different forms (personal and social, positive and negative); 2) ideas if the English philosophers (T. Hobbes, J. Locke, D. Hume, J.S. Milli); 3) ideas of the French philosophers (Ch. Montesquieu, J.J. Rousseau, A. De Tocqueville). According to this thinkers human freedom is not a absolute value but has many limits (social contract, law, customs, religion and ethics).

10

Zasada podziału i równowagi władz w polskim prawic konstytucyjnym w ujęciu historycznym i w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r.

51%

Wiśniewski P.

Roczniki Wydziału Nauk Prawnych i Ekonomicznych KUL

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2009

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vol. 5

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issue 1 Prawo

181-203

EN

In the 18th century, the doctrine of separation of powers was established as a remedy for tyranny . It is Montesquieu who is commonly regarded as the founder of the classic doctrine of separation and balance of powers. Later, attempts to create more of less original models were also made. It should be noticed that the reception of the principle of separation and balance of powers in Poland was very fast, relative to its formulation. This happened together with the establishment of the Third of May Constitution. Unfortunately, that Constitution was quickly abolished and Poland disappeared from the map of Europe for 123 years. The revived state – the Second Republic of Poland – had two constitutions let alone provisional acts of constitutional rank. The first, March Constitution directly referred to the principle of separation of powers. The other, April Constitution was a contradiction of the former. The political system of the Second Republic of Poland in the years 1935-1939 was called authoritarian. The April Constitution directly speaks of a uniform authority of the state. PRL principally had one constitution (1952) – but we have to remember about its amendments of 1976. The political system of PRL was without any doubt a totalitarian one. The Third Republic of Poland returned to the system based on the separation of powers even before its own constitution was passed (1997). Hence, despite attempts to tear the Polish State off the principle of separation of powers, its perception in the society and attachment to it were so strong and permanent that Poland, especially in the periods when it regained full sovereignty, quickly returned to building its political system basing on this very principle. The constitution of 1997 states explicitly that the Polish state system is based on the division and balance of powers: legislative (exercised by the Sejm and Senate), executive (exercised by the President and the Council of Ministers) and judiciary (exercised by the courts and tribunals) (Article 10 Section 1 and 2.) The Constitutional Tribunal, in its ruling of 1994, stated that the separation of powers cannot be regarded as a separation in the case of the relationship between the legislative and executive powers. This is different for the relationship between the judiciary and other authorities (legislative and executive). Here the separation is obligatory . The concept of the essence of individual powers assumes that there exists a sort of competence core of legislative, executive and judiciary powers. The core cannot be entered by the other powers, because it would mean violating the principle of separation of powers. It is true that acts may transfer specific powers between the powers, but the intrusion into the field belonging to another power cannot be too deep, because such a legal normalization would violate the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. The principle of separation and balance of powers involves a system of checks and balances or a system of mutual restraint and balancing of powers. L. Garlicki writes that there are two basic models of the relationship between the legislative and the executive: the parliamentary one (parliamentary-cabinet) and the presidential one. The Constitution of Poland of 1997 preserved the parliamentary system of government in Poland. Art 10 Section 1 of the Constitution of Poland of 1997 provides for the mutual balance of relations between the legislative and executive powers, subsequent provisions of the constitution give a far stronger position to the parliament, and within it - to the Sejm. This corresponds to the Polish tradition. L. Garlicki talks of the specificity of the current Polish model.

11

The “Demarcation Problem” in Science: What Has Enlightenment Got To Do With It? Part I

51%

Cook A.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2022

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issue 1

165-188

EN

Steven Pinker’s recent Enlightenment Now (2018) aside, Enlightenment values have been in for a rough ride of late. Following Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s critique of Enlightenment as the source of fascism, recent studies, amplified by Black Lives Matter, have laid bare the ugly economic underbelly of Enlightenment. The prosperity that enabled intellectuals to scrutinize speculative truths in eighteenth-century Paris salons relied on the slave trade and surplus value extracted from slave labor on sugar plantations and in other areas Europeans controlled. Indeed, deprived of its ugly economic underbelly, Enlightenment was barely conceivable; furthermore, its reliance on surplus value extraction from oppressed labor was accompanied by a racism that, with the exception of the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and a few other thinkers, was arguably inherent to Enlightenment. However, I am not proposing yet another revelation of Enlightenment’s complicity in exploitation of, or disregard for, the Other. Rather, I want to highlight the damage being done today by an insidious strategy of labelling as “pseudo-science” entire domains of non-Western knowledge such as Chinese medicine and Ayurveda, thereby rendering them no-go zones for serious minds. Even though the term pseudo-science had yet to be coined, the beginnings of this tendency are already evident in Enlightenment-era works such as Jean-Baptiste Du Halde’s Description … de la Chine (1735). The perpetuation of this dismissive treatment of non-Western natural knowledge creates a significant obstacle to superseding a “scientific revolution” whose confines have long been burst: it is increasingly recognized that traditional/indigenous knowledge affords a vast reservoir of materials, skills and insights of which the world has desperate need, no more urgently than in response to the covid-19 pandemic.

12

Amerykańska myśl polityczno-prawna od okresu kolonialnego do czasów rewolucji amerykańskiej

38%

Zygmunt R.

Language. Culture. Politics. International Journal

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2017

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vol. 1/2017

227-243

PL

Rozwój amerykańskiego federalizmu towarzyszący powstawaniu Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki jawi się jako fascynujący proces, choć niezbyt często podejmowany na gruncie europejskiej myśli polityczno-prawnej. Idee kolonistów amerykańskich, koncepcje okresu rewolucyjnego czy poglądy Ojców Założycieli, wszystko to składa się na trwający nie dłużej niż stulecie okres gwałtownego i niezwykle owocnego rozwoju demokracji amerykańskiej. Celem pracy jest przedstawienie unikalnych procesów państwotwórczych zachodzących na kontynencie amerykańskim w XVII wieku, a także zwrócenie uwagi na oryginalność rozwiązań demokracji amerykańskiej oraz wskazanie, na ile the Founding Fathers czerpali z dziedzictwa europejskiej myśli kontynentalnej i anglosaskiej.

EN

The development of American federalism accompanying the emergence of the United States of America appears as a fascinating process, but is not often discussed in the field of European political-legal thought. The ideas of the American colonists, the concepts of the Revolutionary Period, and the views of the Founding Fathers, all constitute a period of no more than a century of violent and extremely successful development of the American democracy. The purpose of this paper is to present the uniqueness of political processes taking place on the American continent in the 17th century. The intention of this work is to draw attention both to the originality of American democracy solutions and to reflect on how much the Founding Fathers derive from the heritage of European continental and British thought.

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