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VIZUÁLNE UMENIE A OBRAT K NEUROVEDÁM

100%
ESPES
|
2015
|
vol. 4
|
issue 2
4 – 9
EN
The basic problem of the contemporary art theory is a new focus on an image. This emphasis of visuality brings amongst other radical paradigms interdisciplinary impact to the contemporary culture, too. Not only humanity, but also natural scientific disciplines are able to find common fields of his scientific interest. The result is a profiling of new scientific discipline – neuroaesthetics. Its leaders came up with a bold statement that located the beauty centre.
EN
In this article we ask the question of whether it is possible to connect phenomenology with neuroscience so as to develop the concept of the unified human being, which could be the subject of both objective information and lived experience. This question we answer with the help of the neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux and the phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur. Our finding is that while both authors express the need to bridge the gap between science and phenomenology, in fact they remain locked in their respective methodological frameworks. Although neuroscience says that it needs to exploit the findings of phenomenology in order to adequately grasp experience, instead it actually replaces experience with mental states. On the other hand although phenomenological hermeneutics would like to include objectivity in its operations, in fact it only simulates it by the process of the sedimentation of experience. This finding leads us to further reflections about the character of thinking and about reflection on the person. We are interested in the question of what gives rise to the thought that neuroscience and phenomenology should indeed be concerned with the same thing. What gives rise to the supposition that there should be two perspectival viewpoints on one and the same reality? We suppose, as the preceding study shows, thinking does not grasp reality but rather divides it in a certain way, always differently to another way of thinking. It is not, therefore, the case that we understand better and better what a person is, or that from a different perspective we may regard that same person, but rather that we mean by the concept of person various forms of selfoverlapping. It does not therefore make sense to attempt to create coherent closed systems for dealing with the identical human being, but rather that on the basis of one thinking to divide reality and begin to think differently.
EN
Is human freedom only an illusion and we are determined by all kinds of facts that exclude our freedom? According to some thinkers, the results of Benjamin Libet’s experiments seem to prove this. More effectively than any arguments of science, the existence of free human actions can be questioned by philosophical theses, above all by various doctrines of determinism. In an interdisciplinary dialogue, we will try to answer some postulates of the natural and human sciences with the arguments of Thomas Aquinas, according to which human will is ordered to the general good, which is what determines it. However, every particular good is limited and not good from some point of view. That is why our choice of a specific good is not determined. Reason frees our will from the necessity of always following some individual good, and keeps it open to the complete and universal good.
EN
This article analyses some of the most significant aspects of the exploratory adventure around the physiology of consciousness which the Polish writer Stanisław Lem provides in his science-fiction novels and essays. It is argued that the onto-epistemological and ethical problems associated with the complex mind-brain relationship, the sophisticated medical intervention devices that involve neuronal communication, and the challenges that humankind faces in view of the physical and intellectual evolutionary advance largely determine Lem’s perspective, which is shown to lie between fantastic inventiveness and plausible foresight.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 7
530 – 542
EN
This article is dedicated to the area at the interface of philosophy and neuroscience and it focuses on the critical examination of some of Bergsonʼs ideas. Neuroscience in its effort to strengthen the role of body in relation to mental processes and especially memory, cannot avoid discussing Bergson, namely his classic work Matter and Memory, in which he leaves the research of habitual memory to psychologists, while privileging the “pure memoryˮ that surpasses psychophysical and psychocerebral parallelism, since it does not need any material substrate or location in space. However, new research in neuroscience puts this thesis into doubt, even denying it. The author takes into account research both in neuro-science (especially A. Berthoz) and in phenomenology and refers to works in this field that prove that the individualization of events, the subject of “episodic memoryˮ, on the contrary, is a matter of space – and admits that Bergson was wrong, albeit not entirely, as confirmed by recent discoveries about the neural bases of memory. Moreover, neuroscience has so far read Bergson selectively, so the author intends to return to him and examine in particular the hippocampal function in the light of the cited work.
EN
The present paper deals with the phenomenon of lies and lying from the point of view of the theory of evolution and contemporary cognitive science. In order to investigate these relationships, the following steps are taken: firstly, differences between classical theories of lie are presented (including those created by Aristotele, Thomas Aquinas and Machiavelli) followed by their juxtaposition with the contemporary sciences. It is shown that not only human beings lie, deceive and manipulate. Secondly, the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis in primathology is analysed (Byrne, Whiten, de Waal). Moreover, the neuroscientific approach to the act of lie exposure is discussed (e.g. Brain fingerprinting), along with the issues of neuroethics. Finally, self-deception is presented in the context of the theory of evolution.
7
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Złożona jaźń: Perspektywy empiryczne i teoretyczne

63%
Avant
|
2011
|
vol. 2
|
issue 2
59-75
EN
I have throughout this paper emphasized the complexity of the self. This complexity necessitates interdisciplinary collaboration; collaboration across the divide between theoretical analysis and empirical investigation. To think that a single discipline, be it philosophy or neuroscience, should have a monopoly on the investigation of self is merely an expression of both arrogance and ignorance.
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