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Naturalistyczna opozycja wobec kartezjanizmu

100%
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 2(17)
15-25
EN
My aim is to point out the foundations of Descartes’s programmatic antinaturalism, but also the margin left by Descartes in his program for a dialogue with the followers of naturalism. The latter used it more than once, but this opening for a dialogue was interpreted by them as Descartes’s support for naturalism. In my opinion it is not only a false interpretation of the philosopher’s intention, but also a false presentation of his views on human nature and the world that surrounds us.
EN
Daniel C. Dennett approaches philosophy of mind in a manner typical for reverse engineering. He studies the construction and behaviour of a mechanism in order to discover what are the functions of various units in the system. He applies this method to explain some biological facts and then to interpret specifically mental operations. The author tries to establish why Dennett uses this approach and proposes that his main reason may have been to sustain a naturalistic conception of mind.
EN
Kotarbinski's theoretical philosophy is close to naturalism. Hence, we have a question of how his independent ethics is related to axiological naturalism. This paper proposes a naturalistic justification of the ethics of the reliable guardian. In particular, the postulates of independent ethics can be interpreted as concerned with the question of how moral equilibrium (in the statistical sense) is to be achieved.
EN
The text is a presentation of main issues which were taken into consideration during the First Conference of John Dewey Center at Jagiellonian University in Kraków. The assembly took place in November 2007 and gathered the most important Polish academics specialized in American pragmatism. Larry Hickman, the President of John Dewey Center in Carbondale, USA, and an ambassador of pragmatism in the world, was the guest of honour and greatly contributed to the conference. The discussed issues covered four topics: Dewey's social philosophy, naturalism, aesthetics and the concept of experience, and the ancient roots of pragmatism.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 9
674 – 687
EN
The main aim of the study is to analyse key features of Dennett’s naturalistic conception of conscious experience. The paper proceeds from the assumption that Dennett’s primary intention is the naturalization of consciousness through the so-called “Hard Question”: And then what happens? The structure of the text consists of two main levels of Dennett's naturalistic program: a) negative level – rejection of the Cartesian model of consciousness, b) positive level – formulation of the multiple drafts model. I assume that examining these levels will justify the importance of the Hard Question, thus contributing to a better understanding of Dennett's naturalization of conscious experience.
EN
The author argues that Plantinga's Proper Function and Evolutionary arguments fail against liberal naturalism defined in a broad sense as the view that 'here aren't any supernatural beings'. The former argument can be interpreted in at least three ways: deductively, inductively and theistically. None of these, however, is successful. The latter argument suffers from several deficiencies of which two major ones are: (1) The unlikelihood of the reliability of our cognitive faculties, given (liberal) naturalism and (varieties of) evolutionism, is not shown. (2) Agnosticism with respect to the likelihood of our cognitive reliability is insufficient to establish the self-defeating character of naturalistic evolutionism, unless it is also shown that the belief in this reliability lacks an independent warrant. The last condition has been neglected by Plantinga.
EN
This paper starts from the familiar premise that psychological anti-individualism is incompatible with materialism. It attempts to state more clearly what this incompatibility consists in, and - rather than arguing in detail for any particular resolution - to inquire whether this incompatibility admits any resolution. However, the paper does offer a conditional argument concerning the possibility that the incompatibility is genuine and cannot be resolved. Provided that anti-individualism and materialism cannot be squared, and anti-individualism is correct, it follows that materialism has to be abandoned. If so, the situation is not as disastrous as it might at first seem. We need not, in consequence of our inability to construe a coherent metaphysics of mind, give up on intentional vocabulary any more than we must stop, in consequence of our inability to make sense of induction, anticipating the future.
EN
In the analytic tradition, the appeal to intuition has been a common philosophical practice that supposedly provides us with epistemic standards. The authoress argues that the high epistemological standards of traditional analytic philosophy cannot be pursued by this method. Perhaps within a naturalistic, reliable frame intuitions can be evoked more coherently. Philosophers can use intuition as scientists do, in hypothesis- construction or data- collection. This is an ironic conclusion: Traditional analytic epistemologists rely on the appeal to intuition, but cannot justify it. Naturalists, on the other hand, are not those who need such a method; yet they can better accommodate it within their view.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 6
522-537
EN
Mathematics is often interpreted as an a priori discipline whose propositions are analytic. The aim of the paper is to support a philosophical position which would view mathematics as a discipline studying its own segment of objective reality and thus contributing to our knowledge of the real world. The author tries to articulate in more details such a position which has been proposed recently by Penelope Maddy.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2009
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vol. 64
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issue 2
114-122
EN
After a brief analysis of the specifics of teleological explanations as opposed to causal explanations, the paper seeks to establish the irreducibility of the former to the latter by arguing that teleological explanations are inextricably tied to our notion of intentionality. Since this result undermines the very possibility of 'a physicalist reduction' of the explanation of teleological phenomena, especially of human behaviour, the rest of the paper develops an argument against the perceived need of any such reduction. According to the conclusion of the paper, a more promising program is the development of a 'modern, scientific Aristotelianism', one that can provide a consistent conceptual framework that accommodates both types of explanation.
EN
The paper concerns the possibility of naturalistic ethics. It seems that ethics properly understood must be described as a discipline necessarily focused on evaluation of human action, analyzed in the light of its moral value. Such evaluation, in turn, presupposes an agent who is responsible for his or her actions. So understood agent seems impossible without agent's being capable of self-determination in action. According to the naturalistic thesis, however, such freedom is impossible; all human action is causally determined, with no place for 'sui generis' causation, and such a thesis must be interpreted as excluding the possibility of responsibility for one's action. If so, then the concept of naturalistic ethics seems contradictory. Nonetheless, some authors (ex. Frankfurt and Dennett) try to show that the concept of moral responsibility (so crucial to ethics) does not necessarily entail freedom understood as 'sui generis' causation, and therefore it is compatible with determinism. In this paper I analyze their argumentation with the purpose to assess its conclusiveness. The conclusion I reach is that responsibility postulated by Frankfurt or Dennett is to be understood as merely epiphenomenal, as such it must be treated more like an illusion than a real property of human beings. Therefore, the thesis that naturalistic ethics is a contradictory concept seems to maintain its soundness.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 5
410 - 424
EN
The article is designed to defend the thesis that conceptual analysis is the main method of analytic philosophy. Philosophical analysis pursued in analytic philosophy can be identified with conceptual analysis while concepts can be supposed to be the primary subject-matter of philosophical theories. The thesis can be justified by claiming that philosophical statements are either explicitly or implicitly modal. The truth of modal statements cannot be justified by methods used in (empirical) sciences; some other methods, namely conceptual analysis and related methods should be invoked. The thesis is illustrated by an example taken from the philosophy of language; it is also defended against the argument stemming from philosophical naturalism.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 9
665 – 679
EN
Naturalism as a general philosophical strategy became a popular topic of philosophical debates during the last half of century, however, its roots go deeper into the history of philosophical thought. One of the authors in whose works some elements of philosophical naturalism are undoubtedly identifiable is David Hume. The aim of the paper is to shed light on some naturalistic tendencies in Humeʼs philosophy, which, as I will argue, can be considered as inspiring even today. Such is his approach to his “new science of man”, within which his inclination towards methodological naturalism can be found. Naturalistic tendencies can be identified in Humeʼs views regarding knowledge and understanding, especially with regard to the problem of scepticism. The study outlines also a possible naturalistic interpretation of Humeʼs moral philosophy.
EN
A role of naturalism in the contemporary science is still an important issue, which is commonly discussed in the field of philosophy of science. The author is presenting the factors that are related to the origin of Darwinian theory of evolution, and are crucial for appropriate understanding the matter. Darwin used to be an advocate of William Paley's version concerning the purposefulness. At last, however, the essential part of Darwin's evolutionary concept turned out to be a negation of all previous explanations referring to God's special intervention, or guidance in the process of evolution. Elimination of such explanations is fundamental and much distinctive for modern science as methodological naturalism. A common acceptance of the discussed methodological postulate is firmly connected with the achievements of Darwin's theory. In the present paper the author is willing to show that both scientific and problematic factors were crucial for the fundamental scientific assumption.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 9
661 – 673
EN
Classical pragmatists (Peirce, James, Dewey) have already circumscribed their conceptions overcoming reductionism of naturalism in the forms of physicalism and scientism. Thereby they laid down grounds of pragmatist non-reductive naturalism. In connection to this as well as to conceptions of post analytic naturalists such as Quine and Davidson, but in particular the normative turn of W. Sellars, contemporary neopragmatism develops its varieties of non-reductive naturalism: liberal naturalism (John McDowell), normative naturalism (Robert Brandom), metaphilosophical naturalism (Richard Rorty) and object/subject naturalism (Huw Price). The paper provides an analysis of these topical conceptions which are inspirational for resolution of relations between causation and normativity, nature and culture and relations between nonhuman and human realities, respectively.
EN
The author presents in this paper (and in few others) the philosophy of Stanislaw Lem as Neo-Lucretianism and calls Lem as a Lucretius of the 20th century. The article demonstrates pararell strains in their views on death. Lem - the atheist in common parlance - on Christian point of view is the man of 'strange faith'. There is an eschatology in his outlook, though warldly (finitistic?) one, which has clearly Lucretian nature. In opinion of both there are two attributes of the Cosmos: extermination (Lucretius says 'mors inmortalis', Lem - holocaust) and creation. Mortal human finds comfort in an idea that 'other worlds' come into being in dead Cosmos eternally and 'different minds' are born in them. Eschatological hope lies in thought that antonymous values will be always realized because each kind of mind realizes some part of the class of them. Lem's naturalism breaks in this point.
17
Content available remote

GEORG BRANDES AND THE MODERN PROJECT

88%
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2011
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vol. 10
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issue 1
75-86
EN
Georg Brandes' lecture series on The Main Tendencies in 19th Century Literature was initiated in 1871 and consists of a number of innovative interpretations of European literature. Brandes' interpretations exemplify his interest in the ideals of the Enlightenment: knowledge, liberation, progress and free thought. The lecture series traces a dialectical movement in European literature, described by Brandes as a dialectics between revolution and liberalism on one hand and conservatism and reactionary tendencies on the other. Brandes includes a dialectics between home, i.e. Danishness, and the 'foreign'; he opens up a dialogue between nationalism and internationalism with the intention of almost literally placing Europe in Denmark and vice versa. The future was going to be realized in the present. Georg Brandes tried to persuade the young writers of Scandinavia to adopt liberalism and naturalism in their novels and dramas, which some of them proceeded to do, convinced as they were that Brandes' ideas regarding a new 'debate', moral and political, in literature, were right. However, they failed to implement these ideas as we can see by a reading of, for example, Jens Peter Jacobsen's Niels Lyhne (1880); Henrik Ibsen's Rosmersholm (1886) and Henrik Pontoppidan's Lykke-Per (1898-1904). Emanicipating the mind and liberating oneself from the reactionary forces of society turned out to be too difficult for the women and men of what Brandes himself referred to as The Modern Breakthrough. Looking at Brandes today we may conclude that he was ahead of his own time as well as ahead of ours. His ideas regarding a new internationalism and liberalism are far from being realized.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 8
669 – 679
EN
The article deals with cognitive strategies in social cognition considering its two radical patterns, i.e. naturalism and interpretivism. The author’s view is that it is necessary to differentiate between so called “interpretive philosophy” (G. Abel) and interpretivism as a methodological program in social sciences. A special attention is paid to those ways of naturalization of social knowledge applying the modernized evolutionary Darwinian perspective. Especially the so called “epidemiological approach” of D. Sperber who promotes ontological reductionism which does not need to be necessarily accompanied by the theoretical one is analysed.
EN
Ján Čajak´s novel The Rovesný Family (1909) was consciously composed as a work set in the present. It widely responded to the current problems of that time but in a way it also took account of the contemporary readers´ preferences and literary genre patterns. Within the framework of the contemporary genre range it employs three types of narrative with three different types of topics/motifs: 1. the ideological narrative (the situation of the national education system in the Hungarian Empire after adopting the school, so called Appony´s laws in the year 1906, in the inter-ethnic relationship Hungarians – Slovaks), 2. the national narrative (national movements: the renegades versus the nationally aware – as an internal problem of the national community) and 3. the strait narrative (love and personal, partnership problems). Each of the narratives has a different modality (radical criticism – schematism – sentimentalism) and a different extent of employing the reality, ideality and fiction (realism/documentarism – idealism – fictiousness/literariness). At the same time the narrations in question fall into three genre patterns: 1. the political novel (realistic depiction of the situation in the national education system full of disillusion having a tragic ending), 2. the initiation novel (containing obvious utopian features, initiation of a young person into the national struggle and inflaming him/her for the national issues in utopian ideal world), 3. the romance (sentimental) novel (accenting the partners´ different ethnicity and social inequality, alternatively similarity of their national beliefs and economic independence and equality of each of the partners). Differentiating between the individual layers discloses the discourse status in Čajak´s prose, demonstrating the stylistic disparity of the individual storylines. The author´s ideological solution lies in questioning the passive approach and celebrating the activity regardless of nationality and moral credit.
EN
When we consider which kind of theory we should apply to a given problem, one of the most important criteria is the effect of its application. In other words: we evaluate theories in terms of their abilities to solve problems. In this essay I would like to indicate which kinds of problems are crucial for social sciences and illustrate these problems by means of the structuralist criticism of functionalism. I argue that the Levi-Strauss' proclamations about his method have never been fulfilled and that the structural anthropology is not satisfactory.
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